An inquiry into organizational learning. by Ratliff, William Thomas
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1981
An inquiry into organizational learning.
William Thomas Ratliff
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ratliff, William Thomas, "An inquiry into organizational learning." (1981). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 3715.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/3715

AN INQUIRY INTO ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
A Dissertation Presented
By
WILLIAM THOMAS RATLIFF, III
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
September 1981
School of Education
©
William Thomas Ratliff, III
A1 1 Rights Reserved
1981
i i
AN INQUIRY INTO ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
A Dissertation Presented
By
WILLIAM THOMAS RATLIFF, III
Approved as to style and content by:
Frederic E. Finch, Member
This dissertation is dedicated to . . .
Jack, who helped me stay
connected;
Don, who helped me stay
grounded; and,
Fred, who helped me stay
excited.
IV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
For introduction to the central ideas in this work, I am deeply
indebted to Fred Finch. Don Carew and Jack Wideman, each in his unique
way, have helped at every stage to bring the study to fruition. The
three of them together provided complementary kinds of support which
made the project infinitely easier, more educative, and ultimately,
enjoyable.
At a much earlier point and continuing to this day, my parents
have encouraged me to think for myself and to put my thoughts into ac-
tion. This process of independent inquiry, which began long ago and
which is only symbolized by this dissertation, has often taken me far
away from them. But my learning has in many ways brought me full cir-
cle, a different person and yet closer to my beginnings.
Since the project began, numerous other people have been helpful
to me, and often in ways I had no reason to expect. Early on. Pro-
fessors George Ordiorne, Joe Litterer, and Michael Greenbaum gave
important advice and criticism which led me to streamline the study both
theoretically and methodologically. In the long and frustrating search
for a site, Ken Wiley, Sam Johnson, Ken Blanchard, Tom Loper, my com-
mittee members, and many others made valuable contributions. In addi-
tion, their belief in the value of the project gave me renewed con-
fidence. Jack Greeley was also encouraging and gave me my first real
opportunity to introduce the project inside an organization.
Dick Whitehead and the other senior officers at Berkshire Life
Insurance Company deserve special thanks, for it was through their
V
openness and desire for new perspectives that the study described herein
actually became a reality. Throughout niy work, everyone at the company
was candid, supportive, interested, and good humored. I consider myself
fortunate indeed to have found such an amiable, as well as wel 1 -managed
,
organization in which to test my ideas. My learning from them extends
far beyond what is revealed in this dissertation in both its content and
its impact. Throughout the project. Bill Furey was extraordinarily
helpful in every respect. He made me feel welcome personally, was
always generous with time and information, and he coordinated the pro-
ject so that it ran smoothly and conveniently for all concerned.
Other people have assisted me in ways that extend far beyond the
parameters of the project itself, and without them, the process of
thinking, writing, worrying, and concluding would have been at least
more difficult and perhaps impossible. My friends Serena Lurie and Fred
Sweitzer have been constant sources of support and encouragement. Susan
Hill and Deborah Gladstein have contributed in such various and import-
ant ways that to attempt more than a heartfelt thanks here would be
pointl ess.
Finally, Jane Sibley and Marge Ranns have provided concrete,
detailed and consistently thoughtful assistance with the endless typing,
scheduling, and running around that the production of a dissertation
entails. Marge deserves special thanks for her patience with my
revisions and n\y rush for deadlines.
There are others, too numerous to mention here, who helped me com-
plete this ef fort--those who encouraged me, who participated in
pre-test
vi
interviews, and who gave assistance in other important aspects of the
study. Their willingness to give has not gone unnoticed or
unappreciated.
Will Ratliff
July 1, 1981
vi i
ABSTRACT
An Inquiry into Organizational Learning
September 1981
William Thomas Ratliff, III
M.Ed., Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Conceived as one part of the effort to determine the distinguish-
ing characteristics of long-term effective organizations, this disserta-
tion presents a model of organizational learning and reports on a case
study of a company designed to test the usefulness of the model. Organ-
izational learning is defined as the conscious and deliberate extension
of a consensual ly shared knowledge base by members of the dominant
coalition. The model is differentiated from other theories of organi-
zational learning in that it is not primarily concerned with individual
learning; political theories of decision making serve as the rationale
for focusing on the dominant coalition of the organization and on the
consensual ly accepted, publicly communicated, and integrated knowledge
base it develops. These ideas are also related to the current phenome-
nological ideas of organizational paradigms.
Using this model as a guiding framework, an exploratory case study
was conducted in a life insurance company. The report of this study
describes the specific behaviors and patterns that satisfied the
definitions of the organizational learning model. Berkshire Life
Insurance Company was found to have a very clear dominant coalition
vi i i
which has developed and consciously refined a consensually shared knowl-
edge base. There is some evidence to indicate that this pattern of
organizational learning did lead to superior economic performance, but
attempting to establish this causal link was beyond the parameters of
the study.
The important conclusion of the study is that the organizational
learning model, when combined with other, more operationally specific
theories, can yield very useful insights into organizational life. The
most promising result is that this model could potentially provide a
foundation for integration of presently disparate theories of organiza-
tional behavior. Other refinements of the model are also proposed which
would make it easier to conduct more rigorous, equally comprehensive
research in the future.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Context for the Study
The overarching goal of all organizational theory, all organ-
izational research, is ultimately to provide those who live in, work in,
and guide organi zations--all of us--with concepts and theories which can
be used to make organizations more effective. Of course, this over-
riding purpose is advanced in small steps directed toward more limited
goals, such as training more effective administrators or developing more
comprehensive and useful information systems. Each of these subordinate
fields of work is still immensely complex and interdependent with the
pursuit of useful knowledge in other areas, some specifically related to
organizations and others pertaining to either more general or more
specific areas, such as individual psychology, computer science, or
political science. Furthermore, just as the study of individual be-
havior has lacked the unifying scientific premises that Kuhn has termed
a "paradigm" (Ratliff, 1 979), so organizational theory and management
has been termed a "jungle" without universally accepted principles
(Koontz, 1980), such as the laws of thermodynamics in physics and
chemi stry.
Even so basic an idea as "effectiveness" has proven extremely dif-
ficult to define or use without resort to arbitrary limitations (Con-
nolly, Conlon, and Deutsch, 1980; Pennings, 1 972; Pennings and Goodman,
1
21977). Since effectiveness implies instrumental action which is goal
directed, questions inevitably arise over whose goals are being
achi eved- -members goals, or the goals of consumers, government regu-
lators, or suppliers. If the concern is with members' goals, which
members, individually or in groups, should be considered? Similarly,
effectiveness implies standards. What standards should be applied to an
organization--the economic model of profit maximization, levels of mem-
bers' satisfaction or consumer satisfaction, achievement of publicly
stated organizational goals? Assuming the standards, how can organiza-
tions with different histories, different environments, different mem-
berships be meaningfully compared?
•These are all troubling questions at a theoretical level. If one
does accept certain admittedly arbitrary—because theoretically arbi-
trary may still be eminently practical—assumptions, then knowledge and
theory may still advance in very useful ways. Such practical concerns
are primary here. The context for the purpose of this dissertation is
this quest for ideas that will enable organizations to function more
effectively. Given the ambiguity and lack of definitive, causal "proof"
that surrounds this core idea of effectiveness, the writer limited the
focus by making an assumption well supported in the literature on
organizations, namely that those organizations which are most effective
over the long term are those which adapt or learn well.
Much of the current literature cites the crucial importance of
organizational "fit" or "match" (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch,
31969) to the specific nature of its environment. At the same time,
writers in numerous fields are concerned with the accelerating rates of
environmental change (Toffler. 1970). Presumably, an organization may
"happen upon" a successful strategy or ride a single successful prod-
uct for some time, but to remain successful for long periods during
which resources must be deliberately allocated and choices concerning
"future domain" (Thompson, 1967) must be made, an organization must have
the capacity for successful adaptation to environmental shifts. This
process of long-term, deliberate and conscious decision-making in re-
lation to adaptation or "organizational learning" was the principal con-
cern of this study. To the extent that one could identify aspects of
organization life that are central to this process of organizational
learning and develop ways to test for and subsequently strengthen these
aspects, then a practical and a theoretical advance in the development
of our knowledge of organizations would be established.
This study began with the assumption that organizational effec-
tiveness will be enhanced by an organizational learning process and with
a model to describe organizational learning. The problem was that no
field research using this model had been conducted, and therefore
important questions concerning its utility remained unanswered. This is
a report of such a field study and of the answers it offers as to the
utility of the organizational learning model.
Certain definitions and limitations of focus are important to es-
tablish before proceeding. Obviously, much of the review of the
4conceptual and research literature is a more detailed description of the
origins and significance of these definitions. A brief presentation of
these "destination points," however, should lend a sense of direction
and reasonableness to what is of necessity a complicated journey. The
limitations tell where the study will not go and the assumptions
illustrate the starting point.
Definitions .
Dl. Organization: A group of individuals who act in patterned and co-
ordinated ways in order to achieve some collective purpose (Argyris
and Schon, 1978; Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Thompson, 1967).
This study was concerned with large and complex organiza-
tions which operate in a variety of domains and within the context
of a complicated set of interdependencies. A family or a one-to-
one therapeutic relationship may be considered an organization, but
are not sufficiently similar to organizations considered here to
assume research results would be meaningful in relation to them.
D2. Organizational knowledge: Knowledge about organizational action-
outcome relationships and the conditions, both within the organi-
zation and in the external environment, under which these relation-
ships hold; in order for this knowledge to be organizational
rather than simply individual, it must be accessible and communi-
cable to all members of the dominant coalition, integrated with
knowledge of the interdependence of various organizational actions,
and consensual ly held by members of the dominant coalition (Duncan
and Weiss, 1979).
5D3. Dominant coalition: "That group of interdependent individuals who
collectively have sufficient control of organizational resources to
commit them in certain directions and to withhold them from others"
(Thompson, 1967, p. 128).
04. Organizational learning: The conscious and deliberate development
of organizational knowledge, which may be a formal or informal
process, by the dominant coalition.
D5. Organizational adaptation: The adjustment to environmental change
through organizational action, which may be but is not necessarily
based on organization knowledge.
D6. Organizational paradigm: A set of beliefs, assumptions, expecta-
tions, and perceptual frames of reference which are instilled in
organization members through the process of socialization and which
may be either conscious or unconscious. Those elements of the
paradigm which are consciously held and shared by members of the
dominant coalition are a subset of organizational knowledge.
Limitations .
LI. Concerned only with knowledge which is consciously and deliber-
ately held and applied in the processes of problem-solving,
decision making, and planning within the dominant coalition.
L2. Concerned only with the development of knowledge, not with its im-
plementation. Knowledge pertaining to implementation is certainly
a vitally important subset of organizational knowledge, and the
6implementation step is one part of the learning cycle in that it
generates new information pertaining to errors or performance gaps.
The success, failure, or even the actuality of implementation is
not of concern here, however, only the development of knowledge.
L3. Although this project is certainly one small step in defining the
characteristics that distinguish effective organizations from inef-
fective ones and an assumed link between organizational learning
processes and effectiveness is an important aspect of the rationale
for the project, this project is not concerned with qualitative is-
sues or evaluation of organizational learning, only with identify-
ing the component processes of organizational learning. Before a
process can be assessed, it must be identified, understood, and de-
scribed.
Assumptions .
Al. A cognitive-phenomenological view of individual learning, which
includes goal -di rected behavior, accepts only limited rationality,
and weights perceptions and beliefs as opposed to realities
(Argyris and Schon, 1974; Epstein, 1973; Thompson, 1967).
A2. A systems view of organizations which stresses the interdependence
of all organizational subsystems, incorporates feedback loops and a
tendency to maintain homeostasis, but is not deterministic in that
there is limited discretion and choice available to organization
members within the range allowed by environmental constraints.
7The dominant coalition is that group within the organization which
exercises discretion in organizational action, as opposed to the
discretion available to any organization member for individual
action.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this stuciy was to assess the utility of a certain
theoretical model of organizational learning.
The core constructs have been well developed, at least up to a
certain point, by various authors in the field. Reviewing this
development will be the basis of Chapter II. The model described herein
had never previously been the basis of a field study, however, so that
the constructs and propositions which make up the model required testing
and refinement. A brief introduction to the model is needed before this
purpose can be elaborated upon.
There are two central and reciprocal elements in this conceptual
framework. The first is the "dominant coalition" in the organization
and the second is "organizational knowledge."
Much of the literature concerning organizational decision making
has focused on either predicting decisions assuming rationality or
presenting new, more rational ways to make decisions. This literature
has been roundly critiqued from various points of view (Pfeffer, 1 977)
and it is widely understood now that major decisions, those that affect
the life and functioning and direction of the whole organization, are
arrived at through a process more properly described as political than
8rational (Cyert and March, 1 963; Gabarro, 1 979; March and Olsen, 1 976;
Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Thompson, 1967). It is one
in which coalitions among the members of the highest echelons of the
organization, as well as powerful outsiders, play a central role.
This conception of organizational decision-making has been one
contributing theme to the conflict over use of organizational goals as
an element in considering organizational effectiveness: an organization
is not synonymous with any coalition, particularly over time, and yet
cannot be anthropomorphized as an entity separate from its constituent
coalitions. The "dominant coalition" as presented by Thompson (1967),
and as it is used in this paper, presents a solution to these questions
of multiple organizational goals and conflicting subgroup goals by
redefining goals in a uniquely organizational perspective. Gtoals can be
viewed as "intended future domains," and anyone can intend that the
organization move in certain directions, but only the dominant coalition
has "collectively . . . sufficient control of organizational resources
to commit them in certain directions and withhold them from others" (p.
128). Thompson and many others (March and Olsen, 1976; Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1974) have shown how this political process of resource allo-
cation can lead to "side payments" and other activities that have little
to do with long-term fulfillment of formal organizational purpose.
There has been much writing and some research on the various determining
factors and internal processes of a dominant coalition. It is generally
assumed that the dominant coalition is responsible for organizational
decision making and overall performance as well as the subtler role of
9establishing behavioral norms for an organization. Evidence of this is
found in the literature that refers to the necessity of "top management"
involvement in change processes (Allen and Pilnick, 1 973; Beckhard,
1969; Peters, 1980) as well as in most general management and strategic
planning literature. MacMillan (1978) is one of the few writers to both
note the centrality of political behavior in organizations and also an-
alyze systematically the appropriate responses of organizational leader-
ship to political phenomena. His primary concern, however, is with the
inclusion of political conceptualizations in the strategic formulations
of the firm in relation to its environment.
This leaves a troubling gap in the literature, and in our theories
of effective organizational leadership. Little has been published which
specifically addresses the underlying issue in this paper--namely
,
what
characterizes a dominant coalition which consistently leads an organi-
zation through effective adaptation. Stated more succinctly, how does a
coalition learn? Using the literature for guidelines, this study was an
attempt to identify the dominant coalition in a single organization and
describe its present learning processes; this was simply a first, but
necessary step in a series of research steps.
Use of "intended future domain" as a crucial element in the
shared thinking of the dominant coalition sets the stage as well for the
concept of "organizational knowledge." This concept has been most fully
developed previously by Duncan and Weiss (1979) who emphasize the cru-
cial distinction between individual and organizational learning. As the
10
dominant coalition goes about making the strategic decisions of resource
allocation and future direction, each individual member has knowledge of
the results a given organizational action will precipitate under certain
conditions. These consequences are both external and internal and are
affected by interdependencies with other organizational actions as well
as by environmental conditions. Organizational knowledge exists to the
extent that these individual assumptions and knowledge are consensual ly
shared by members of the dominant coalition, to the extent that individ-
ual knowledge is accessible to all members, and to the extent that it is
in a form that all members of the coalition can understand. Organiza-
tional knowledge exists in all organizations to some degree, if only be-
cause certain causal assumptions and knowledge bases are generally
shared throughout the culture.
Organizational learning, as previously defined, is the development
of organizational knowledge. Even a fleeting consideration of this view
of learning shows that it is dependent on two distinct aspects of func-
tioning within the dominant coalition. First, the quality and progress
of organizational knowledge is directly dependent on the quality of in-
formation on various aspects of organizational performance available to
any single member of the dominant coalition. There are numerous
examples of innovative organizations developing unique information sys-
tems to support their special approach to the development of organiza-
tional knowledge (Chandler, 1 962; Dowling, 1 978). Once this information
is available to any coalition member, the generation of
organizational
knowledge is then dependent on the willingness and abilr^ of
dominant
11
coalition members to share it in useful ways. Neither of these condi-
tions can be taken for granted; for example, Pfeffer (1977) has pointed
out that secrecy and privileged control of information is a very common
and effective means for the maintenance and enhancement of individual
power in organizations.
Various authors (Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Sheldon, 1980) have noted
the similarity between the requirements for organizational knowledge and
Kuhn's description of a scientific paradigm. "Paradigm" is a useful
term because it lends a sense of the uniqueness that comes to character-
ize highly developed organizational knowledge within a single organiza-
tion and to distinguish that sense of "speci al ness" from cause-effect
knowledge that is generally available. It introduces the important
effect of organizational socialization, the creation of a perspective
and a set of expectations that can be either destructive or facilitative
to the generation of organizational knowledge. Since organizational
learning is dependent on the norms of sharing information as well as the
procedures of gathering it, this added emphasis to the overall "para-
digm" is helpful. There is at least extensive anecdotal confirmation of
the link between a strong paradigm and organizational effectiveness
(Chandler, 1962; Dowling, 1978; McKinsey & Co., 1980). Thus, a paradigm
may be viewed as a certain type of extension, or perhaps an outgrowth,
of the development of organizational knowledge.
This brief statement is a summary of the central ideas in the the-
oretical basis of this study. This project was not an effort to gene-
rate new theoretical constructs. The overlapping fields of management.
12
administration, and organizational behavior are inundated with theories
(Koontz, 1980). The ideas summarized to this point represent a defini-
tion of the contributing elements in a process of organizational learn-
ing which appears to be both accurate in its representation of the real-
ity of organizational learning and also testable, observable, identi-
fiable in the terms proposed. Developed more fully in the next chap-
ter, it represents a synthesis of the ideas about organizational learn-
ing published to date. This model holds great promise as a conceptual
framework for integrating many different aspects of management and
organizational theory. For example, if the model provides a sound basis
for analyzing individual organizations, its component concepts might
enable decision-making theorists to develop better hypotheses about what
kinds of decision making processes are most likely to lead to implemen-
tation of decisions at different levels of the organization. At the
macro-theory level, it might lead to political typogies of organizations
which could be linked to predictions of effectiveness.
In order for such advances to be realized, numerous studies of
various types must be carried out. The first type of study--of which
the one described here is an exampl e--must be exploratory in nature. By
attempting to apply the general model to the rich, often overwhelming
specificity of particular organizations, the model can be at once as-
sessed and improved. Knowledge about specific member behaviors which
lead to the extension of organizational knowledge may be established,
for instance. After such general studies have refined the concepts and
demonstrated their overall usefulness, if that is the outcome, then
13
later studies can develop systematic methodologies for studying large
numbers of organizations in a comparative approach; and eventually cor-
relations between organizational learning and some objective measures of
effectiveness can be sought.
The purpose of this study then was to make a first exploratory ef-
fort at analyzing an organization in detail using the concepts of the
organizational learning model as the theoretical foundation. This
serves to evaluate the usefulness of the model and to aid in its
refinement. Its usefulness has been assessed both as tool for analysis
and as a heuristic model for describing organizational behavior in an
integrated way. A by-product of the study, described in more detail in
Chapter V, is its contribution to the systematic methodologies mentioned
above as a goal of future research.
Methodology
The basic methodology utilized was an exploratory field study
focusing on a single organization. As a first effort to determine the
value of the model and possibly to improve it, this approach was merited
for several reasons.
First, there are aspects of the model and its historical de-
velopment that lent themselves to an intensive case study approach. The
model is a relatively new one, never before used to guide a research
project. This means that both the constructs and the propositions of
the model, as well as the model's relation to more general theories.
14
are very much in the process of refinement. Operational definitions of
the component parts of the model are a particular priority. The model
is also a relatively abstract one, not dependent on any single set or
sequence of behaviors. Finally, it is a model of great promise in terms
of both its realism and its significance as a possible unifying model
for presently disparate theoretrical themes. Analysis of published
cases (See Appendix B) reaffirmed this promise.
Given these attributes of the model which served as the guide for
this project, there was a near perfect match between the strengths of
the methodology proposed and the anticipated research problems.
Kerlinger writes, "Field studies are strong in realism, significance,
strength of variables, theory orientation, and heuristic quality (1973,
pg. 406)." He goes on to point out that one of the principal uses of
field study approaches is to lay a groundwork or foundation for later
research which can be more rigorous in the testing of hypotheses. This
was particularly important to the purpose of this study where both model
and research techniques were being tested and refined more or less
simultaneously.
No methodology had previously been used to research this model.
In all of behavioral science, there is little assistance for matching
specific methodologies to specific research problems. Therefore, more
open ended and exploratory approaches were deemed most desirable.
Interviews especially offered the opportunity, within the structure of a
schedule calling for focus on broad areas, for subjects to make con-
nections which seemed most important to them. This expedited the search
15
for areas of consensual ly held, accessible, and valid knowledge and also
permitted more subtle aspects of the paradigm--such as similarity in
phrasings or emphasis--to emerge. Thus, these techniques were the most
promising ones to use in an effort to uncover specific processes which
would fit into the more abstract concepts of the organizational learning
model. Only after some period of time, at the point when the model of-
fers discreet hypotheses about operational and controllable variables,
can the methodology become more specific and concrete.
Faced with this inherent ambiguity in results, a researcher does
well to limit the complexity of a given project and simply be as open
and direct about the strengths and limitations of the project as pos-
sible. Such is the case here.
An exploratory field study with a single subject offered the op-
portunity to engage in a discovery process, one in which rich data and
researcher flexibility allowed for progressive strengthening of both the
methods and the guiding model. The development of each illuminated the
other.
There were at the same time obvious limitations to this research
design. These limitations are well established in the literature of
behavioral research. Kerlinger (1973) points out that the lack of dis-
creet hypotheses makes field research difficult to assess. Furthermore,
no variables can be controlled, even if they can be sufficiently well
identified, and therefore relations between variables are difficult to
establish beyond appeals to logical inference.
16
A more important limitation still is general i zabi 1 ity . Without
more than academic comparisons to other organizations, there is the risk
that the results of this study are simply a report on a single, idi-
osyncratic phenomenon rather than a first step toward insight into the
learning process in all complex organizations. Even supposing, as this
researcher believes, that the results are not simply reflective of an
isolated process, how far the findings can be usefully generalized is a
very difficult matter. At the very least, there is understandable
reason to doubt that the same processes would be found in the same form
in organizations with very different purposes, of different size, or of
very different formal structure. Clearly, similar projects will be
needed to demonstrate the usefulness of the model in varying sizes and
types of organizations functioning in varied environments. It is
important to keep in mind that the project herein was a first step and
an essential step if that process is to proceed. So, with all the pro-
blems and potential limitations of the project, it seemed clearly to of-
fer a significant contribution.
As has been stated, in this project there was an interplay between
the theoretical model and the research itself. This interchange helped
to uncover more specific situational elements in the single organization
than the model is designed to assess and also insured against signific-
ant gaps or blind spots in the research. Thus, there was an ex-
pectation that the model and the research method had to be "bendable to
accommodate the enormous complexity of the variables involved. This
17
flexibility of approach has been defended by Mintzberg, who calls for
"inductive, creative, intensive field research" (1977, p. 94) when the
functioning of managers and policy makers is the subject. He sees this
as a result of the unstructured and varying nature of management work as
well as of the current developmental state of theory in this area of
organizational behavior.
At the same time, there were also checks and balances or cross
referencing built into the methodology. Otherwise, lack of quantitative
or controlled data could have served to remove requirements for rigor in
the linkage between research results and the theoretical model. Little
help was to be found in quantitative models or formulas; almost none has
been effectively applied to complex organizational phenomena (Koontz,
1980) and even when there was such research, as in laboratory investiga-
tions of coalition behavior (Wahba, 1977), it was so divorced from
practical situations as to be only peripherally related. A methodology
was developed, however, that met the needs for rigor without absenting
the relevant. The overall technique here was to investigate important
phenomena using at least two independent sources of information to check
against each other. For example, relationships between the President
and other members of the dominant coalition were assessed through self-
reports and through reports of third parties. This approach of pursu-
ing different perspectives on the same event/object is a fundamental
verification technique (Bateson, 1 979) in daily living and problem-
solving as well as in science. When confronted with divergent phenomena
18
that have no "correct" or logical end-point and where replication in a
precise sense is impossible, this type of model verification presents
the only alternative to simple anecdotal reports. Writers primarily
focused on research methods have made the same appeal for cross-
verification (Campbell and Fiske, 1 959; Webb, 1966).
The goals of a methodology for diagnosing organizational learning
within this model were threefold. First, the dominant coalition had to
be identified. Second, the various elements of organizational knowl-
edge, both the specific action-outcome relations and more importantly,
the paradigmatic beliefs or philosophical guidelines, had to be clearly
established or verified. Third, the processes whereby this knowledge is
developed and altered by the dominant coalition had to be identified,
with attention to both the specific behaviors involved and also to the
contextual factors, internal norms, and "intelligence functions" that
shaped the organizational learning process. The organizational learning
constructs had to be operationalized into observable phenomena. The
methods applied permitted this activitity to proceed within the research
project itself because no prior research had developed these operational
definitions.
A review of the methods used in similar investigations shows con-
sistent overlap. Furthermore, their effectiveness has been verified at
least informally by both general use and by successful application in
many settings to various ends. The first and most obvious approach for
many researchers has been a combination of direct observation and
19
interviews (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Beckhard, 1969; Gabarro, 1 979;
March and Olsen, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Schon, 1978). Since
the number of people included in a dominant coalition is not great, even
in very large and complex organizations, this approach is both practical
and also productive because it can yield a great deal of information.
Although it presents many problems, such as censoring, bias, and pos-
sible misinformation, it has the added advantage of possibly revealing
other sources of information that can be used to substantiate or dis-
confirm the interview results, and which may well be peculiar to the
specific organization or type of organization.
One crucial aspect of the focus of this investigation to keep in
mind was its limitation to conscious and deliberate organizational
learning efforts by members of the dominant coalition. This focus, in
and of itself, made the study more amenable to research based on self
report and less susceptible to abusive attributions of internal
processes.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1974), investigating the impact of intrauni-
versity politics on budget resource allocation, set out first to find
out which departments were most powerful. They combined interviews with
departmental chairmen and historical studies of key faculty committee
memberships and found significant corroboration between the two
sources.
Many researchers primarily concerned with only a few top managers
have been even more reliant on interviews. Gabarro (1979) interviewed
three newly installed company presidents and their principal
20
subordinates at regular intervals over three years in his investigation
of the development of relationships within a top management team.
Mi ntzberg
,
who has attempted to offer detailed and concrete descrip-
tions of actual management roles, has simply spent days observing a
single manager.
As this review shows, there is a great deal of variation within a
general approach. Researchers have largely accepted the type of "induc-
tive, creative, intensive field study" research for which Mintzberg
calls and have shown considerable willingness to adapt reserach inter-
ventions to their own needs. Unfortunately, in the work of some re-
searchers the weakness of this flexible approach is quite apparent,
where grand prescriptions or generalizations are made on the basis of
quite limited information. One guard against the misuse of "soft" data
is obviously the investigation of numerous organizations using the same
essential model or approach. Notably, this approach has been used both
by Argyris and Schon (1978) and by March and Olsen (1973); in re-
searching a concept as complicated and mul tidetermined as organizational
learning, such comparative data is particularly useful. Although that
approach was not a possibility within the scope of this project, pre-
viously reported "cases" were analyzed with this model as "test cases."
A nunber of these analyses are reported in Appendix B.
Generally, researchers (Kerlinger, 1973; Pelto and Pelto, 1978)
and others concerned with data collection (Nadler, 1 977) have stressed
the same strengths of interviewing--adaptabi 1 ity , opportunity to build
21
rapport and to empathize, and the potential richness of the data. These
strengths matched precisely the needs of this study. At this ex-
ploratory level, interviewing provided the greatest hope of building the
kind of interchange between the theoretical model and the direct data
that is needed to develop the model. The often cited problems of
expense and of difficulty coding data were not sufficiently problematic
in this project to be of concern. The only major concern that is also
mentioned in the literature is that of interviewer bias affecting
results; this was potentially a problem, but one which simply had to be
addressed through self-awareness on the part of the researcher and
through the use of on-going criticism of the research project by people
not directly involved.
Several researchers have made additions or extensions to the
interview process a vital aspect of a larger methodology. Argyris and
Schon (1978) have developed a very specific, and innovative, tool. As a
follow-up to interviews these authors have asked organization members to
fill out a form which details both inquiring behaviors and unacted on
thoughts, feelings, or considerations. Accumulating a body of such re-
ports, then they construct a "map" or "information flow chart" which
shows graphically the blockages within each crucial learning loop. Some
reviewers have cited this addition to the methodology of organizational
intervention and research as one of the major contributions of the
authors' work (Coleman, 1978). Similarly, research on the effectiveness
of various OD approaches has shown that survey feedback has been one
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technique which seems to be effective fairly consistently (Porras and
Berg, 1978). Although organizational change is not the goal of the
methodology under consideration here, such research does indicate that
review of organizational learning "maps" or feedback of preliminary data
are methods of generating valuable and valid information.
These general techniques were designed to yield data in all three
areas of concern in the research, the who, what, and how of organi-
zational learning. Within just these approaches, there was also ample
opportunity for the cross verification mentioned earlier; certain
aspects of self-reports were compared to verbal assessments of the same
point by other members or checked by related observations. These ap-
proaches were the core of the methodology.
There are other, more limited methods that were added to yield
valuable insight as well, particularly as ways to confirm or disconfirm
information gained from "softer" sources. One such technique, and one
of the very most promising insofar as determining the membership of the
dominant coalition was concerned, was network analysis.
As Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrum describe it (1979), network analy-
sis can be adapted to yield information about many aspects of who com-
municates with whom, the content and importance of the exchange, and the
"clustering" or "density" of different groups or subgroups. They men-
tion self-reports as one source of this information, but generally would
provide a structure to the response by asking for specific data. Ex-
amples would be, "List the names of the ten persons you talk to most
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often in order to accomplish your job," or "List the persons whom you
view as most essential to you in the performance of your job." Observa-
tions could also be used, A variation of these questions was used in
the interviews.
A final approach, and one which was easily combined with ones men-
tioned already, was that of historical analysis. One central line of
investigation was into a revealing event in the history of the organiza-
tion; there are certainly similar techniques employed in all social sci-
ence, from psychohistory at the individual level, to the "critical
incident" approach to group analysis, to the rigorous art of writing
history itself.
In fact, historical analysis has several advantages. It may well
be less threatening to organization members than investigating the pres-
ent and because it can be "bounded" in time and space to some degree,
relationships between variables can be more carefully pursued. Although
speculating about qualitative links, opening up the "effectiveness" can
of worms, was not to the point of this project, historical incidents are
also more amenable to that type of assessment because "the returns are
in," at least presumably; objective performance data can be reviewed and
attempts at correlation can be made. Finally, within the phenomenologi-
cal frame of reference, the ways and feeling with which the past is de-
scribed by present organization members may yield valuable insight into
the present state of organizational learning, particularly at the emo-
tional or meaning attribution levels of a paradigm.
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Pettigrew (1973) addressed many of the same issues which are rele-
vant to the methodology of this project, and his research was suffi-
ciently similar to this effort to merit careful attention. He, too,
expressed concern about the excessive dependence of social science
research projects on a single method- -whether it be observation, inter-
views, or questionnaires. Again and again he stressed the need for com-
bining various approaches and, within approaches, the use of various
sources.
Thus, Pettigrew's comprehensive and multifaceted approach appears
to be at once a validation and a model for the methodology of this pro-
ject. In the process of studying a single decision in great depth, he
used direct observation over time, interviewing, content analysis of
documents, diary-keeping, questionnaries
,
and unobtrusive measures.
These methods were further enriched and cross validated through
use of multiple sources of documentary data and multiple observers.
These approaches may not be uniformly available in every organization
and, as Pettigrew points out, the methodology evolves to some degree
with the research, due to both increasing familiarity with the site and
increasing sophistication of perception on the part of the researcher.
Still, his methodology provided for both depth and breadth of data.
Finally, Pettigrew makes a strong proposal for historical investigation
he stresses the importance of being able to place the present in an
historical context and the fuller perspective available on historical
events.
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Pettigrew has been a particularly compelling model for the inves-
tigation proposed herein. His methodological scheme, though more
involved and requiring more time and resources than the project under
consideration, was in essential principles and goals very similar.
Jelinek's study of the planning processes at Texas Instruments
(1979) is an even more important parallel to this study. She was also
attempting to verify through a field study a model of organizational
learning. In this effort, she used interviews and document analysis to
trace the evolution of the Texas Instruments' planning system. While
her view of organizational learning is significantly different from the
one proposed herein, she settled upon roughly the same methodology as
was developed for this project. This is not accidental, insofar as her
model of organizational learning, and the concept of organizational
learning itself, were--and still are--in the process of formulation.
Given this stage of development in the theory base, field studies of an
exploratory nature are almost the only reasonable research approach.
Significance and Limitations
The significance and limitations of the study have been referred
to in passing throughout this chapter. They also provide a useful point
for summing up the most important themes.
The study is significant because it contributed a concrete and ac-
tive test of a very promising theoretical model. In theory, the model
provides an integrative framework into which many of the disparate ideas
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in organizational theory can be meaningfully placed. This study pro-
vides a preliminary, and very substantive, test of the value of the mod-
el as a guide in the detailed analysis of a single organization. Thus,
not only does the study represent a successful case analysis of a single
organization's learning processes but it also demonstrates the useful-
ness of the organizational learning model as a guiding framework for the
analysis of organizations in general. At the very least, it points what
could be a very productive direction for future research. Too little is
known now about the internal determinants of long-term organizational
effectiveness, and further use of this model--as encouraged by the
study—may greatly enhance our knowledge in this field. Within this
broad contribution, of course, this study illuminates particular com-
ponent concepts of the model, such as the relationship between indivi-
dual managerial styles and the organizational paradigm.
There are severe limitations to the study, however, many of them
inherent in field studies in general and case studies even more especi-
ally. llie first is general izabil ity. Berkshire Life Insurance Com-
pany is not a large organization by most standards, employing only about
three hundred and fifty people. Its product lines are fairly limited
and most of its operations are housed in a single location. Although a
business, as a mutual life insurance company--one in which the policy
owners are also technically the owners of the company--it is somewhat
insulated from particular environmental pressures which many businesses
face. Every organization is unique, and a case study can never be
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guaranteed to separate the unique from the general. In short, although
the organizational learning model was extraordinarily useful in guiding
an analysis of Berkshire Life, there can be no certainty as to its ap-
plicability to other organizations; and the more different an organiza-
tion is from Berkshire Life in terms of size, mission, or almost any
other criterion, the less it can be assumed--solely on the basis of this
study--that the organizational learning model would offer the same bene-
fits.
Similarly, field studies are prone to researcher bias and that is
certainly a danger in the present study. The nature of that bias is
such that the author-researcher cannot identify it beyond recognition of
the risk. In this project, the risk was perhaps unusually high, since
the researcher worked alone and was constantly placed in the position of
identifying with the company and its managers, the subjects of the re-
search .
Finally, there are limitations inherent in the study itself. This
study was not designed to establish a causal link between organizational
learning and effectiveness. It was not designed to establish the con-
nection between top manager perception and belief and that of lower
level subordinates. The study was designed only to establish the use-
fulness of looking at organizational learning, at the interaction of
political processes within an organization and the generation of
knowledge which serves as the basis for organizational action, and this
limited goal was accomplished. Its relevance to other past and future
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research conclusions can only be estimated, not clearly established as a
result of this study.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Section 1 - The Dominant Coalition
Often in the literature on organizational behavior and organiza-
tional performance, "the organization" or "senior management" or "top
decision-makers" are referred to in ways that imply an almost mechanis-
tic degree of rationality, as if once all external influences on the or-
ganization and all the internal technology are known, an observer could
predict organizational behavior. This style of writing recognizes the
reality of concerted organizational action and, since the stated purpose
of many organizations is in fact to rationally achieve organizational
goals, it is certainly understandable and useful. Furthermore, the
reduction of uncertainty--incl uding uncertainty associated with the
variability of human actors--is a driving force seemingly inherent in
the very nature of organizing (Thompson, 1967).
Tushman (1977), in concert with many others, has assailed this
tendency to "treat the organization as a black box." Rational models of
decision-making, as well as the deterministic theme in the organization-
al design literature, have been critiqued from many perspectives. Lim-
ited individual information processing ability (March and Simon, 1958),
the prevalence of ambiguity regarding cause-effect knowledge on which
decisions are based (March and Olsen, 1973), and the variance of indi-
vidual and subunit goals (Pfeffer, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974;
Tushman, 1977) have all been used as reasons to question any perspective
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which assumes predictability and unanimity in organizational action. Of
course, the greatest critique rests in empirical evidence, a recognition
of the fact that there may be no rationally comprehensible reason why
U. S. Steel chooses 1980 to begin instituting tighter cost controls and
higher standards of profitability for its plants rather than 1978 or
1970 (Salpukas, 1980).
This reality has been recognized in organizational literature in
two ways. First "choice" or "discretion" has been postulated in the
literature as an important element of roles at the higher levels of or-
ganizational hierarchies (Thompson, 1967). Mintzberg (1977) and others
who have directly studied managerial work have likewise stressed its
unstructured nature and the individual and idiosyncratic ways in which
information is gathered or decisions are made. The second and most con-
sistent response to the unpredictability of organizational behavior has
been descriptive studies of the ways in which decisions are actually
made. This approach has led to the recognition of and increasing empha-
sis on political phenomena in organizations, on the acquisition and use
of power to achieve person or subunit goals.
Cyert and March (1963) are generally credited with the introduc-
tion of political realism into organizational theory. Their work drew
attention to coalition phenomena but has been found severely wanting in
its lack of analysis of these phenomena (Pettigrew, 1973). Without add-
ing new research, Thompson (1967) did a great deal to systematize a
theory of coalitions and the environmental and technological factors
that would affect their composition and development.- Many researchers
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have continued to investigate decision processes with particular at-
tention to the role of coalitions. In a typical study, Pfeffer and
Salancik (1974) studied the relationship between departmental power and
resource allocation in a university budget process; they found that bud-
get increases reflected more closely the differential power of individ-
ual departments than it did any other criteria such as size, student
class enrollment, or national prestige.
Pettigrew (1973) performed a longitudinal study of effects that
specialization had on coalition formation in a single organization and
of the specific individual and group behaviors employed over time to ac-
quire and maintain the power to shape allocations, policies, and future
direction of the organization. His work verifies the usefulness of a
coalition perspective in analysis of behavior at every hierarchical
level within an organization and also emphasizes the importance of
unique circumstantial and historical factors in the evolution of
coalitions.
The combined result of this work has been a focus on and accept-
ance of the "dominant coalition" as that group in the organization, and
possibly including outsiders,- who at a given point in time "collectively
have sufficient control of organizational resources to commit them in
certain directions and to withhold them from others" (Thompson, 1967, p.
128). Although numerous authors contend that power-based phenomena in
organizations are insufficiently studied (Pettigrew, 1 973; Schein, 1 977;
Tushman, 1977), the general idea and definition of a dominant coalition
as the group which defines organizational goals and directs concerted
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organizational action soems to be generally accepted and frequently used
as a starting point for explanations of and investigations into organi-
zational behavior (Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Nolan and Finch, 1980; Finch,
in process).
A final verification of the centrality of the dominant coalition
in considering organizational learning comes from the literature on or-
ganizational development and planned change. It is an accepted "truism"
that the support and participation of top management are essential if
change efforts are to be successful (Allen and Pilnick, 1 973; Lake and
Callahan, 1971; Ivancevich, et al
. ,
1978). Some writers have even gone
so far as to include top management initiation as an element in the very
definition of "organization development" (Beckhard, 1969). Peters
(1978, 1980) has made detailed studies of the means by which top
managers do in fact alter patterns of organizational action.
The explanations given for the necessity of dominant coalition
sanction are hardly sophisticated in their approach to reasons behind
this important understanding. There is usually a reference to either
"power," since top management has the ability to compensate for and
institutionalize change processes, or "commitment," based on the assump-
tion that subordinates will not commit themselves to efforts which
"higher ups" do not feel are important enough to merit participation.
These ideas are not usually presented as part of a comprehensive system
or model that explains the crucial role of the dominant coalition. The
model proposed in this thesis offers such an explanation for this phe-
nomena which is widely observed but poorly conceptualized in the
litera-
ture.
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A detailed review of coalition theory is not to the point of this
paper, but certain important themes should be noted. One such theme
concerns the source of organizational power. Kruglanski and Raven
(1975) have theorized various power bases, but these can be considered
general rather than unique to organizations. Within organizations, man-
agement of significant uncertainty has been postulated as a primary
source of both individual and subunit power (Kotter, 1978b; Thompson,
1967; Tushman, 1977). This has been verified in part by a typology of
companies and the management specialties which tend to dominate top
management positions within each type. The dominant specializations in
turn shape the future direction of the company in self-reinforcing ways
(Miles, et al
. ,
1978). Thus, in a specific dominant coalition,
expertise in areas defined by organizational members as sources of
uncertainty may determine power balances or the degree to which
subsystems are over- or under-represented in the coalition.
Similarly, various degrees of interdependence and dependence
characterize the relations between subsystems of a system. Kotter
(1978b) and Pettigrew (1973) show how crucial an aspect of the power-
oriented behavior in organizations the management of these inter-
dependencies is.
Control of information has often been recognized as a source of
organizational power. Since accurate and current information is one
foundation of the organizational learning process, one way political be
haviors will shape organizational learning is through the control of
information. Pfeffer (1977) views secrecy as one of the principal
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techniques in the acquisition and maintenance of individual and subunit
power.
A final theme of the decision-making and coalition literature
which sheds light on the organizational learning process is the dis-
tinction drawn therein between routine and innovative decisions. The
latter involve considerations which are understood to be new and dif-
ferent from any decisions that are so common in the organization as to
be institutionalized and routine. Pettigrew (1973) views innovative de-
cision processes as a time of heightened political activity within the
organization, in large part due to the uncertainty involved. Involve-
ment in these different types of decisions may vary and hence shape the
constitution of the dominant coalition. This fact may explain a great
deal of the usefulness of institutionalized planning and evaluation pro-
cesses in that these processes make the process of considering newness
and the uncertain future a routine organizational process, subject to
greater control and direction by the dominant coalition. Jelinek (1979)
contends that only processes which have been administratively insti-
tutionalized can be considered truly organizational. Hence her focus in
a study of organizational learning is upon administrative systems
employed in a single organization to make innovation and learning
routine.
MacMillan (1978) has made one of the few systematic inquiries into
the nature of political activity in organizations. His concern is more
with interorgani zational political strategy than with the political
dynamics within organizations, but he does root his theory in an
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explanation for individual political behavior and the resultant formu-
lation of coalitions. He views coalitions as an inevitable element of
organizational life and describes policy formulation by the leaders of
the organization as a political process of balancing demands of vari-
ous internal and external coalitions. Interestingly, he veiws this
group at the top of the organizational hierarchy primarily as "fidu-
ciaries," as representatives of interest groups, rather than as a
potential coalition. This group generally is invested with legitimate
authority within the organization as well, which puts it in a unique
position politically vis a vis other interest groups. MacMillan never
discusses these leaders as a coalition, or coalitions, in their own
right and hence fails to bridge his discussion of political effective-
ness within the organization to any external organizational effective-
ness other than in the realm of political activity. Still, he offers
very illuminating ideas on intraorganiztional political activity, and
perhaps most usefully, begins by defining a number of terms: politi-
cal action, power, influence, political capability and authority. His
definitions bear repeating here because they can serve as a set of link-
ing concepts in the process of matching specific behaviors and percep-
tions to the more abstract concepts in the organizational learning
model
.
Political action takes place when an actor, recognizing that the
achievement of its goal is influenced by the behavior of other
actors in the situation, undertakes action against the others to en-
sure that its own goals are achieved (p. 8).
Power of an actor over an opponent in a situation is the capaci ty of
the actor to restructure the situation, so that the opponent acts as
the actor wishes.
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Power in a situation is regarded as the capacity of an actor in that
situation to , . , restructure the situation in such a way as to get
others to act as the actor desires
. .
.
power is situationally de-
termined.
Influence of an actor % . . is the capacity ... to restructure the
perceptions of the opponent so as to get the opponent to act as de-
sired [emphasis in original, p. 15].
Political capability is used to denote the sum of power and influ-
ence of an actor.
Authority is defined as legitimized political capability ; that is,
legitimized power and influence .... The actual authority of a
person in a situation is really his informal authority in the sit-
uation. This informal authority can be greater or smaller than the
formal authority conferred on the person by the organization
.... there are limits to authority, and these limits are broadly
set by the organization in a formal sense, yet they are speci fical ly
set by each individual in a situation in an informal sense ....
what may constitute a legitimate action by some may not be regarded
as legitimate by others .... [emphasis in orginal, pp. 16-17].
With these definitions as starting points, MacMillan structures a very
coherent model of political behavior, both intra- and interorganiza-
tional. Since the concern here is not primarily with political activity
but with the effect of such activity on organizational learning, his
thrust is tangential to the principal topic here. His definitions do
provide the basis for the analysis of political action and structures,
however, and he reemphasizes many of the points made in earlier litera-
ture concerning organizational power and influence bases. He reduces
these bases to very manageable and operational terms, which makes them
more useful for analysis as well. Power bases are possession of strate-
gic power resources, control of alternatives, influence, and authority.
Influence bases are, similarly, possession of strategic influencing
resources--such as audience or information, control of influencing
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alternatives, power, and authority. He also points out, as several
authors have previously, how specialization within the organization may
serve as the basis for competing interest groups, and offers some
insight into what constitutes effective political leadership. Thus, by
systematizing prior conceptualizations, MacMillan makes a major
contribution to the literature on political processes in organizations;
and though he is not primarily concerned with the phenomena surrounding
a dominant coalition--in fact, he never uses the term--he provides this
study with concepts which are very useful.
Insight into these political processes in organizations greatly
enriches the theoretical and practical guidelines of this study. There
are two critical contributions that this literature makes to the study
of organizational learning that must be reemphasized. First, the site
of organizational learning is clearly established; we know where and for
whom to look--the dominant coalition. The group which directs the con-
certed action of the organization must also be the group that learns if
organizational adaptation is to take place in a conscious and deliberate
way. A central premise of this model of organizational learning is that
organizational learning must be understood, and can only be understood,
as a function of the interactions in the dominant coalition. Important
information may exist outside the collective awareness of the dominant
coalition, but organizational learning cannot take place until this
information is shared and integrated into the knowledge base of the
coalition. Organizational learning may take place at a subsystem level
• and affect organizational behavior within that subsystem, but this
38
simply illustrates the model working at a lower hierarchical level, not
an aberration to the model.
Once the dominant coalition becomes the focal point of investiga-
tion, the task of describing organizational learning becomes signifi-
cantly simpler. First of all, we have narrowed the field of inquiry to
a single group of people. Although not much of the literature on groups
addresses anything like the complexity of factors affecting a coalition
at the pinnacle of a large organization, there are certainly valuable
contributions to be gained from the literature on groups. Some of the
literature specifically directed toward top management relationships
(Gabarro, 1979) has produced results quite similar to analysis of group
development in laboratory settings, with an emphasis on sequential
stages of introduction, testing, and finally trust and accommodation.
There is no reason not to believe that a dominant coalition is governed
by much the same behavior patterns as other groups. This is not an
appropriate place for an extensive review of group literature, but
group functioning within the dominant coalition obviously greatly
affects the development of organizational knowledge. Numerous authors
have already drawn this link between group functioning and the capacity
for system learning; Janis (1972) comes immediately to mind, with his
reconstruction of governmental crises resulting from the exclusion or
repression of divergent viewpoints.
The second vitally important contribution of the literature on
decision-making and political process in organizations to an overall
understanding of organizational learning is to place that organizational
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learning process in its socio-political context. To the extent that
organizational knowledge exists and is developed and refined, it is a
product of political processes and negotiations, of the use of power
within the organization. It cannot therefore be analyzed from a simple,
rational point of view. The organization may fail to learn in times of
apparent need or learn without apparent environmental stimulus. Indivi-
duals may learn and even publicly share their new knowledge with no
impact on systematic organizational action. Only with an appreciation
for the role of the dominant coalition and for the power relationships
and structures, formal and informal, which support it, can organiza-
tional learning be understood.
An increasingly popular concept in efforts to improve overall
organizational functioning is that of strategic planning (Hofer and
Schendel
,
1978; Andrews, 1980). This work is similar to the literature
on decision-making in that it is primarily prescriptive in nature and
assumes rationality in decision processes. Here again, a thorough
examination of this literature would be only tangential to the purpose
of this paper. Two points are crucial, however, and are consistently
reemphasized in writing on the subject of planning. First, top
management is clearly assumed in this literature to be responsible for
the long-term performance of the organization through the process of
developing and implementing strategies in a changing environment.
Secondly, the planning process itself is often discussed in much the
same terms as learning processes are in the organizational learning
literature. Planning is clearly one avenue, and perhaps the most common
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one, through which organizational knowledge is developed and extended by
the dominant coalition. What is characteristically and unfortunately
missing from most of the planning literature is a recognition of the
political, coalitional aspects of organizational decision making.
Without detailed review, voluminous bodies of literature in four
principal areas have been alluded to in this section: organizational
decision-making, group behavior, organization development and strategic
planning. A brief example may be helpful in illustrating how these
disparate approaches converge to verify this model of organizational
learning. Tushman (1977), in his overview of political processes that
affect organizational action, notes that "superordinate goals" have been
frequently proposed as one organizational influence which can limit
subunit conflict and promote concerted action. Allen and Pi 1 nick,
describing their efforts to combat "negative norms" in organizations
(1973), list several factors that are key in this change process. Top
management commitment, modeling behavior, and sanctioning behavior in
support of the new norms are the first factors listed. And in Dyer's
(1977) review of factors that promote group performance, "unifying
purpose" is a central focus. Andrews (1980) considers definition of
business purpose as the first priority of top management. Thus, in
different terms from different perspectives, writers in each area have
pointed to the crucial impact that the dominant coalition can have by
promoting a shared view of the organization and its purposes. The
nature of such a view is the subject of the next section.
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Section 2 - Organizational Knowledge
Given the importance of the dominant coalition in the process of
organizational learning, the next critical concept is "organizational
knowledge." By developing the idea of a dominant coa*lition, the
"learner" in organizational learning has become much more focused and
manageable. In the same way, we must clarify the "object" in the learn-
ing process. The definition of "organizational knowledge" has already
been provided. Much of this definition focuses not on the knowledge or
information itself, but on the social or interpersonal context in which
it is held. "Consensual," "communicable," "integrated," "accessible"--
these words describe not knowledge, not content, but the conditions un-
der which any knowledge can be considered "organizational knowledge."
As has already been stated, organizational knowledge exists to some de-
gree in all organizations, but a fuller understanding of its nature, and
of the informational aspect of it, is neccessary. More specifically,
since information and knowledge are the bases for organizational action
and decision-making, we must understand how and what kind of informa-
tion is involved.
A central assumption of this paper is a cognitive-phenomenological
view of human learning (see Al, Chapter I). An important aspect of this
view of individual learning is the emphasis it places on a "world view"
(Epstein, 1973) or "theory-of-action" (Argyris-Schon , 1 978); this con-
cept is of a hierarchically organized system of values, beliefs, and
assumptions. Experiences and sensory data are filtered through this
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system internally and analyzed and given meaning according to the "con-
structs" held by the learner. Hence, the behavior of an individual is a
function as much of this "theory of action" as of the stimulus situa-
tion. It is tempting when seeking to explain organizational learning to
focus on the accuracy or substance of information upon which decisions
are made, and in fact organizational errors are often the product of
poor information. Over the long-term, however, a dominant coalition can
develop an information system that reflects its unique needs and goals.
The historical examples of innovative companies suggest such a pattern
(Chandler, 1962; Dowling, 1979).
There is a tremendous literature as well specifically concerned
with management information systems, so-called MIS, and with the infor-
mation processing capability of various organizational structures
(Tushman and Nadler, 1978). Although the "intelligence function"
(Wilensky, 1967) is a vitally important aspect of the overall organiza-
tional configuration, it is not the concern here. Once again, the
presumption here is that a dominant coal ition capable of organizational
learning, as defined by the model, will develop increasingly effective
information systems, whether formal and structural or informal. Simi-
larly, the extensive literature on information processing within various
organizational structures is only tangential to the argument developed
here.
Theories which stress information content over the processes
whereby information is assimilated and applied miss the point. The
history of organizations--governmental , military, business, educational.
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etc. --is full of cases of "intelligence failure," where decision makers
ignored vitally important data, even falsified it, in order to maintain
a belief system. In discussing just this phenomenon, Wilensky (1967)
emphasizes repeatedly that the quality of information will always
reflect the quality of questions asked by top management. Automation
serves not to alter this principle, but simply to make errors apparent
faster and with greater reverberation through the system.
Clearly, the quality of questions asked is a product of the exper-
ience, education, and frame of reference of the manager. Wilensky tends
to emphasize these individual factors and other research corroborates
this assumption, indicating that "cosmopoli tans"--those with more educa-
tion and a wider range of experience--tend to be more innovative in or-
ganizations than "locals" (Pierce, 1 977). There is clearly no substi-
tute for technical expertise and analytic skills. There are also social
or organizational factors that have been shown to be important, such
factors as job satisfaction and involvement, performance discrepancies,
and, most importantly to this thesis, "values of strategic decision
makers" (Pierce, p. 33). This theme is repeated again and again in the
literature; the attitudes and values and priorities .of top management
are reflected in the information and innovative ideas that are generated
in the rest of the organization. Even in such an apparently scientific
endeavor as geological exploration, Peters (1980) found a close
correlation between corporate success in mineral exploration and the
amount of time spent discussing exploration in top management meetings.
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Wilensky says that the greatest impact an information specialist
can have is not in regard to content or quantity of information, but in
"the capacity to affect the general tone of policy discourse" (1967, p.
174). Thus, even though there is little we can say on the specific
nature of information involved, organizational learning requires a
certain attitude or value toward information within the dominant
coal ition.
There are many sources of blockage, just as there is the ever-
present danger of wrong or insufficient information. Beyond individual
characteristics of managers that promote information flow, innovation,
and the development of new knowledge, there are also characteristics
that become organizational or systemic and which come to frame the ef-
forts, initiatives, and expectations of organization members. Clearly,
in a model which defines learning as the development of consensual, ac-
cessible, communicable, and integrated understandings of action-outcome
relationships, the focus is first and foremost on these organization-
wide, or at least dominant coalition-wide, characteristics.
One team of theorists and OD practitioners that have clearly
grasped these issues from a different perspective is Allen and Pilnick
(1973). They stress the "normative systems" operating within any organ-
ization that shape individual expectations and experience far beyond any
single set of role defined behaviors, systems of ideas or beliefs having
to do with organizational and personal pride, performance standards,
customer and colleague relations, or innovation and change. In address-
ing the organizational factors that shape and maintain this system
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of belief and expectations. Allen and Pi 1 nick list among other factors:
top management commitment to norms; modeling behavior, especially by
leadership; management sanctioning behavior; evaluation and reward
systems; and, information, communication, and feedback systems. All of
these factors are a direct res-ult of dominant coalition policy, though
they will certainly evolve independent of dominant coalition attention.
Beckhard (1969), also concerned with purposeful change efforts in
organizations, cites many of the same attitudinal elements of organiza-
tional life under the anthropological term of "culture." He, like Allen
and Pilnick, sees the top management of an organization, the dominant
coalition in the terms of this paper, as responsible for the creation
and maintenance of a culture that promotes attainment of organizational
goal s
.
From yet another perspective, an unpublished McKinsey & Co. report
(1980) indicates that some of the characteristics that consistently ef-
fective and innovative corporations share are similarly based. These
similarities include a "guiding philosophy," a strong emphasis on cus-
tomer satisfaction and attention, and an internal system that stresses
accountability. The present concern of this paper is not so much on ef-
fectiveness, but quite simply on the existence of this organization
"ideology" that has previously been alluded to, and cited in organiza-
tional literature, as the "organizational paradigm." Just as every or-
ganization must have some degree of organizational knowledge in order to
function, every social organization also develops norms. Both are
interacting elements of individual and organizational theories of
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action." A crucial distinction, however, is that by definition organi-
zational knowledge is consciously and deliberately developed. A
paradigm may operate, and often does operate, out of the awareness of
organization members. To the extent, however, that a paradigm is con-
sciously recognized and ‘cultivated
,
to the extent that IBM is aware of
socializing and cultivating "IBM men," the paradigm is an arena for
organizational learning in the same sense that any organizational action
may be. And to that degree, the paradigm is a special and uniquely
important subset of organizational knowledge.
Pfeffer (1980) has stressed the maintenance of a paradigm as a key
management function. In an illuminating summary, he points to the two
major thrusts in the organi zai tonal literature; one approach emphasizes
the macroview of economic necessity and environmental determinism and
the other stresses cognitive, proactive activities and behavior on the
part of managers. Pfeffer notes that both are critical in analyzing
organizations and then focusses on the indications that creation and
maintenance of an effective paradigm are critical aspects of the beha-
vior of effective menagement; in this set of behaviors he stresses
"symbolic action" by management which legitimates economic necessities
and constructs an organizational identity which organizational partici-
pants can then use to guide their own behavior. Clearly, although these
behaviors are symbolic in nature, the contributions which Pfeffer indi-
cates they make to organizational effectiveness are profound.
This understanding of organizational knowledge is a much more
recent development in the literature on organizations than is the
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dominant coalition. Yet, in a view of organizational behavior that
incorporates the social and political processes, such a specialzied view
of knowledge is a necessity. In describing this view of organizational
knowledge, Duncan and Weiss stress this distinction between individual
knowledge and knowledge "required for systematic organizational action.
. . . The overall organizational knowledge base emerges out of this
process of exchange, evaluation, and integration of knowledge. Like any
organizational process, the only actors are individuals. But it is a
social process, one that is extraindividual. It is comprised of the
interaction of individuals and not their isolated behavior" (emphasis in
original) (1979, pp. 88-89).
Even though a paradign may operate out of awareness in many ways,
to the extent members of the dominant coalition are aware of sharing
certain values and beliefs, it is a vital part of organizational know-
ledge. "Around here we work at it until we are the very best in the
field," is obviously a much more important consensual, communicable, and
integrated action-outcome assumption than a more concrete one such as
"advertising for product X is most cost-effective during summer months,"
even though the latter is easier to verify. A crucial aspect of under-
standing organizational learning processes lies in grasping the way that
paradigmatic organizational knowledge, as exemplified by the first
quote, shapes the development of understandings such as the second
quote.
Thus, in seeking organizational learning, the focus is on social,
interactive processes that develop organizational knowledge that fits
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these relatively clear requirements. Unless these requirements are met,
investigation gets hopelessly bogged down in a focus on individuals.
Individuals develop knowledge or bring it into the organization through
individual learning, whether factual, causal, or paradigmatic; unless
%
this knowledge is shared with and accepted by other individuals, specif-
ically those in the dominant coalition, learning is not yet organiza-
tional learning. This is the primary difficulty with most models of •
organizational learning, which leads to the next section.
Section 3 - Organizational Learning
Each component of this organizational learning model thus has ex-
tensive support in various parts of the literature. Certain authors
have also specifically used the term "organizational learning" in their
own writing as a central construct. Three pairs of authors-- Argyris
and Schon (1978), March and Olsen (1976), and Duncan and Weiss (1979)--
deserve special attention since they have focused on the same core issue
as does this thesis. The Duncan and Weiss position is clearly the most
thorough and comprehensive view, although not nearly as detailed in its
development as that of the other two teams. First, this model will be
summarized and additions to and minor differences with it will be dis-
cussed. Then I will show how the other models are sufficiently
accounted for within this comprehensive theory. The definitions for
organizational knowledge and organizational learning already presented
are taken directly from Duncan and Weiss; hence, their influence is also
clear and necessary, if not so exclusive, in the views of organization.
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dominant coalition, and in the underlying theoretical assumptions
concerning individual learning. A final author, Jelinek (1979), has
addressed organizational learning from a somewhat different perspective
and also merits special attention.
Each of these theories is an attempt to specify some of the criti-
cal processes that have been neglected within what Tushman has called
the "black box" perspective of top management behavior (1978). An
organizational learning approach recognizes the fact that neither in-
ternal structure nor external environment has a predictably determinis-
tic effect on organizational action. It is utterly apparent that even
organizations that share essentially the same internal structure and
external envi ronment--two schools within the same urban conditions in
the same district for ex ampl e- -often function with marked differences in
success at meeting organizational goals. This readily observable
reality has made obvious the need for theoretical models that account
for the difference between organizations' abilities to adapt and respond
to environmental or internal elements. This is the universally accepted
rationale for a theory of organizational learning.
A major theoretical problem involved in building such a theory,
however, has been dealing with the fact that even though organizations
may have different degrees of success over time, regardless of the pre-
sence of any single member or group of members, only individual members
act or learn for the organization. It is precisely due to the different
solution to this central theoretical problem that distinguishes the Dun-
can and Weiss model from the other three, both theoretically and
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quantitatively. Whereas Duncan and Weiss begin their analysis by
placing learning, and all organization action, in the context of what is
known concerning political power in organizations and the central role
of the dominant coalition in determining organizational direction,
Argyris and Schon, and March and Olsen take individual learning as their
starting point and never effectively make the bridge to concerted,
systematic organizational processes, Jelinek limits her focus to the
development of systematic methods of "institutionalizing innovation" and
hence is primarily concerned with administrative systems.
Given the starting point, Duncan and Weiss have the core of a
truly organizational model--one that meets requirements for theortical
consistency both within larger, macro theories and internally, for
descriptive accuracy, and for predictive ability. Focusing on the
dominant coalition narrows and concretizes the study of organizational
learning; all individual learning need not be explained or addressed and
attention only to individual learning is insufficient,
. The second question Duncan and Weiss address, which leads to the
development of their understanding of organizational knowledge, regards
the nature of what must be learned by members of the dominant coalition.
Presuming that knowledge, cognition, is the basis of action, then the
knowledge base of the dominant coalition is "action-outcome relation-
ships" which also "specify the conditions under which a given action
will lead to a given outcome" (Duncan and Weiss, 1979, p, 82), This
includes knowledge of the external environment, the internal system, the
interdependence of subsystems, etc. As has been developed previously.
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this knowledge has a paradigmatic quality that the authors also des-
cribe; although these more abstract beliefs may be stated in less opera-
tional terms, as a sort of embracing "this is who we are," they are
%
still clearly understandable as action-outcome relationships.
That this knowledge exists within the organization is necessary
but not sufficient; referring back to the dominant coalition as the
group which directs organizational action, a socio-political phenomenon,
knowledge must be placed in this socio-political context. In order for
knowledge to be the basis of systematic, concerted organizational action
directed by the dominant coalition, this knowledge must be shared know-
ledge, it must be understandable to all who act on it, and it must be
integrated into a system of knowledge. These are social requirements,
not informational ones or conceptual ones. Having clarified these
social requirements that distinguish organizational knowledge from
individual knowledge, the rest of the model flows easily. Understanding
this crucial point, Duncan and Weiss emphasize it repeatedly:
Organizational learning is limited to public knowledge, but is so-
cially defined as valid, relevant, and available to other members of
the organization (p. 88).
This knowledge produced by individuals is organizational only when
it becomes exchanged and accepted by others. Thus, the exchange is
necessary, although not sufficient, for organizational learning. It
is this exchange that makes it possible for individuals to integrate
the fragments of specialized knowledge into an organizational knowl-
edge base. . . . This requires that [it] be subject to validation by
some criteria and that others identify it as relevant to their own
needs. This is necessary for organizational knowledge to be con-
sensual and integrated (p. 89).
Regardless of the method by which an individual finds a new action-
outcome relationship or modifies an existing relationship, this
change in knowledge must be made public, communicated to and be ac-
cepted or legitimated by others before it can be considered a
change
in organizational knowledge. This does not mean that the
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individual has not yet learned, or that this new knowledge cannot
be the basis for individual activities. It does mean that this
knowledge cannot be used for organizational activities beyond the
individual. In other words, at this point, no organizational
learning has occurred, (emphasis in original, p. §4).
With the -central ity of the dominant coalition and the social na-
ture of organizational knowledge established, the processes of organiza-
tional learning are easily inferred. Since these shared action-outcome
relationships are the basis of organizational action, they will be
changed and developed when expected or intended outcomes are not
achieved.
Duncan and Weiss emphasize the importance of these "performance
gaps" (pp. 91-92) in describing the actual circumstances that lead to
organizational learning. They also accept any other process whereby new
knowledge might change the consensual understanding of these relation-
ships. Examples they give are knowledge provided by outside consultants
or other organizations, such as universities, insights gained through
rethinking organizational problems, or results from altering communica-
tion channels within the organization so that individuals are exposed to
new information about organizational actions. While all these processes
begin with new knowledge acquisition by individuals, the learning must
always be accepted by other members of the dominant coalition and incor-
porated into their shared system of integrated concepts in order to be
considered organizational. New knowledge is only relevant and inte-
grated once it has been incorporated into the shared view of action-
outcome relationships.
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Duncan and Weiss also stress the important role of the organiza-
tional paradigm.
A view of organizational learning as systematic requires some mech-
anism to 'simplify' the complexity of the world about which organi-
zation members create new knowledge . . . such a mechanism would be
some form of framework comprised of concepts which group phenomena
into classes or categories and make abstract thinking possible.
There must exist within the organization some consensus about this
framework in order to make communication among organization members
possible (p. 90).
These are provided to organization members in their socialization
. .
.
paradigms are necessary for organizational learning. They
provide a basis for abstracting general action-outcome relationships
from specific events. They provide a way of determining the rele-
vance or importance of questions within the organizational learning
process. They provide a common language, which makes possible the
sharing of experience and insights among organization members (p.
91).
This is one of the few points in the development of the Duncan-Weiss
model that needs clarification for the purposes of this proposal. It is
not clear when they write about a paradigm whether they are discussing
more abstract, general, and philosophical tenets which are still subject
to conscious and deliberate scrutiny, as all organizational knowledge
must be, or whether they consider the paradigm a more unconscious, ideo-
logical frame of reference which provides a context for the development
of organizational knowledge. In considering methodological issues of
how to identify, indeed how to operationalize, organizational learning,
this distinction between conscious and contextual is not insignificant,
even though in observable practice the difference may not be readily
apparent.
When Duncan and Weiss describe the paradigm as, in effect, cri-
teria, "a way of determining the relevance or importance of questions
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within the organizational learning’ process," it seems they are speaking
of consciously shared understandings which, while abstracted from any
specific events, are still available to dominant coalition members
within the 'exchange that constitutes organizational learning. When the
authors allude to "a way of seeing or organizing the principles gov-
erning perception" or "frameworks . .
.
provided to organization members
in their socialization," it seems they are referring to more profound,
less conscious factors in the organizational learning process, to con-
textual factors. Kuhn's (1970) concept of paradigm would include both
the conscious and the unconscious, but within the limitations placed on
organizational knowledge, it could include only the former. Similarly,
other writers have used the concept "paradigm" in much the same way as
"culture" (Sheldon, 1980) is used when referring to organizations.
Pfeffer (1980) emphasizes what a vitally important aspect of management
the creation and maintenance of a paradigm is.
Inquiry into the organizational paradigm is a vitally important
aspect of, organizational learning, described as "double loop" and
"deutero-1 earni ng" by Argyris and Schon (1978). "Paradigm" and "organi-
zational knowledge" are not usefully considered synonymous, however, and
Duncan and Weiss do not make this distinction sufficiently clear.
Having constructod this model of the dominant coalition learning
via the evolutionary and incremental process of developing organiza-
tional knowledge, and having postulated the way in which they theorize
learning might take place, Duncan and Weiss conclude by considering the
factors that might limit the acceptance of new knowledge by the
dominant
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coalition, regardless of validity. Many such factors can be easily in-
ferred and have already been mentioned in Section 1. Besides the limi-
tations imposed by the necessity for consistency within the paradigm,
the authors mention political factors in the organizational and communi-
cation channels. As will be pointed out, the other models of organiza-
tional learning, for all their limitations, have more to offer on this
topic.
Argyris and Schon began their collaboration with development of
individual learning and behavior models within their "theory of action"
approach (1974). Although it relabels some of the terms, their model of
individual psychology is very similar to mainstream cognitive personal-
ity theory (Epstein, 1973; Kelly, 1955); their concepts essential ly mi r-
ror the underlying assumptions in this proposal concerning individual
action and learning. That perspective need not be developed here, but
it is crucial to the Argyr is-Schon approach which repeatedly stresses
that people act according to "images," "maps," and "theories of action."
The failure of the Argyris-Schon model is that they never develop a
model of organizational action, except to say it is taken by indivi-
duals. What is missing is a useful or meaningful address of the central
importance of power relationships, the fact that only a limited group of
individuals determine the direction and domain of the organization and
hence shape the meaning of organizational learning. To the extent that
Argyris and Schon directly discuss power, it is primarily as an obstruc-
tive factor in their chapter on "limited learning systems" (1978). In
another work, however, Argyris (1976) demonstrates at least implicit
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sophistication about the centrality of top management in organizational
learning.
When the Argyris-Schon model is combined with the Duncan-Weiss
model, however, it makes a significant contribution to a deeper under-
standing of organizational learning. As might be expected, this con-
tribution is especially valuable in describing just what the specific
individual and interpersonal behaviors might be in the organizational
learning process. They also offer a typology of organizational learning
which draws useful distinctions as far as the focus or content of organ-
izational inquiry.
The two models mesh so nicely because they both accept action-
outcome relationships as the organizational knowledge base. Argyris and
Schon call this system of propositions the "organizational theory-in-
use," thus, they share the assumptions of desired rationality and goal
orientation of the Duncan-Weiss team, and describe organizational learn-
ing as a process of "error correction":
Just as individuals are the agents of organizational action, so they
are the agents for organizational learning. Organizational learning
occurs when individuals, acting from their images and maps, detect a
match or mismatch of outcome to expectation which confirms or dis-
confirms organizational theory-in-use. IrPthe case of disconfirma-
tion, individuals move from error detection to error correction (em-
phasi s mine, p. 19).
This is almost identical to the idea of "performance gaps" preferred by
Duncan and Weiss. Argyris and Schon even distinguish between organiza-
tional and individual learning, writing:
. . . for organizational learning to occur, learning agents' discov-
eries, inventions, and evaluations must be embedded in organization
memory. They must be encoded in the individual images and the
shared maps of organizational theory-in-use from which individual
members will subsequently act (emphasis in original, p. 19).
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Unfortunately, these ideas of "organization memory" and "organization
theory-in-use" are never clarified as to the question of who holds and
develops them. This gap is filled by the dominant coalition.
The specific contributions of Argyris and Schon to the model
developed here are in two areas. First, through detailed cases and
elaboration of the "images" and "maps" ideas, they give a detailed view
of how organizational learning can be impeded and of the form productive
inquiry can take. Calling impediments to learning "conditions for
error" and "inadequacies in organizational theory of action" (p. 56),
Argyris and Schon describe specific incidents wherein "mistaken assump-
tions, incongruities between espoused theory and theory-in-use, and
incompatible norms" block communication. The product of successful
inquiry fits the Duncan-Weiss requirements of communicable, accessible,
consensual, integrated knowledge. Conditions for error may result in
either undetected error or in uncorrected error, but these cannot be
systematically addressed without inquiry into and correction of the
conditions themselves. The table below matches specific conditions to
specific "corrective responses" (p. 59):
TABLE 1: CONDITIONS FOR ERROR AND CORRECTIVE RESPONSES
Conditions for Error in
Organizational Theory of
Action
Corrective Responses, which may or
may not be permissible within the
behavioral world
acciimn^innill ^ V U ^w 1 1 vl ^ U 1 1
1^ w 1 w 1 1
Incongruity
X win|^u c 1 V 1 1 1 wi ri(jiiii.j
Vagueness
Ambiguity
Excess/Sparseness
un tcbudL; 1 1 1 ty
Scattered
Information withheld
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Argyris and Schon spend considerable time detailing dysfunctional behav-
iors and patterns, showing how these patterns can be mapped graphically,
and describing possible solutions or alternative patterns. The specifi-
city is helpful in generating possible avenues of investigation within
an organization.
A second contribution from this model lies in the distinctions
Argyris and Schon draw between different types or levels of learning:
-single loop learning:
members of the organization respond to changes in the internal and
external environments of the organization by detecting errors which
they then corect so as to maintain the central features of the or-
ganizational theory-in-use. These are learning episodes which func-
tion to preserve a certain kind of constancy . . . strategies and
assumptions are . . . modified so as to keep organizational perform-
ance within the range set by organizational norms. The norms them-
selves . . . remain unchanged (pp. 18-19).
-double loop learning:
... a double feedback loop which connects the detection of error
not only to strategies and assumptions for effective performance but
to the very norms that define effective performance . . . incompat-
ible requirements in organizational theory-in-use are characteris-
tically expressed through a conflict among members and groups within
the organization. . . . Double loop learning, if it occurs, will
consist of the process of inquiry by which these groups of managers
confront and resolve their conflict ... by setting new priorities
and weightings of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves
together with associated strategies and assumptions (pp. 22-24).
-deutero-learni ng:
. . .
members learn about organizational learning and encode their
results in images and maps (p. 29).
These three different types or levels of learning are not necessarily
discontinuous, but they are qualitatively different. Duncan and Weiss
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do not make these distinctions explicit, though in their consideration
of paradigms in organizations they are alluding to just these different
levels of the learning process. Each type of learning refers to
revision of shared understandings of action-outcome relationships, but
the spheres and time frames are likely to be different. Technical and
short-term questions probably dominate in the single-loop process,
whereas long-range planning demands a more normative perspective.
Although March and Olsen (1976) refer to "organizational learn-
ing," their work lacks any reference to a process distinct from or more
comprehensive than individual learning. Their focus is on the many fac-
tors that complicate traditional, rational models of individual learning
within the organizational context. They allude to the same theoretical
tradition which produced a focus on political and coalition phenomena,
and in fact March is a frequently cited author within that tradition,
but they in no way relate this understanding of the social processes
within organizations to a model of organizational learning. Their con-
cern is a further elaboration on the severe restraints placed on tradi-
tional decision making models by conditions of ambiguity and it is
useful to the model developed here only to the degree that it
illuminates important limitations.
Most "models of choice" imply a cycle shown below (p. 57):
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Indi vidual Individual
Action Bel ief
Organizational V Envi ronmental
Action / Response
Figure 1 - March and Olsen's Individual Choice Cycle
March and Olsen detail how various factors can break each link in
the cycle. Tradition and obligation often compel individuals to act
differently than their beliefs might otherwise lead them to. Individ-
uals often are quite unsure about what if any effect their action may
have on organizational action. Environments change and shift constantly
and it is often not clear which shifts are caused by organizational
action and which are the result of other, unrelated or chance factors.
Nonetheless, March and Olsen conclude that, "despite ambiguity and un-
certainty, organization participants interpret and try to make sense out
of their lives (p. 63)." In the context of ambiguity, this sense is of-
ten a product of social and interpersonal factors. If a member is well
integrated in the organization, s/he will tend to like what s/he experi-
ences in the organization. If s/he trusts the people with whom s/he has
contact, s/he will tend to share their perspective and evaluations.
Taken together these propositions suggest a view of reality forming
that emphasizes the impact of interpersonal connections within the
organization and the affective connection between the organization
and the participant on the development of belief . . . (p. 66).
March and Olsen are primarily concerned with models of choice, with how
decisions get made. They never draw specific connections between their
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different macro critiques and their individual learning model except
insofar as choice situations affect the interpersonal and affective
connections to which they allude. Still, they offer some useful insight
into the individual experience within organizations and the ways that
ambiguity, a prevalent perceptual and emotional condition, affects or-
ganizational action and decisions, including the organizational learning
model propsoed herein, Duncan and Weiss focus on shared knowledge of
action-outcome links. March and Olsen show how often, and more impor-
tantly how, organizations muddle through without such knowledge, parti-
cularly how public organizations do this.
None of what March and Olsen contend disqualifies the model devel-
oped here even if accepted as valid. Their perspective does cast a sha-
dow on the neat coherence of the interrelated aspects of the model.
More importantly, it provides some insight into the peculiar power and
importance of paradigms, of those systems of assumption and belief which
are shared by organization members and which assist them in simplifying
the world prior to analysis of specific causal links. The paradigm pro-
vides direction and coherence in an uncertain and confusing world. To
the extent that a paradigm does unify and strengthen the affective con-
nections within an organization without doing violence to inquiry into
error and conditions for error, then it provides a basis and context in
which organizational learning can proceed.
An important addition to the literature on organizational learning
has been made by Jelinek (1979). In an attempt to limit her definition
of organizational learning to those events which meet the most rigorous
62
requirements, she focuses on the development of administrative systems
designed to insure continued change and innovation in an organization.
She views this as the clearest example of Bateson's idea of deutero-
learning in organizations, wherein an organi zation--Texas Instruments in
the case of her study--institutional izes a process of learning that was
simply idiosyncratic or individual prior to that time. This definition
is unnecessarily limited, largely because it does not focus on the
dominant coalition or any set of actors as the learner. Still, her
focus on the process of institutionalizing the learning process lends a
concreteness and specificity which can only further the development of
the concepts. Furthermore, her study, while using different models and
definitions as starting points, points to some of the specific behaviors
involved in organizational learning, just as do Argyris and Schon. In a
step beyond any of the authors mentioned to this point, she and, in a
similar study, Murray (1976) have charted the process whereby a new
piece of organizational knowledge becomes "institutionalized" into the
routine patterns of a large organization.
Section 4 - Summary
A brief summary of the model as developed to this point may be
useful. There are two central constructs. First, the "who" of
organizational learning is the dominant coalition, that group within an
organization which determines the allocation of organizational
resources. The "what" of organizational learning is organizational
knowledge, knowledge of action-outcome relationships and the conditions
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which affect them. In order to be organizational
,
these relationships
must be consensual ly held by, accessible and communicable to, and
integrated into an overall knowledge base by members of the dominant
coalition. Further attention has been paid to the organizational para-
digm as that set of unifying beliefs and assumptions which serves as the
basis and guiding principles for organizational learning. Thus, an
organization learns as the dominant coalition refines and develops its
shared knowledge within the context of a guiding philosophy or paradigm;
the paradigm itself may also be a subject of inquiry and hence of learn-
ing. This is a learning cycle as well, because a clearer, more exten-
sive knowledge base encourages the development and unified action of a
dominant coalition (see diagram below).
Clearer roles,
responsibilities.
More unified
membership and
shared vision of
future.
V
All organizational process
shaped by Paradigm
Organizational Knowledge
Examination of
performance gaps,
use of new knowl-
edge, monitoring
of progress tow-
ard goals and
objectives, etc.
4 J
Figure 2 - Organizational Learning Cycle
There are two central theoretical foundations for the model des-
cribed above. First, there is the ample literature which
characterizes
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decision-making within organizations as an essentially political
process. The second theoretical basis of the model is the less exten-
sive literature regarding the nature of knowledge used in organizational
decision-making and of its social construction through such activities
as planning, information gathering, environmental analysis, and problem
solving. Drawing on this literature, it is clear that an investigation
of organizational learning in any organization must attempt to answer
three questions:
—who is the dominant coalition?
--What is the nature of the present base of organizational
knowl edge?
—how is new organizational knowledge developed by the dominant
coalition? These are the questions to which the methodology described
in the next chapter was addressed.
I
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH PROCEDURES
Section I - Preparation
Based upon the nature of the model and a review of various pos-
sible methodologies, an exploratory case study of a single organization
was chosen as the best way to proceed. (For the rationale for this
overall methodology and for the specific data gathering approaches, see
Methodology section of Chapter I.) Unstructured interviews were to be
the primary instrument of the research, and two different interview
formats were designed. The first interviews, limited primarily to
possible members of the dominant coalition, were structured around an
open-ended interview protocol which would generate information relevant
to the model as it pertained to the present functioning of the
organization. The second round of interviews was to provide the first
cross validation of the information gathered in the initial interviews,
and was to include more organization members in addition to the dominant
coalition. These interviews were to focus on some important historical
incident but, being open ended in nature, were expected to generate data
either congruent with or in conflict with that gathered in the first
round. Other supporting methodologies were an analysis of various
public and internal documents and an analysis of the response within the
organization to the feedback of information gathered to that point.
This four step procedure was a product of a compromise between the
ideal research approach exemplified in this case by a project such as
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Pettigrew's (1973), and some important constraints. Whereas Pettigrew
was able to use multiple investigator/observers and to conduct his study
longitudinally as well as intensively, financial and time restraints
limited the scope and length of this project. The investigation of an
historical 'incident was an attempt to compensate for the lack of a truly
longitudinal component. The only balance to a lack of additional
researchers was to present the research procedures as candidly and
thoroughly as possible and to invite questions from reviewers of the
study. In addition, the members of the author's doctoral committee
could and sometimes did raise questions and issues from their per-
spectives as the project proceeded.
Another constraint on the scope of the project was the willingness
of prospective organizations to commit significant resources and time to
a project with limited internal pay-off, so the project was structured
to be minimally disruptive and maximally useful to the host organiza-
tion. This limitation revealed itself primarily in the relatively small
number of interviewees, the lack of other than incidental direct obser-
vations of company processes, and the structure of the feedback meetings
and report. (A copy of the final report to Berkshire Life is included
as Appendix D.)
Having decided that an exploratory case study using interviews as
the primary data gathering tool was the most appropriate research
approach, the next step was to develop an interview format and pre-test
it. Drawing on various methodological and theoretical sources, a
questionnaire was designed to elicit information answering the three
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bdsic questions inherent in the model. The questions were essentially
the basis for all inquiry into the organizational life of Berkshire Life
Insurance Company, They were:
Who is the dominant coalition?
What is the present organizational knowledge base?
How, if at all, does organizational learning, as defined in the
model, take place?
Each of these abstract ideas first had to be matched to specific be-
haviors and knowledge areas in the organization which could then be tar-
geted for inquiry. As explained earlier, the goal was not so much to
explore any specific aspect of the organization in great detail, but to
obtain a broad enough picture of the dynamics at the highest levels of
the organizational hierarchy to be able to characterize the development
of new organizational knowledge by the dominant coalition. This infor-
mation and analysis would then serve to answer the ultimate question of
the project: Does inquiry guided by the organizational learning model
provide insight into the factors that ultimately shape organizational
performance? This chapter describes the development and application of
the procedures used to answer the three key questions posed by the
model. An analysis of published cases provided significant indications
that the model would be useful and some insight into how best to pursue
data relevant to the model, (See Appendix B for this analysis,) This
served almost as a type of pilot study. The answer to the question
concerning the usefulness of the model itself is one that can only be
provided by analysis of the data produced by pursuing the three
questions
,
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The specific questions relating to the composition of the
dominant coalition grew out of two basic sources. The most obvious
source was the definition of "dominant coalition" provided by Thompson
(1967): "That group of interdependent individuals who collectively have
sufficient control of organizational resources to commit them in certain
directions and to withhold them from others." Given the mention of
resource allocation, this was the easiest of the three key definitions
to operationalize. Interdependence, as well as some basic information
concerning communication and influence patterns, was the subject of
several questions drawn from network analysis (Tickey, Tushman, and
Fombrun, 1979).
To assess the present status of organizational knowledge, two
underlying issues were involved. The first was to identify aspects of
organizational life which might be the subject of organizational learn-
ing. Drawing on various sources in the literature (Allen and Pilnick,
1973; Dowling, 1978; Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Jelinek, 1979; Kotter,
1978a; Kotter, 1978b; McKinsey & Co., 1980; and Pettigrew, 1973), the
rather inclusive headings of Planning, Management Philosophy, Communi-
cation, Financial Orientation, Customer Orientation, and the Orientation
of Individuals to the Organization were chosen. It was recognized in
advance that these were essentially arbitrary distinctions and that
inquiry into any one area would automatically overlap into others. The
importance of these topics lies not in their separateness but in the
comprehensiveness of the overall list. The goal was to include enough
areas of management action to illuminate consistent patterns in
dominant
coalition thought and behavior.
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The second underlying concern in the effort to surface the organi-
zational knowledge base was the identification of those topics where the
social criteria of organizational knowledge--accessibil ity
,
communica-
bility, integration, and consensus--were satisfied. To serve this goal,
respondents were consistently asked if other top managers would agree
with their own individual understanding of particular action-outcome re-
lationships. Overlap in responses alone would not have been suffi-
cient, since organizational knowledge is by definition consciously held
and deliberately developed.
The final phase of the questionnaire concerned organizational
learning. It was pursued through only one central question with pos-
sible follow-up prompts. Where interviewees indicated the existence of
consensus on certain topics, they were asked to describe how—if at all
—that agreement among top managers was consciously and deliberately
promoted. Certain of the topics listed in the Organizational Knowledge
phase of the questionnaire were "processes," notably Planning and Com-
munication. Questions on these topics, particularly those pertaining to
planning, were expected to preempt the final phase of the question-
naire. Several authors (Dowling, 1978; Jelinek, 1979; and Andrews,
1980) have indicated the centrality of planning--at least
potentially—as an organizational learning tool. Furthermore, since
"strategic planning" is a "hot ticket" in business literature and
consulting these days, it was hoped that inclusion of planning as a
central point of inquiry would facilitate entry into a host
organization.
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Given this first cut" et 3 questionnaire, which was included in
the proposal for this project, the next step in the procedure was a
series of interviews to test and refine it as a research instrument.
These interviews were conducted over a several month period. Fortu-
nately, it was possible to hold a number of these interviews within one
single organization. The researcher was able to conduct test inter-
views using the "Initial Interview Schedule" (See Appendix A for final
interview schedule.) with the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor for Student
Affairs, a dean, a former dean, and an associate dean, all at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, Amherst. This concentration of pre-test
interviews in a single organization permitted a more thorough analysis
of the questionnaire's utility in generating answers to the three core
questions proposed by the model. A final pre-test interview was con-
ducted with a divisional vice president in a major manufacturing cor-
poration. This additional interview was used to make sure that the
final questionnaire would be in language appropriate to a business
setting, as opposed to a public service or educational setting.
As a result of this pre-test procedure, the original interview
schedule was significantly altered. Planning was emphasized to a
greater degree; Performance was added as a separate topic; and other
topics were pared down. These changes were indicated by the fact that
whereas specific content areas, such as Financial Orientation, often
revealed some of a manager's thoughts, inquiry into planning and per-
formance usually elicited ideas related to all three aspects of the
model and to the dynamic interaction between them. For example, a dean.
71
when asked if there was an "official" philosophy of management at the
university, said that he first began to see such a philosophy emerge in
the meetings the deans held to discuss what would be the most important
qualities required of a new chancellor. When asked to elaborate, he
went on to say that it was at that time that he heard people at the
highest levels of the University say, for the first time in public meet-
ings, that the University was at a critical juncture and had to choose
between either emphasizing excellence in selected areas or legitimating
and trying to respond to every demand for new services and offerings.
In the course of those discussions, the deans decided as a group to
press the emphasis on quality. This answer, which addressed a planning
process, touched on the emergence of a coalition and linked it to the
development of consensus around a critical action-outcome relationship.
When similarly revealing answers were forthcoming almost every
time planning was the focus of the interview, it made sense to revamp
the protocol to closely examine planning processes. As it turned out,
the historical incident eventually chosen as a point of investigation
was the initiation of a formal planning system at Berkshire Life. With
an interview schedule that would surface the information relevant to the
model, the next step was to find an organization willing to host the
project
.
Entry
Probably no stage of this project so illustrates the problems
inherent in exploratory field research as that of locating and
72
negotiating entry into Berkshire Life Insurance Company. After several
months of contacting companies in vain, the researcher was referred by a
relative to a business associate and professional consultant in the life
insurance industry, J. Kenneth Wiley. Mr. Wiley was willing to write a
"letter of introduction" for the researcher to Albert Cornel io. Execu-
tive Vice President for Marketing at Berkshire Life. Several weeks
later the researcher met with Mr. Cornel io at Berkshire Life and in the
course of forty-five minutes laid out the nature of the project, some of
the theory behind it, and his request for a supporting stipend.
Mr. Cornel io responded that he was at least willing to consider the mat-
ter with the other senior officers and that he would have Richard White-
head, Sr. Vice President, call if the matter was deemed to be worth
exploring in more detail.
Early the next week, a meeting was held with Mr. Whitehead in
which the project, its possible benefits to Berkshire Life, the re-
searcher's academic and professional background, and the appropriateness
of Berkshire Life as site were all explored in detail. Throughout this
time, the primary "selling point" for the project was its possible bene-
fits to the corporate planning process; a copy of the final and least
academic of the project proposals is attached as Appendix C. This had
been read by Mr. Whitehead, along with the author's resume. At the
conclusion of this interview, Mr. Whitehead asked to see a copy of the
interview schedule which would be used in the first stage of the re-
search. This document, included in Appendix A, was provided by mail,
and the following week Mr. Whitehead agreed on behalf of Berkshire Life
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to host and fund the project. Another appointment was scheduled to make
arrangements for the project.
In this second meeting with Mr. Whitehead, the principal focus was
on further elaborating the actual research steps and the best way to
proceed with them at Berkshire Life. The researcher proposed that a
liaison within the company be appointed to facilitate scheduling and
orientation to the history, present structure, and operating procedures
of the company. This would reduce demands on top management time and
might also provide some valuable experience to an organization member
below the top management level. Mr. Whitehead decided to consider this
with the other senior officers.
Another researcher proposal concerned the best way to introduce
the project to the rest of the top management group. He suggested that
a meeting be held where the underlying theory and a description of the
research steps could be presented to everyone involved and then clari-
fied through discussion and questions. This was agreed upon and possi-
ble dates for the meeting were discussed.
The final point of discussion in this meeting was the schedule of
payment of the research grant. Mr. Whitehead offered to arrange this in
any way desired by the researcher and it was agreed that the grant would
be paid in four equal installments with the final one due upon comple-
tion of the project as it related to Berkshire Life. This involved the
initial meeting, an orientation to the company, the first round of
interviews to last one and a half to two hours with the four senior
officers and the head actuary, a second round of interviews designed
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to investigate some historical incident of significance to the company,
and then a feedback of this data to the company for its internal use.
The design of the feedback was by agreement postponed until its nature
and usefulness to the company could be assessed.
On the day of the introductory meeting, the researcher met briefly
with Mr. Whitehead and was informed that William Furey, Vice President
for Field Planning and Manpower Development, would be liaison for the
project and would be in the meeting. Attending the presentation of the
project, in addition to Messrs. Whitehead and Furey, were: Larry
Strattner
,
President, Albert Cornelio, Executive Vice President--
Marketing, and Gene Amber, Senior Vice President--Investments.
The presentation was in three stages. First, the underlying
theory was described. "Dominant Coalition" was not used, however, and
the importance of political phenomena was not emphasized; "Planning
team" or "top management" was substituted for "dominant coalition."
This change was made in an effort to not shape in advance responses
which might be given in the interviews. The second stage of the presen-
tation focused on what benefits might accrue to Berkshire Life as a
result of the project. The principal points here were that planning
might be improved and that’ the investigation of the organizational
knowledge base might reveal aspects of the company's activity or per-
formance which were receiving too little top management attention. In
the third phase of the presentation the specific steps in the project
were described.
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The principal questions focused on the meaning of "paradigm,"
which was answered by examples from the literature, and on the appro-
priateness of Berkshire Life as a research site. The latter question
was based on Berkshire's comparatively small size, particularly since
examples in the presentation were giants like Texas Instruments, IBM,
and ATT, and on the fact that it has a fairly limited product line. The
researcher attempted to allay these concerns by expressing his satisfac-
tion with Berkshire as a site and by pointing out that the examples
available in organizational literature are primarily of giant companies.
Otherwise, there was limited discussion of the presentation, though it
seemed to be positively received, and it was agreed that the project
should proceed.
Orientation to Berkshire Life
Both as a way of reducing the demands on top management time and
also as a way of facilitating researcher understanding and acceptance,
several steps were taken to introduce him to the life insurance industry
in general and to Berkshire Life in particular. The first such step was
a two hour meeting with Dr. Grant Osborne, Professor of Insurance at the
University of Massachusetts, School of Business. He provided an over-
view of the current state of the life insurance industry, explained
technical terms pertaining to life insurance products and the very
complex accounting procedures used by life insurance companies, and ex-
plained the most common weays of evaluating life insurance company per-
formance. Then, in the context of this earlier discussion, he assisted
I
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the researcher in understanding and evaluating the Berkshire Life Annual
Report and comparing Berkshire Life's performance to that of other com-
panies in the industry.
The balance of the orientation took place in extensive conversa-
tions with Bill Furey, the liaison' for the project and an employee of
Berkshire Life his entire professional life, and in reviewing a great
many documents provided by him. (A complete list of the documents
reviewed and analyzed at this and other points in the research is
provided at the end of this chapter, page 83.)
The last of these conversations, prior to the first round of
interviews, took the form of a sample interview so that aspects of Berk-
shire's functioning that might require detailed explanation could be
uncovered. At this point, specific policies and procedures, such as the
performance appraisal system, the roles of committees and task forces,
and the educational refund policy, were explained. It was also during
this orientation phase that a fairly detailed history of the past two
decades was compiled so that references to past events and people no
longer with the company could be readily integrated into the interview
format without additional explanation. This sample interview with Bill
Furey was included for purposes of analysis in the first found of
interviews, which followed the same general schedule of questions.
The Interviews
Following the orientation and initial review of relevant
documents, five interviews were conducted with the four senior officers
\
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and A1 Easton, Vice President and Actuary. These ranged in length from
two to two and one-half hours and roughly followed the "Initial Inter-
view Schedule" (see Appendix A). At the outset, however, interview sub-
jects were encouraged to "wander" and to elaborate points or draw con-
nections between events in whatever way seemed most useful to them.
This ihtoduction, and to some degree the first question--"What has been
your most important contribution to this organization?"--were included
to put respondents at ease in hopes of eliciting candor and their own
individual judgements and perspectives.
This initial round of interviews, and further document analysis,
led the researcher to choose the first formal, long-range planning
process in 1972-73 as the historical incident for investigation. The
rationale for this choice will be discussed in more detail in Chapter
IV, but in essence, this process was frequently and repeatedly referred
to by interviewees as a turning point in the management, and hence in
the performance, of the company. Being eight years past, however, and
over a year in duration, a detailed inquiry which might be the usual
approach to an "incident" did not seem appropriate. Therefore, the
interview format for the second round of interviews was kept fairly
general and evaluative in approach. The subjects for this round of
interviews were the ten of the eleven members of the original Long-Range
Planning Task Force who were still employed at Berkshire Life. This
group included Bill Furey, the five men interviewed in the first set of
interviews and four additional subjects: Tom Franco, Director of
Advertising and Sales Promotion; Dick Levy, Vice President-Computer
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Services; Colin MacFadyen, Vice President-Securities; and Bob Plageman,
Real Estate Officer, who at the time of the task force was Director of
Planning and Office Services,
This interview format was shorter in length. For those subjects
who had participated in the initial interiews, it included both ques-
tions from the first interview that had been neglected or which needed
more elaboration and also whatever questions concerning the original
planning process they had not answered spontaneously in the first inter-
view, For the four new subjects, the format included an introduction to
the project, an encouragement to "wander" or to draw connections which
seemed most important to them, and the complete set of questions in the
"Historical Incident Interview Schedule," which can be found in its en-
tirety in Appendix A.
After all the interviews were transcribed and analyzed, separate
meetings were held with Bill Furey and Dick Whitehead to discuss the re-
sults of the interviews and to design the feedback mechanisms for the
management team at Berkshire Life, It was agreed that the first stage
in this process should be an oral presentation of the results to the
four senior officers as a group. Bill and Dick independently arrived at
the conclusion that it would be inappropriate for Bill to attend this
meeting because some of the results pertained to issues taht clearly
were the private domain of senior management, at least initially, such
as the approaching retirement of the President. It was also agreed to
leave the design of the feedback process to the rest of the
interview
participants, and possibly to other officers as well, until after the
meeting with the senior officers.
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The Feedback Process
At the meeting held with the senior officers, the research
results were presented in four areas. First, feedback was addressed to
the formal document "Corporate Phil osophy--Objecti ves--Strategy--
Policy." Then, feedback pertaining to the implementation of that plan
was given. The next area for feedback related to the planning process
as it was presently structured. The final focus of feedback were some
important results from the interviews pertaining to management style and
the approaching retirement of the President. None of these results were
surprising to any of the top managers and discussion generally focused
on clarification of the results and on how to use them.
Subsequently, a report was written to be circulated to all
participants in the research project. This report included a summary
description of the theory behind the research, the steps of the research
procedure, and the overall results of the project. This document
(included as Appendix D) focused primarily on the long-range planning
process, reflecting the original interest of the senior officers in the
project. This step concluded the actual research procedures.
Observations and comments made during the planning and execution of
these feedback steps were used in cross validating the results attained
at earlier stages.
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Summary
The research was conducted in three sequential stages, the second
of which was the primary data gathering phase. The first stage involved
entry into and orientation to Berkshire Life. The second stage con-
sisted of two sequential rounds of interviews with a total of ten top
management personnel. Document analysis was an integrated part of both
these first two stages. After the first two stages were completed, the
data were assembled and a synopsis of the important points were pre-
sented back to the participants in the research. The responses to this
feedback were observed and analyzed to check the preliminary findings
for accuracy and to gather any new and relevant information.
Following is a complete list of the interviewees, their official
titles, and some information on their background as it relates to their
role at Berkshire Life and this project. There is also a list of the
documents reviewed in the course of the project.
List #1: Managers Interviewed
Lawrence W. Strattner, Jr., CLU, President. Began his pro-
fessional life in education, which was noted by several participants
when the researcher's own professional background was discussed.
Worked in the field for Prudential. Came to Berkshire Life 20+
years ago as the first Director of Training and Development. Held
various other positions, including Senior Vice President-Agency
Operations, from which he was promoted to President in 1967.
Albert C. Cornel io, FLMI, CLU, Executive Vice-President-
Marketing. Came to Berkshire Life as an attorney 20+ years ago.
Rose to Senior Vice President-Insurance Services prior to combina-
tion of Insurance Services with Agency Operations to form a single
division. Marketing, in 1971.
Eurgene L. Amber, Senior Vice President-Investments. Came to
Berkshire Life 20+ years ago in Investment Division. Has been
Senior Vice President since before 1967.
Richard L. Whitehead, Senior Vice President and Secretary.
Responsible for all home office administrative and corporate/
community relations functions. Came from Home Life of New York 20+
years ago in Personnel. Became Senior Vice President in 1965.
Albert E. Easton, FSA, FLMI, CLU, Vice President and Actuary. Came
to Berkshire 13 years ago from Equitable. Became chief actuary in
1971.
Thomas S. Franco, Director of Advertising and Sales Promotion. Came
to Berkshire 15 years ago in present role.
William M. Furey, CLU, Vice President-Field Planning and Manpower
Development. A third generation employee of Berkshire Life whose
father was President prior to 1967. Has been with Berkshire his
entire 20+ year professional life, and is now primarily responsible
for recruiting and developing new General Agents.
Richard C. Levy, Vice President-Computer Services. Came to
Berkshire 16 years ago as a progammer.
Colin MacFadyen, FLMI, CFA, Vice President-Securities. Came to
Berkshire in Personnel 20+ years ago after working in the field for
another company. "Recruited himself" for investment position prior
to 1970.
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List #1 (continued)
Robert L. Plageman, Real Estate Officer. With Berkshire 20+ years,
up until three years ago in Administrative Services. Served on task
force in 1972-73 while Director of Planning and Administrative
Se rvices.
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List #2; Documents Reviewed and Analyzed During Project
Annual Reports to Policyowners, 197 9 and 1980.
Annual Statement to State Insurance Departments, 1980.
Communications with Outside Parties:
Advertisements in industry magazines, recruiting materials, monthly
magazine for agents.
Internal Communications:
Statement of Corporate Philosophy-Objectives-
Strategy-Pol i cy
,
197 3.
Statement of Corporate Phil osophy-Objectives-
Strategy-Policy
,
1978.
Extensive reports and memoranda filed as part of task force efforts
in preparation for 1973 "Statement of Corporate Philosophy."
Memo detailing the current composition and principal purposes of the
twelve standing committees and the two currently operative task
forces.
Memoranda detailing personnel policies.
Report assessing in detail the results of general agent recruiting and
training over last eight years.
Reports comparing company performance to industry as a whole and to
twenty-eight companies which are viewed as competitors.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
This chapter reports the findings of the research project and then
the analysis of those findings. The findings are organized into four
sections. First, a brief summary of the recent history of the company
is provided; drawn from various sources, this background information is
offered at the outset in order to facilitate reader understanding of
later information. The next three sections of the chapter each sum-
marize the findings in relation to one of the three core questions of
the case study guided by the organizational learning model. These
questions are, in order of presentation:
Who is the dominant coalition of Berkshire Life?
What is the state of the current organizational knowledge base at
Berkshire Life? and.
What are the organizational learning processes at Berkshire Life?
The sources of the answers to these questions are detailed throughout;
generally, interviews have provided the overwhelming bulk of the data.
Documents, observations, and the feedback processes were primarily used
to either confirm or disconfirm interview responses.
After the data is reported, analysis follows. The first level of
analysis is structured to answer the question: To what degree does
Berkshire Life "learn" in the sense defined by the model? This analysis
concludes the traditional case study aspect of the project.
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The second level of analysis addresses the central question of the
entire project, however, and therefore this discussion has been placed
in the final chapter. This central issue is: How useful is the
organizational learning model in guiding inquiry into the factors that
determine organizational effectiveness? As a secondary aspect of this
analysis, strengths and weaknesses of the model outlined in Chapter II
are considered. This final level of analysis was separated from the
case study portion of the analysis because it is another step removed
from the data. It represents a qualitative assessment of the usefulness
of the data. Of course, the actual sifting of data and drawing of
conclusions did not proceed in such a neat sequence; it was a messy,
back and forth, interactive process. In a project with so many
interwoven themes, there might be other equally reasonable ways to
present the data and analysis, but this order fit both the process of
the research steps and also the components of the model which guided the
research.
Section 1. History and Present Structure
Berkshire Life Insurance Company was founded in 1851 as a mutual
company, meaning that the policyowners technically own the assets of the
company. Until recently, it was almost exclusively an East Coast com-
pany, providing a full range of life insurance products through its
field force, which was organized in General Agencies. As it was for
most businesses, and for most life insurance companies especially, the
1930's were a period of terrible financial strain for Berkshire Life.
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The company came out of that period attempting to grow by being "all
things to all people" and without a clear definition of the type of
market it wanted to serve or the type of agent it needed to recruit. As
a result, it entered the 1960's with a rather "rag tag" collection of
agents with widely varying competencies and styles of selling. The Pre-
sident in this period was Rankin Furey, a man of dynamic capability who
ran the company with most significant decision-making centralized to his
personal attention. Seven people reported directly to him at one time
and he was involved in initiating and controlling organizational actions
in every sphere. Under his leadership the company grew, but turnover in
upper management positions was high and there is some indication that at
least in the latter years of his tenure, the company was "buying
business"--pricing its products too low or compensating its agents too
liberally, either of which would result eventually in losses on those
policies. In 1967, he retired and Larry Strattner, then Senior Vice
President—Agency Operations, was selected as his successor.
In order to smooth that transition of leadership, Larry produced a
statement reflecting his own ideas of what corporate philosophy and
direction should be. This became a public document. Shortly after
assuming the presidency, he began to promote a long-range planning pro-
cess, but there were pressing immediate problems which led this first
planning effort to be postponed.
The company was employing at that point about three hundred and
fifteen people in the home office and the building into which they had
moved in 1958 was filled to capacity. Bob Plageman was actually charged
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with recommending architects for a new addition before it was decided,
at his suggestion, to initiate a work measurement program with the
assistance of an outside consulting firm. According to Bob, he had
recommended this step several times to the previous president, but it
had never been investigated beyond that point. Through this program,
the company reduced the home office work force by twenty per cent over
the next two years, even as the volume of business continued to grow;
this reduction was attained through attrition rather than lay-offs.
This program eased the pressure of growing expenses and allowed
expansion of the building to be postponed as well. Studies by the chief
actuary, who was terminated not long afterward, indicated that the
financial situation of the company was still quite serious, however.
This led to decisions in 1971 to cut the dividend scale, a comparatively
drastic step in a mutual life insurance company, and also to introduce
new, less competitively priced products. Both A1 Easton and Larry
Strattner feel in retrospect that these measures may have been
overreactions, but by the early 1970's the company was in considerably
better financial shape.
There was also considerable flux in the top managerment group at
this time. The Director of Computer Services left for another job and
Dick Levy assumed that position in 1970. One actuary retired and his
successor was asked to leave when he was not working out to the
satisfaction of the senior officers. A1 Easton, a relatively new
arrival at that time, was promoted to the position of senior actuary. A
General Agent was asked to come in as Senior Vice President--Agency
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Operations, Larry's old position, with the understanding that he could
later return to his agency, which he did in 1972. Finally, the Senior
Vice President of the Administrative Division was approaching retirement
as well.
In 1972, A1 Cornel io was made Senior Vice President--Marketing
Services, a position which combined the old Insurance Services and
Agency Operations divisions into a single division. This combination
was apparently Larry's idea, and at this point is still a very
unorthodox one in the insurance business. This innovative arrangement,
and A1 Cornel io's appointment as the head of the new division, brought
questions and criticisms both from inside the company, particularly
among the field force, and also from outside the company. This seems to
have been the last event in a period of considerable turmoil, however;
as one subject put it, "the power structure was finally stable."
With the financial and personnel situations more stable. President
Strattner turned again to long-range planning in 1972. He convened a
task force, which he chaired, consisting of Dick Whitehead from Per-
sonnel, Bob PI ageman from Planning and Administrative Services, Colin
MacFadyen from the Securities area of Investment, another investment
officer who left the company soon thereafter, Dick Levy from Computer
Services, A1 Easton from Actuarial, Bill Furey from Agency Operations,
and Tom Franco from Advertising and Sales Promotion. Thus, every major
department of the company was represented by a junior officer and the
three senior vice presidents, A1 Cornel io. Gene Amber, and Merle Tabor
from Administration, sat in as ex officio members.
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Meeting throughout the year of 1972, this group produced the first
written long range plan for the company, dated January 1, 1973. This
plan identified the specific markets the company would strive to serve,
provided broad outlines and philosophical commitments, and established
numerical goals in critical areas for the first time.
In the period covered by this first five year plan, there were two
jolting environmental shifts, A large increase in Social Security dis-
ability benefits radically altered the market conditions in the "blue
collar" disability market, and the passage of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) made tax qualified pension plans so complex
that literally tens of thousands of small businesses and professional
people, Berkshire's primary customer markets, allowed their pension
plans to lapse. These two external events affected Berkshire's economic
performance, but otherwise the years since 1972 have been ones of
steady, and accelerating, growth. The two most recent years were par-
ticularly successful, in which Berkshire stood near or at the top on
every dimension of industry comparison.
Today, Berkshire Life is still a small company in an industry of
about 1800 life insurance companies. The industry is dominated by a
handful of giants, however, such as Prudential, Connecticut General,
Metropolitan, etc., so that Berkshire still ranks among the largest
seven per cent. The company has expanded its operating area by opening
General Agencies in such distant states as California, Texas, and
Washington, and is now licensed in the forty -eight contiguous states.
While it offers a complete line of life insurance products, its clear
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emphasis is in pension, salary continuation, and disability products
designed for the affluent and financially sophisticated professional or
small business person. These products require a great deal of continual
service, which is provided primarily by the home office after the
initial sale.
Unlike most insurance companies, where the Policyowner Services
and Actuarial departments are structurally separated from all field
functions, at Berkshire Life all market related functions are combined
in a single Marketing Division (see Figure 3). This integration of
functions is further promoted by a system wherein three key committees
bring together diverse specialists for ongoing joint efforts in
Merchandising, Marketing, and Product Development. The last of these
provides an example of how these committees function.
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Whenever a new product or product change is suggested, and there
are many sources for such suggestions, the Product Development Com-
mittee, chaired by A1 Easton, is convened to consider it. The committee
includes not only A1 Easton and another actuary, the traditional product
specialists in an insurance company, but also A1 Cornel io, the
department heads from Underwriting, Policyowner Service, and Marketing
Services, and Dick Levy, Vice President--Computer Services. Levy is not
a member of the Marketing Division, but his department will have to
design much of the support for any product. Before a decision is made,
all of these specialists have an opportunity to contribute their unique
perspective not only on the proposed product change itself, but on the
impact such a change might have on their departments and the best ways
to coordinate their efforts in planning and implementing the change.
Similarly, at the corporate level, whereas each division head has
sole responsibility for the functioning of his di vi sion--and makes the
final decisions pertaining thereto--the Management Committee (Strattner,
Cornel io, Pmber, and Whitehead), meets biweekly "to provide for regular
and orderly communications among the senior officers of the major
divisions and for briefing and review of general administrative,
personnel and company relations matters." (Memorandum from President
Strattner to all management personnel on standing committee assignments,
dated January 12, 1981.) Almost every matter of corporate wide
consequence is discussed in this committee before action is taken.
There are other committees serving a variety of functions, from
technical planning in the Telecommunications Task Force to conducting
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input from lower levels of the hierarchy to appropriate decision makers.
On the Building Addition Advisory Committee numerous employees have had
an opportunity to be party to the design and construction of the new ad-
dition to be completed this summer. The Personnel Advisory Committee
provides an ongoing forum for many supervisory personnel to make sug-
gestions concerning personnel policies. Thus, there is a fairly con-
ventional, functionally specialized corporate structure with an active
and important overlay of committees.
Section 2 - The Dominant Coalition
There is clear evidence from all sources concerning the membership
of the dominant coalition at Berkshire Life. The four senior officers--
Strattner, Cornel io. Amber, and Whitehead--are involved in and respon-
sible for, either singly or as a group, every decision with long term
significance for the company. Every single interview subject attributed
to this group the principal influence over present and future directions
for the company. In addition, there are clear structural components to
their central ity--their positions at the lead of each major corporate
division and the company as a whole, and their exclusive membership in
the Management Committee. Thus, the interview responses have obvious
support in the structure, and hence, also the documents, of the company.
This group also is, and has been, quite stable over time and over types
of decisions. It is very clear then, who the dominant coalition is at
Berkshi re Li fe.
There was also substantial agreement in responses concerning other
aspects of the leadership of the company. Interviewees who mentioned
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other powerful organization members clearly differentiated these others
from the primary group. There was significant overlap between the per-
sons mentioned; of five subjects who named people other than senior of-
ficers, four people mentioned Bob Herklotts, and three mentioned A1
i f
Easton and Dick Levy.
The basis for differentials in degrees of influence was also a
point of agreement. Every time such a difference was mentioned, it was
described in terms of functional role. The most important example of
these comments concerned the centrality of marketing functions. Every
senior officer, and several others as well, described Berkshire Life as
a "marketing organization" or as a "marketing driven" company. There-
fore, Larry and A1
,
as the senior officers involved in marketing, were
viewed as most influential by almost every respondent. Similarly, when
Herklotts, Easton, or Levy were described as influential, the importance
of their respective functions was given as the rationale for these
attributions.
No one described personal friendships or other factors not
directly related to job functions as a source of organizational power.
At the same time, several interviewees below the senior officer level
said that Berkshire Life had considerable political maneuvering eight or
ten years ago. Events which were cited as bringing about the end of
such covert struggles were three: Hank Weiss's departure and the sub-
sequent installation of A1 Cornel io as Sr. Vice President of the com-
bined Marketing Services division; Larry Strattner's selection as
President; and, the initiation of a formal plan which clearly defined
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corporate direction and therefore provided a rational basis for resource
allocation and personnel decisions.
Members of fhe organization place a great deal of importance on
this stability in the top management group. A1 Cornelio expressed it
thusly: "Another thing that's helped . . . we've had a relatively
mature, stable group. It's hard to describe the benefit of an on-going
team which has been at it for a while. Without a plan and with high
turnover, we were always susceptible to changes of direction. Now when
we bring in a new person, we (can) watch them very carefully." This
theme was echoed as well by those immediately below the senior officers.
Almost the first comment A1 Easton made, when told of the focus of the
project on planning, was: "An advantage now is that spheres of influ-
ence are set. I don't sense any power struggles. I go way beyond plan-
ning in terms of what makes a successful company. You need a stable
power structure; those are the periods v^en you make progress." Bill
Furey repeated the same idea. "One of the reasons why we have the prog-
ress we've made is because prior to (the beginning of formal planning in
1972) there was a lot of organizational change. I've worked for three
or four different people since I came to the home office in 1960. . . .
Keep in mind that all the people I've talked about . . . Henry, Herk-
lotts, Furey, Cornelio, Strattner and to some extent Whitehead, we've
worked together for a number of years."
The clarity with which the dominant coalition can be established
makes the next data, describing the organizational knowledge base,
much
easier to present.
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Section 3. Organizational Knowledge
In order for knowledge or belief to be organizational, as opposed
to individual, in nature, it must fit a very clear definition. Organi-
zational knowledge describes action-outcome relationships that are con-
sensual ly agreed to be valid by the dominant coalition, that are ex-
pressed in communicable terms, that are accessible to all coalition
members, and that are integrated into a system of action-outcome knowl-
edge so that relationships between different actions can be described
and assessed in terms of their impact on the organization as a whole.
The goals of the questions designed to explore the organizational knowl-
edge base were to establish the existence of that knowledge base and to
discern patterns or significant, consistent characteristics of the
shared ideas. Every specific aspect would certainly have been impos-
sible and pointless to pursue, since the emphasis in the model of
organizational learning is on more paradigmatic understandings as op-
posed to specific functional or technical ones.
Only those six interviews conducted in the initial round and
employing the more extensive schedule of questions (see Appendix A) were
structured to uncover organizational knowledge in a systematic way. The
later interviews and other data gathering techniques were used primarily
to check the results of these initial interviews. Overall, there was
substantial congruence between the two pools of data, and since the en-
tire dominant coalition was included in that first set of interviews,
they provided the basis of any organizational knowledge. The concur-
rence of other members peripheral to the dominant coalition is
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validating, and is mentioned where pertinent, but is not essential.
Although the interviews themselves often did not follow the order or
specific questions of the interview protocol, the general areas of
organizational life listed in that schedule do provide a useful way of
organizing the subjects' responses.
Planning and strategy . Since 1972, Berkshire Life's identified markets
have been
the small businessman or professional person; corporations with bus-
iness needs for personal insurance products--pension plans, salary
continuation plans, etc.; others whose needs for income replacement
upon death, disability, or retirement exceed benefits provided by
government and employer, and who should have been well qualified
counsel with regard to supplementing such benefits. (Corporate
Phil osophy-Objecti ves-Pol icy-Strategy; Jan. 1, 1973; p. 6.)
Every single respondent credited the definition of this specific mar-
ket, and the resulting direction of the company, to the Long-range Plan-
ning Task Force which met through 1972. All the interview subjects were
members of this task force, but even given that fact, the unanimity with
which respondents described the past and future direction of the com-
pany, the specific components of that strategy, and significant environ-
mental threats and opportunities facing the company was striking.
The consensual view was that the company should, and most probably
would, maintain essentially the same direction for the next five years
that it has established in the last eight. The most difficult con-
straint on company growth, and hence a central goal, is the lack of
wel 1 -qualified General Agents in the field. The principal threats in
the larger environment come from new, investment-oriented insurance
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products which are being marketed without providing the traditional
level of compensation to the agent making the sale. This is a dual
threat, since it not only presents the company with stiff competition to
its present products but also undermines the agency system which has
been the primary marketing approach of the life insurance industry for
decades. Inflation has made these new products attractive and the
changing nature of financial service institutions, exemplified by the
recent wave of insurance company-brokerage house mergers, has provided
the marketing thrust behind them. Without exception, every one of the
six initial interviewees mentioned every one of the factors above.
The "marketing driven" nature of the company was reemphasized by
these responses, insofar as there was comparatively little discussion of
any forces which might have an effect outside of the marketing area.
Demographic shifts, mentioned by three of the six, and technological
advances, mentioned by five of the six and two of the four in the second
round as well, were only discussed in light of the impact they might
have on the demand for life insurance products and the company's ability
to market them. The only respondent who consistently spoke of
opportunities, trends, or threats in relation to any area other than
marketing was Gene Amber, who of course focused on investments. Even
he, however, outlined every aspect of the direction and present
situation of the company in terms of marketing.
The significance of the plan as a component of the organizational
knowledge base was even more obvious in the ways individuals referred to
it. Larry Strattner described its origin this way:
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Our sales representation was a fairly motley crew, selling in dif-
ferent kinds of markets with vastly different levels of sophistica-
tion . . . . This helter-skelter collection of people and agenciesdidn t seem to be the ideal thing to build on. We decided to look
at what we were doing, to identify those things which seemed to have
a future and to build on those things and achieve some sense of
direction.
[The plan^ is hardly a Bill of Rights. It has nevertheless provided
us with a track .... It is a simple, basic policy now es-
tablished through osmosis.
A1 Cornel io expressed the same basic thought.
That original product--now everybody has that pretty much ingrained
in them. They know our products. They know our markets. We have a
track to run on, and don't spend a lot of time spinning our wheels.
The plan was described in very similar terms, sometimes even the same
phrasings, by all respondents. Several, like A1 Cornel io, also focused
on a specific aspect of the plan that makes it particularly important
from an organizational knowledge point of view, namely that it yields
very explicit performance goals and therefore performance gaps. This
fact will be discussed in more detail in the section on organizational
learning, but it is important here in that it indicates the action-
outcome basis of organizational knowledge.
The plan was also described as more than simply a group document
that guides decisions and operations. When subjects were asked who the
"prime mover" behind the plan was, seven of the ten responded that it
was Larry Strattner. Most, however, never had to be asked that question
because they had already described a link between Larry's personal style
and the plan. A1 Cornel io summarized it by saying, "His strength is
that he conceptually comes up with things ... he is a thoughtful kind
of guy who does not get involved in saying, 'Do this or don't do
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that « Even more illuminating, however, are the comments of Bob
Plageman and Colin MacFadyen, who viewed the plan as indicative of
organizational kn owl edge- -and learning--far beyond its specifics. Bob
PI ageman:
Now, I do know, having known Larry for all the time I've been in' the
company
. , . this very much fits his personality. He's a very
organized and quite structured guy. His predecessor ... had a
very different style, had different strengths and different weak-
nesses than Strattner . . . successful, yes, but still we didn't
have what Larry likes to run by, which is a roadmap.
In a similar vein, Colin MacFadyen spoke of the plan as an incorpora-
tion of Larry's style into the company's operating patterns.
... it was a part of Larry's style, precipitated by his perception
of changing conditions in the industry and how we were going to cope
with them. It developed for all of us a form of discipline, in that
we had to think ahead and set it down in writing and establish
objectives .... and that discipline has continued to prevail
.... Larry's a very well-organized type of person. This
represented a passing on of his style of organization to those of us
who work with him.
Thus, the plan embodies implicit action-outcome relationships, and
powerful paradigmatic ones, as well as explicit ones.
Performance. Every single respondent found Berkshire Life's performance
in recent years excellent. There is a very clear objective basis for
this shared view. Berkshire's economic results for the last two years
have shown substantial increases over both the company's past results
and the industry averages for the same periods. Quoting the 1980 annual
report
,
... for Berkshire Life, 1980 was a truly outstanding year, and
such progress deserves attention and evaluation .... The
highlight of our year has to be our gains in new business. New life
insurance volume of $587,812,000 represented a 68% increase over
1979, a year in which ... the gain over the prior year was a
hefty
24%.
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There are other impressive figures, and the good performance includes
the investment area as well, where policy loans had played havoc with
the results of many life insurance companies, Berkshire Life's "new
money rate" has consistently been in the top four or five of the
twenty-eight companies which they consider actual competitors, which was
reported not only by Gene Amber, but by other subjects from the market-
ing and administrative divisions as well. The specific statistics are
not important here. The important fact is that everyone knew these
results, and not simply in relation to their own specialty functions.
It is important to note in this discussion, that the life insur-
ance industry is a tightly regulated one with a long history. Its
measures of performance, both current and in relation to the past, are
absolutely standardized and publicly available. Therefore, researcher
questions regarding the type and accuracy of performance measures were
not of great relevance at Berkshire Life, These questions usually
brought one of two related issues to the surface, however. Both relate
to the meaningful ness of the numerical goals included in the plan.
These comments touch on one area of disagreement, both within the
dominant coalition and among other members of the upper management.
Dick Whitehead said he feels the plan should include comparative
goals, stating desired industry rank in each area, such as growth in
assets or new premium income. Also, he feels the planning process
should include more thorough investigation of forecasts that are missed,
either above or below. As he discussed these points, he also predicted
--based on past conversations in the Management Committee--that the
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other senior officers would disagree with him. He was right; the other
three indicated satisfaction with both the goals and measures for per-
formance.
At the same time, his view of the numerical goals was shared by
some of the junior officers who described them as "arbitrary” and not
particularly useful in setting departmental priorities or in evaluating
departmental performance. These comments reflected an ongoing, though
very low key, debate within the dominant coalition and other managers.
Part of the basis for this disagreement was revealed in a comment by
Larry, when he said the numbers in the plan were "sort of incidental,"
that the important aspect was having challenging and measurable goals
and that getting too "sophisticated" in analyzing the numbers would not
be useful
.
When subjects were asked what Berkshire Life does particularly
well and what it does particularly poorly, there was again broad agree-
v
ment. For strengths, every interviewee--even those not asked the ques-
tion--stressed the company's services and support to its field force and
to the ultimate customer. Specific aspects of this service were
stressed repeatedly as well. Every senior officer other than Gene Amber
spoke of the sophisticated telecommunications system that provides much
quicker backup to agents than that of most companies Berkshire s size,
and he jokingly referred to Investments always receiving the lowest
priority for computer services--a sort of humorous confirmation of other
people's comments. The fact that top managers consistently stress serv-
ice to the field was also repeatedly mentioned.
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Interestingly, Gene Amber described the commitment in his division
to responding quickly to mortgage bankers when they inquire about
specific projects; then he added, "It's sort of like the rest of the
company, its service--service to the customer."
Other strengths were also frequently mentioned. The committees
and task forces were described as very effective communication and oper-
ational planning structures by eight of ten subjects. The "open" and
"concerned" style of management was also described as very firmly es-
tablished and as a contributor to open communication and to increased
commitment and motivation.
There was less overall agreement about weak areas in the company's
performance. When the interviewer asked this question as it was written
in the interview schedule, "What does this organization do particularly
poorly?", the response was most often something like, "I can't think of
anything we do poorly," or "We've spent the last ten years making sure
there is nothing we do poorly," or "If there was anything I thought we
were doing poorly. I'd be working on it." Respondents were very will-
ing, usually spontaneously, to turn the question around and discuss
aspects of the company that need improvement. Amber and Easton, both
concerned with the overall financial situation of the company, said they
have been disappointed with the growth of assets. At the same time,
they acknowledge the plan did not establish that as a priority. All six
subjects in the first round mentioned the slowness of the upgrading and
expansion of the field management; at the same time they stressed the
unexpected difficulty of finding and retaining general agents who can
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function in Berkshire Life's sophisticated markets and noted the in-
novative and diligent attempts made by the company in this area. Con-
tinuing to address this problem was the single goal mentioned by every
respondent.
Although there was clear consensus around this and other problem
areas, there was none that this was something that the company does
poorly--only that it is faced with a challenging problem. Other ex-
amples of this are the comments made concerning employee performance
appraisal and the communication of "general" information. In both these
areas, no one mentioned them when asked the question about what the com-
pany does not do well. When asked about performance appraisal, however,
two senior officers and three other managers said, in effect, that this
was an area that the company has not done as well in as it should. This
was repeated when asked about communication. Three senior officers ex-
pressed concern that although they make a tremendous amount of informa-
tion public, it seems not to stimulate curiosity in officers' meetings
or feelings of being included at lower levels in the organization
hierarchy. This was one of the few management concerns where there
seemed to be genuine uncertainty about the nature of action-outcome re-
lationships.
Management philosophy, orientation toward organization members. The
same words were repeated again and again by subjects describing the
management style or philosophy of the company, words such as "open,"
"concerned," "people oriented," "informal," and "flexible," A majority
of the subjects also drew a close connection between the company's
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"official" style and Larry Strattner's personal style. The agreement on
basic management principles among the four members of the dominant
coalition was even more pronounced. Since that group is the seat of
organizational knowledge, that is the starting point for reporting data
on management style and philosophy.
Larry Strattner described two essential ideas on management in
addressing this question. First, it is the responsibility of management
to manage and the responsibility of the Board of Directors to monitor.
This principle holds at lower levels of the organization as well, where
Larry said he expects each manager to make decisions in his own area and
for his superior to support him unless he is prepared to replace him or
unless the decision has impact beyond the manager's own division or
department. Balancing this principle of trust and managerial
independence, Larry has worked to establish "an environment in which we
seek as much as possible to manage by consensus." Whereas these two
ideas might appear to be in conflict, Larry explained how that was a
mi sconception:
There are some misconceptions about the role of committees ....
Any major decision is discussed in the Management Committee.
Consensus is the goal, but I will play referee. The committee
structure affords specialists with input into the overall com'pany,
but the Management Committee doesn't decide anything. ThT
individual officers make decisions about their areas or r~make
decisions where I have to, but we strive to establish consensus
about what the best way to move is. (emphasis added)
Each of the other senior officers repeated these principles, not
only explicitly but implicitly as they described their own managerial
behavior. A1 Cornel io, when asked who was moving Berkshire Life into
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future directions, began by saying that the original long-range plan was
the product of that task force in 1972, then:
Accepting that plan, it is reviewed on an ongoing basis--not very
formally but in an ongoing way
. . . basically, through committee
structures. Neither Larry nor I are going to take product develop-
ment for our markets on ourselves. There's the Product Development
C^mittee, chaired by A1 Easton--all input goes through that Com-
mittee, product research, sugggestions from the field. In that
committee we ask, "Will it work in the market? Is it competitive?"
(Gives example of how suggestion from the field was handled.)
Anyway, the committee operates in terms of short-term changes in the
basic context of the plan. If we sense a basic change, so that the
plan has a problem because it's holding us back product-wise, the
committee refers that to Strattner and the Management Committee.
Describing his relationship with a subordinate he was about to hire, A1
said.
He asked, 'How much control am I going to have over how I run the
department?', to which I answered, 'You'll have all the control in
the world, just don't change anything. If you want to change some-
thing, then you bring us in . . .we want input.' We don't want
change for change sake where it concerns our products or marketing.
Now he's been here a while and knows our strengths and weaknesses,
so he can make a contribution, but where his actions will affect
other areas we want to make sure it fits our direction.
In a very different way of expressing it, A1 was pointing out the same
two underlying ideas--manageri al autonomy balanced against the push for
consensus in important decisions. Dick Whitehead and Gene Amber made
similar points in their responses, emphasizing both the openness to
input and debate and also the finality of their decisions in their areas
of responsibility. The senior officers also repeatedly emphasized the
aspects of management style mentioned earlier as a particular company
strength--management openness and concern in relation to employees.
This theme was particularly important in the comments of the other
interviewees; both Bill Furey and Al Easton, the only managers not on
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Management Committee to participate in the longer interviews, linked’
this "people-oriented" style to Larry's personal style of being
empathetic, willing to listen, and concerned about how people feel about
what they do.
An aspect of management style that was mentioned by only one
senior officer, but which also seemed to be shared--at least insofar as
how the senior officers are perceived by the other respondents- -was
their willingness to get involved in detail. Bill Furey, A1 Easton and
Dick Levy all described specific incidents in which they were impressed
by top management attention to detail, especially on Larry's part. The
degree to which Larry's personal concern and attention to detail are
influential in projecting an overall management style was revealed in a
lunch conversation with Jim Dunn, Manpower Development Officer reporting
to Bill Furey. He described his experience on the day after his arrival
as a management trainee when he heard his father had died. He was sit-
ting in his office worrying about the ramifications of taking time off,
when President Strattner, whom he had never. met, came in. Larry told
him not to worry, to take as much time as he needed with pay, and that
his job would be waiting for him when he got back. As Jim said, "That
builds loyalty."
It is important not to conceive of this management philosophy as
individual, however, because it is truly organi zational--shared by and
consciously developed by the dominant coalition. Dick Levy s comments
about his experience working in Computer Services are illustrative.
The top management of this company has become very involved, not in
the bits and bytes of data processing or in the intricacies of how
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you get something done, but in what they want done
. . . senior man-
agement has been setting priorities and backing me in a lot of dif-
ferent situations developing products, not in an undue pressure en-
vironment, but in an understanding manner. Senior management has
made a major contribution to the success of data processing,
. . .
especially Whitehead and Cornel io.
It's a relatively smooth relationship between our area and upper
management
. , , , We seem to feed each other information rela-
tively well. I have no qualms about going to them and saying, 'Hey,
we did this wrong. I think we should regroup and start again.' . .
. the feedback is good ... in fifteen years since I've been here.
I've become more and more excited about working at Berkshire Life.
They gave me a lot of opportunity. They gave a lot of people a lot
of opportunity .... They don't tell you they're going to do
anything for you but they give you the opportunity to show that you
can do it.
Dick Levy's last comment leads to one final aspect of management philo-
sophy which was demonstrated not simply by the comments of senior mana-
gers but also by the career paths of individuals in the company. While
recognizing that they must sometimes hire technical specialists from the
outside, Berkshire Life maintains what Larry Strattner calls an "almost
fanatical insistence on promoting from within." Though less emphati-
cally, this was echoed by Cornel io and Whitehead, the two senior offi-
cers with primary human resource development responsibilities.
In addition to top management commitment and behavior, there are
also systems and policies that support many of the ideas mentioned in
the interviews. Berkshire Life will refund between fifty and one hun-
dred percent of education tuition costs incurred by full-time employees.
There is an official "open door" policy announced by a memo from the
Personnel Department that assures any employee access to any manager,
including the President, to discuss any company-related concern without
fear of retribution. There is a merit salary system wherein each
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department head is given salary parameters for every position in the
department and a certain percentage increase in the departmental budget
for salaries. Within those two constraints, department heads are
permitted to make annual salary adjustments according to their own
assessment of employee performance. Each of these policies supports a
central idea in the management philosophy at Berkshire Life.
The performance appraisal and overall compensation systems, as
mentioned earlier, were viewed by most interviewees as areas in which
Berkshire Life has not performed as well as it should. This led to a
top management decision to have Hay Associates, a very prestigious com-
pensation consulting firm, evaluate and systematically redesign the job
description and compensation guidelines at the company. This massive
intervention, concluding while this study was being conducted, was
described by all six of the initial subjects as providing a basis for
designing a more effective performance appraisal system.
Communication and information flow . As mentioned in the earlier sub-
section on Performance, certain aspects of communication were viewed as
being particular strengths of the company while the efforts to com-
municate general information to all officers or all employees were seen
as problematic. There are really three different types of communication
and information. One type is that information needed to make and imple-
ment the daily operational decisions that constitute the work of the
company. The second type of information is that which top managers re-
ceive through whatever means that lets them know how the organization is
performing in its various domains. The third type of information is
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that which is exchanged between top managers and other company employees
concerning the company as a whole, its purpose, performance, and guiding
policies, not related to specific task accomplishment. Members of the
dominant coalition discussed these three different types of communica-
tion in very different terms, although both their certainties and their
confusions were consensual ly defined.
Everyone agreed that the essential communications having to do
with the ongoing tasks of the business are a particular strong point in
the company. Several officers below the top management level mentioned
the stress Larry places on communication. A1 Cornel io described one of
his major contributions as "getting a number of diverse, 'go your own
way' departments in unison to achieve company goals." The committee
structures in his division serve this function. Almost every respondent
alluded to the committees and task forces, which are used extensively in
the Marketing Division, as being extraordinarily effective communication
forums.
In another example of his attention to communication, A1 described
altering application forms so that agents in the field would know as
soon as an application was approved without having to wait for it to be
processed. By focusing on this communication system, persistent prob-
lems were alleviated. "People complain that I've gotten involved in
detail, but over the years some people who work for me have learned to
do that."
Tom Franco's comments about the Merchandising Committee, which he
chairs, were illustrative of both the committees' usefulness in
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communication and also of the two principles of management described in
the earlier section.
[It] really is nothing more than a communication forum, because from
a line standpoint A1 makes the decisions
. . . but that doesn't
change the fact that I need to know what the decisions are and some
of the philosophy behind them. I get a hel 1 of a lot of that in the
Merchandising Committee, which then spills over into subcommittees
and hallway conversations ... and the committees are well inter-
mixed.
He went on to describe how the overlapping membership of committees in
the marketing area adds to the richness of his perspective and under-
standing. Franco's comments also showed how the committee structures
help overcome the fact, which Larry pointed out in his interview, that
an insurance company is a collection of specialists.
Bill (Furey) and I have no reporting connection, but we're on the
Merchandising Committee together and we see each other at least once
a month there and talk about a lot of things . . . which maybe we
forget otherwise, and then that prompts some other conversations . .
. I'll end up on a subcommittee with a guy from the Computer De-
partment or a guy from the Actuarial Department, people I
ordinarily wouldn't talk to for six months.
Although Dick Whitehead and Gene Amber do not employ committees quite
so extensively as A1 does in Marketing, the stress on communication is
much the same. Gene Amber described his view this way:
Communication could always be better, I don't care what the
organization is . . . We do pretty well in my rather smallish
organization, information within the division, but even there things
go astray. We try to keep people apprised of what's taking place.
Dick Whitehead focused on the impact of committees and task forces as
well, and on the quality of interaction within them.
. . .
the fact we can pull together people from various functions to
attack the problem, put someone in charge of that task force who is
not the senior person, and get them working toward a common goal
without defending their own turf . . . I think the four senior
officers set the example in that we do not all manage the same way.
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and we are not reluctant to disagree either among the four of us or
In front of other people, so that It's no secret In the company that
the four of us disagree, and It's clear that that hasn't Impaired
the four of us from cooperating or In terms of career.
He went on to describe how he holds regular staff meetings with his de-
partment heads to discuss goals, problems, etc. So, It's very clear
that the four senior officers are In essential agreement, and push a
def1n1te--and reportedly effect 1ve--approach to operational communica-
tion.
In the area of gathering relevant Information from outside the
organization, particularly as It relates to performance and the market-
ing environment, there was also agreement and a clear emphasis. In
Marketing, there are various structured ways that general agents and
agents can communicate to the home office management. In addition,
pricing analysis Is done at least once a year for every product so that
the company's position In the marketplace can be assessed. This
Information Is then fed Into the committees for discussion.
While this study was being conducted, a report was being compiled
by Bill Furey's department and the people In Agency Operations on the
performance of the company In recruiting and successfully supporting new
general agents. A1 Cornel 1o described the process of examination that
Information would go through.
I'll discuss It with the people responsible (for the report) . . .
We'll discuss It, and If there's anything we feel we should be doing
differently. Bill, Cy, and I will take It to the Marketing Committee
and we'll discuss It In the Merchandising Committee, and then If we
decide we should be doing something differently. I'll take It to the
President. So, It'll go through a number of gelling processes.
Another source of valuable Information for company management Is
the various Industry associations; there Is one of these for virtually
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6very technical specialty in the company, Dick Whitehead described the
company philosophy this way—
Our participation in industry associations is a way we perceive
things beginning to happen. Again, it is very important for us as a
company because we sit up here all by ourselves and it's easy to be
satisfied and not realize that the world is passing you by. But
there are a lot of good ideas out there we could use if we just knew
they existed, so we encourage a fair amount of participation and we
try to get our people out and part of these industry associations.
Even though there was no question designed to surface such information,
every subject except one mentioned his participation in some industry
association. So, in this area as well, a consistent pattern is evident
in the thought and action of the top management group. Just as there is
a strong emphasis on effective communication within the company in the
course of task accomplishment, there are also efforts made to establish
useful information flow into the company from outside.
The last type of communication is more amorphous; it concerns the
efforts of the dominant coalition to open up channels of communication
to lower levels of the organizational hierarchy in relation to concerns
and information that do not pertain to daily task performance. The fact
that an effort has been made here at all demonstrates the centrality of
communication in the value scheme and frame of reference of the top man-
agement group, but their only shared action-outcome understanding ex-
pressed during the interviews was one of disappointment and confusion at
the apparent lack of success in this area. The basis of that dis-
appointment was an externally conducted, anonymous Employee Attitude
Survey, Whereas the company received above average ratings for job
security, employees at Berkshire Life seemed less satisfied with efforts
of top managers to communicate with them than was the case in most life
113
insurance companies of similar size. As A1 Cornelio put it, "I was
amazed, because only six or eight months before that the President of
the company had just completed a series of meetings over coffee in
which, over the course of a year, every single employee had the op-
portunity to discuss any topic with the President."
This befuddlement was repeated or affirmed by each of the senior
officers, and this concern was the topic of group discussion at the
feedback presentation to the senior officers as well. It was clearly a
matter they had discussed on numerous previous occasions.
Customer Orientation . This area has already been touched on in the
earlier section on Performance. Every subject except Colin MacFadyen
and Bob Plageman, the two who have no direct contact with the field,
named servi ce--both to the agent and also to the policyowner, as a cen-
tral value of the company. There is no reason to quote specific indi-
viduals here, because their comments essentially repeated, with only
minor variations, the commitments explicitly outlined in the original
"Corporate Phil osophy-Ob jectives-Pol i cy-Strategy"
:
What we wi 1 1 sel
1
: Products and services will be developed within a
framework which recognizes that they are inseparabl e--that the sale
implies service and service is perforce product.
Several subjects emphasized the point that the general agents, although
employees, are in effect the customers of the home office and deserve to
be treated as such. Larry Strattner:
We preach ... and it is now a part of the company program, that it
is the job of the home office to serve the person carrying the rate
book. The agent is our customer and the policyowner is their
customer.
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This is the consensually shared idea of customer service at Berkshire
Life. Likewise, the agent is generally the conduit for feedback from
the policyowners on company products and services. As was noted in the
preceeding subsection on Communication, there are both structures and
norms operative to emphasize the value of input and feedback from the
field. These are consciously reinforced by each member of the dominant
coal ition.
Financial Orientation
.
Questions in this area focused on three issues
in financial management--profitability
,
cost effectiveness, and cost
control. Most of the discussion in the interviews focused on the last
of these three, for several reasons. First, profitability is a somewhat
different concept at the corporate level in a mutual company than in
most business firms because all income beyond cost of business and pro-
vision for a contingency reserve is returned to the policyowners in the
form of dividends. Second, profitability of individual products is ex-
tremely hard to assess, particularly in the short run, because all sales
lose money in the first year or so--due to field compensation and the
costs associated with setting up a policy--and also because it is af-
fected by long term events, such as mortality rates. These calculations
are usually left to technical specialists, the actuaries. Finally,
these vagueries make cost effectiveness, which is always very difficult
to assess, almost impossible to determine in any meaningful way in the
life insurance business. The accepted measure in the life insurance
industry is "net cost to policyowner per $1000.00 of coverage," but
again, over the life of a policy this figure can be altered substan-
tially by changes in the dividend scale.
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Given this background information, there is clear unanimity about
the basic financial goal of Berkshire Life--it is growth. This goal is
clearly established in the corporate plan:
Growth contributes to better unit cost; it helps to stabilize earn-
ings from mortality; it provides opportunities for a broader based
investment program; and most important, it helps create a climate
for attracting and retaining outstanding people. We will,
therefore, continue to pursue aggressively a course of sound growth.
This underlying commitment was implicitly obvious, and often expressed,
throughout the interviews and was well supported in the documents and
observations as well. Berkshire Life is aggressively, and successfully,
attempting to expand its business.
This effort was obvious in the marketing thrust of the organiza-
tion, A consistent commensurate effort at the home office must be made
to insure that costs of gaining and servicing that new business do not
outstrip the income it generates. This was why so much discussion
focused on cost control; in addition, it is an area where the company
experienced a severe problem in the late 1960's, and one where it ex-
perienced a highly successful solution.
The importance of that historical incident, where a work measure-
ment program was instituted with outside help and home office costs were
subsequently brought under control, was stressed by five of the six peo-
ple asked about the company orientation to cost control. The senior
officers especially spoke of having weathered that crisis as an ex-
perience that has shaped their individual and shared attitudes.
There was less agreement about the status of present cost control
efforts. Significantly, those three senior officers who elaborated on
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t h6 topic not only stdtod thoir own viow but also notod the current
disagreement among them and predicted accurately who would express
current concern and who would not. Although there was currently
disagreement about the meaning and significance of climbing costs, there
was consensus about the long-term importance of cost control and the
systems, such as work measurement, were in place to support it.
Orientation of individuals toward the organization . The four senior
officers, and everyone else interviewed or spoken to informally,
expressed very positive feelings about Berkshire Life as a place to
work. Most respondents mentioned the positive organizational climate,
and also noted that the company's outstanding performance in recent
years both has been gratifying in and of itself and also has enabled the
company to do more for its employees in the way of bonuses, benefits,
etc. In describing their view of company-wide morale, the senior
officers once again noted their surprise at some of the results in past
surveys of employee attitudes. Two of the senior officers mentioned the
fact that the company fared considerably better among employees that had
been with the company a while, and it was also noted that comments about
unfairness in work loads and compensation had been one impetus to the
comprehensive intervention by Hay Associates. The members of the
dominant coalition expressed very similar thoughts on this subject,
despite some shared sense of not knowing exactly what the nature of
action-outcome relationships are. It was clear from their comments and
past actions, such as taking regular surveys, that the levels of morale
and job satisfaction are viewed as important elements in both the
mission and the long term success of the company.
V
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Section 4. Organizational Learning
The final set of questions in the principal interview protocol
concerned the means by which shared knowledge and attitudes are de-
veloped and refined. Although to meet the demands of the model, this
process need only include members of the dominant coalition, the de-
velopment of organizational knowledge frequently includes other
organization members as well. Several subsections of the section on
Organizational Knowledge have already touched on the ways that top man-
agers described extending their action-outcome knowledge.
One of those subsections focused on responses to questions about
planning and strategy. Comments by several people demonstrate how the
act of planning itself provided for the development of organizational
knowledge. Colin MacFadyen, quoted at length earlier, described how he
viewed planning as conducive to a shared sense of discipline by the top
group. Bill Furey also described the development of shared knowledge,
almost expressed in terms of the identify of the company, and how that
led to more effective use of managerial talent:
. .
.the most important single reason why we've had less turnover,
because we've known where we're going. We defined our markets, . .
. we'd never defined our markets before. We'd tried to be al 1
things to all people and were all over the lot; corporate planning
has been vital in keeping us stable--'here's who we are, what we're
committed to, here's how we're going to go about it; here's the
market' --we started with the market and then decided what kind of
agent we needed, then what kind of agency management, then what kind
of support, then what kind of home office. So you add to that we ve
had the people plugged into the right slots in the plan, and it's
worked pretty well. Everybody was pulling in the same direction.
These comments show how the plan provides a direction and a basis for
other types of decision, a set of action-outcome understandings.
These
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original understandings also yielded performance gaps, which served as
the basis for new inquiry by the dominant coalition. A1 Cornel io de-
scribed how this occurred in the first five years.
ERISA ... is a fine example of how the planning process works very
nicely. We were going along fin,e and then hit a blip. Plan sets
out the goals, then you have to look at deviations. You have good
and bad deviations--and need to look at both. Last year we had good
deviations. After ERISA, all of a sudden we were falling off.
The same thing happened with disability income. Social Security
payments jumped way up and took away some of the incentive to work.
We had massive losses. With the plan, we had something to compare
it to. In the old days, we might have gone along buiiipity-bumpi ty
.
We wouldn't have known to take a look because we wouldn't have known
where we were supposed to be. ... Ihe plan caused us to look at
the deviations. It turns out these deviations were the result of
external events that required new adjustments, not in the basic plan
--which was still sound, but in some of our ways of implementing the
plan.
These essential themes about the usefulness of the plan and the plan-
ning process were repeated again and again. Every single interview sub-
ject gave much of the credit for the company's recent performance to the
plan and the planning procedures instituted in 1972.
Another way of developing shared knowledge of the organization
which was mentioned by most interviewees is the extensive use of com-
mittees and task forces. These have been documented already, particu-
larly in the subsections on Communication and Information Flow and on
Management Philosophy. It is worth quoting Larry Strattner again.
The committee structure affords special ists wi th input into the
overall company. The Management Committee is focal in providing
overall direction. Any major decision is discussed in the Man-
agement Committee; consensus is the goal, but I will play referee
when I have to.
This type of exchange almost inevitably leads to a shared under-
standing at least about how each individual views the company, even
if
it does not lead to agreement on direction.
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Another top management learning tool has been the fairly regular
use of consultants. At least three times since Larry Strattner became
President, major consulting firms have been hired to assist in improving
organizational performance. The specific projects have been in tech-
nical areas--work measurement, field compensation systems, and home
office compensation systems. These experiences have also helped shape
top management attitudes.
The decision to host and fund the project described here is
another example of the use of outside resources. The dominant coalition
did not initiate the project, but provided the opportunity, they
discussed as a group the possible costs and benefits, met as a group for
the initial presentation of the project, contributed significant amounts
of time to the interviews, and then met as a group again to hear and
discuss the results. At that point, they indicated some of the feedback
might well prove useful to them.
Similarly, they have employed outside people to take employee
attitude surveys. Then they have discussed those results in depth and
used them, to some degree, to guide future decisions. They have drawn
on the opportunities provided by industry associations for individual
learning, and there is historical and interview data to suggest they
have used that individual learning as a starting point for group
learning.
The senior officers mentioned other activities as well when asked
how public knowledge of the company's performance and philosophy gets
developed and extended. They described officers meetings, held six
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times a year, and the company newsletter that goes to all employees.
These seemed to be, as they described them anyway, more attempts by the
dominant coalition to communicate to the employees, as opposed to ef-
forts to generate new knowledge among the top four.
One final source of dominant coalition learning deserves mention.
The other three senior officers each gave a great deal of credit to
Larry Strattner for both promoting certain ideas explicitly and modeling
principles that have become known as corporate values. He was
frequently mentioned as the exemplor of the company management philo-
sophy and the company approach to communication. It was his idea to
merge the two old divisions into a single Marketing Services division,
and that idea of marketing as a process from product development to
point of sale has become a central concept in the organizational
knowledge base--in the conception of the company as "marketing driven."
Other interviewees, below the senior management level, described Larry
as contributing "discipline," "organization," and "concern for people"
to the corporate philosophy.
Several respondents, including two senior officers, said informal
conversations were a source of new thoughts and ideas. As they
elaborated, it seemed that in such instances, these spontaneous dis-
cussions usually lead to examination of such a topic in a more formal
meeting, such as a committee.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW DATA
INTERVIEW
SUBJECT
FUTURE
DOMINANT CORPORATE
COALITION DIRECTION
KEY
CORPORATE
GOALS
ENVIRONMENTAL
TRENDS OF
IMPACT
#1 Senior Officers
A1 Cornel io
Basical ly
the
same
Recruiting
GA's
New prods.
New comp.
Demographics
Techno, trends
#2
Larry Strattner
A1 Cornel io
Senior Officers
Planning Group
basical ly
the
same
Recruiting
GA's
Field backup
Inflation
New prods.
New comp.
#3
Senior Officers
Easton, Herk-
lotts. Levy
Basical ly
the
same
Recruiting
GA's
Field backup
New comp.
New prods.
Inflation
Tech, trends
#4
Senior Officers
Co rnel io
Easton
Basical ly
the
same
Recruiting
GA's
Growth
Inflation
Economic growth
New prods.
#5
Larry Strattner Basically
A1 Cornel io the
Senior Officers same
Recruiting
GA's
Insuring GA
qual ity
Inflation
New prods.
New comp.
Tax changes
Demographics
#6
Larry Strattner
A1 Cornel io
Dick Whitehead
Gene Amber
Basical ly
the
same
Recruiting
GA's
New prods.
Demographics
#7
A1 Cornel io
Senior Officers
Basical ly
the
same
Recrui ting
GA's NA
#8
Senior Officers
Larry Strattner
A1 Cornelio
Basical 1y
the
same
Upgrading
quality of
GA's
Technol ogical
trends
#9
Senior Officers
Larry Strattner
A1 Cornelio
Dick Whitehead
NA NA NA
?n5 Larry Strattner
Senior Officers NA NA Inflation
NA = Not asked or addressed spontaneously.
Many of these summarizing words may not be clear without referring to
the text of Chapter IV.
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TABLE 2 (continued)
INTERVIEW
SUBJECT
NUMERICAL
GOALS &
MEASURES
STRENGTHS
mm
IMPROVE-
MENT
PLANNING
PROCESS
#1 Sati sfied
Service to
agent &
customer
Not much,
Overal 1 com-
munication
could be
better,
Perf. appraisal
Track clear
Not too soph-
i sticated
Integrated
#2 Sati sfied
Very difficult
to figure
Service
Competitive
products
Computer
services
Not much
Communication
of broader
i ssues
Track clear
Committees
monitor
Per. gaps
show up
#3
l^lot satisfied.
Not enough
depth of
understanding
Open comm.
Service
Sales sup-
port
Financi al
planning.
Training of
sales org.
,
Perf. appraisal
Not enough
eval uation
Not enough
partici pat ion
Markets clear
#4 Sati sfied
Service
Quality
people
Growth in
assets
Provided
groundwork
Effective
#5 Satisfied
Service to
field
Communica-
tion
Computer back-
up
Perf. appraisal
Recruiting GA's
A blueprint
Direction
,
markets clear
Consensus
built
#6 Sati sfied
Service to
fiel d
Growth in
assets
Perf. appraisal
Track clear
Di recti on,
more impor-
tant than
goal s
#7
Numbers not
rel evant
Service
Backup to
field
Numerical
goals
Perf. appraisal
Exercise good
Markets clear
Plan vague
Committee
fill gap
#8 NA
Service, esp
fi el d
1
.
NA
Clear markets
Focus on GA
recruiting
#9
Numbers not
relevant to
departments
NA NA
Track clear
Goals clear
#10 NA NA
Reviews of
plan
Provided
di scipl ine
NA = Not asked or addressed spontaneously.
Many of these summarizing words may not be clear without referring to
the text of Chapter IV.
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TABLE 2 (continued)
INTERVIEW
SUBJECT
“MANAGEMENT OTmuNICATION CUTTUmTR
PHILOSOPHY FLOW ORIENTATION
'TINAUCIffC
ORIENTATION
#1
Consensus
Commi ttees
integrate
Managers manage
Field input
EAS* indi-
problem
Lots of
effort here
Se rvice
Strong com-
munication
Agent as
customer
Cost concerns
Hi story
#2
Upen comm. Field input I
Concern for Committees !
jood prods. Controls impor-
Service and tant
employees Surprise at
Detail EAS
backup to Time lags affect
field calculation
Hi story
Open comm. Task forces and Service Overviews need
#3 Committees and
task forces
committees
Open door
Strong commit-
ment
to be improved
Profitabil i ty
Managers manage Strong commit-
ment
Sales support needs moni-
toring
#4
Cohens ive, open
Theory Y
Managers manage
Could be better
Open door
Info for deci-
sions good
Service is key
Strong commit-
ment
Cost effective,
i nstil led
Hi sto ry
Open comm. Committees Planning be- Controls effec-
#5 Consensus
People oriented
Matrix
Strong commit-
ment
gins with
customer
Agent as
customer
tive
Hi story
People oriented Commi ttees Field oriented Shared, commit-
#6 Open Door Open door Strong com-
Strong commit- ment
ment
Good lateral comm.
ment, lax at
moment
History
Committees Committees Service best NA
#7 Managers manage
Trust in people
Flexible
are key avail able
#8
Informal
,
open
Suppo rti ve
Involved
Open exchange
Trust evident
Service Controls effec-
Strong commit- tive, impor-
ment to field tant, useful
#9
Informal
,
open
Can be tough
Goal oriented
Participatory
Participation
encouraged
Open comm.
NA
Hi sto ry
Precedent for
pi anning
Very important
#10
Informal
Well organized
Informal
Info available
if interested
NA NA
NA = Not asked or addressed spontaneously.
Many of these summarizing words may not be clear without referring to
the text of Chapter IV.
*EAS = Employee Attitude Survey
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Section 5, Discussion and Analysis
The central issue remaining, based on the information presented in
the previous three sections, is--does Berkshire Life function as a
learning organization? More specifically, does the dominant coalition
at Berkshire Life consciously and deliberately develop a progressively
more useful and effective knowledge base to guide its actions and de-
cisions? The answer to both questions is clearly "yes." All the var-
ious components of the organizational learning model are well rep-
resented in the data.
Dominant Coalition . The dominant coalition is so unanimously and con-
sistently verified--by self-report, third party report, organizational
structure, document analysis, and behavior during and in relation to the
project--as to be established beyond doubt. Not only do the four senior
officers collectively control the company's resources, but by all
accounts they have provided stable and influential political leadership
as well. MacMillan (1978) distinguishes between power and influence,
and the dominant coalition at Berkshire Life holds both the legitimate
power to restructure situations and the influence to restructure the
perceptions of organizational members. In MacMillan's terms, they hold
a tremendous amount of "political capability."
Organizational Knowledge . In order to be considered organizational , an
action-outcome relationship reported by a single member must be accepted
consensual ly by all members of the dominant coalition. It must also be
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public and accessible to all coalition members, expressed in terms all
of them understand, and integrated into a system of other action-outcome
understandings. Many concepts of the functioning and underlying philo-
sophy of the company described by the dominant coalition and other man-
agers at Berkshire Life meet all of these requirements.
In the areas of future direction of the company, environmental
trends, management style, organizational communication, attitudes toward
the customer and the agent, financial orientation, the strengths and
weaknesses of the company—in all these areas there is a remarkable de-
gree of agreement in all of the data. There are areas of disagreement
as well, but the way in which these were reported supports the self-
reports concerning communication and management philosophy. Open dis-
agreement and debate are apparently encouraged.
The accessibility of knowledge was also reported. Not a single
respondent reported any area of company performance or functioning that
was taboo for discussion. This knowledge is for the most part not only
cultivated within the dominant coalition but also disseminated widely to
^
other members.
The interviews at Berkshire Life, the quoted passages in the ear-
lier sections of this chapter show, were for the most part free of tech-
nical jargon or cliqueish phraseology. Even if an effort was made to
present information in this form to an unsophisticated outsider, which
is doubtful given the spontaneous and relaxed delivery of most par-
ticipants, then it has demonstrated the ability of the coalition
members
to describe shared ideas in communicable form. This was further
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evidenced by the fact that, even though substantial consensus existed,
each subject expressed these core ideas in a form and by drawing con-
nections that were uniquely individual. For example, one officer said
that he felt a course in Transactional Analysis given by external
trainers to all managers had been a major turning point in altering
barriers to effective work communication. Not a single other subject
even mentioned the event, but all characterized the commitment to open
communication as being accepted and firmly supported at the top of the
organization.
Finally, there was considerable evidence of integration among the
various action-outcome understandings. The process view of marketing
embodied in the company structure, complete with ongoing committees
where technical specialists jointly define problems and solutions,
demonstrates one aspect of this integration. The various efforts to
provide job security, design fair compensation systems, open access to
top managers, and develop individuals within the organization showed
both an integrated concern for people and also an understanding of the
impact employee morale and satisfaction can have on performance. The
fact that the Management Committee meets regularly, that every division
is represented, and that each decision is discussed in an effort to
reach consensus demonstrated an appreciation for the importance of all
affected parties understanding and being committed to a decision. The
same could be said of the broad departmental representation on the
long-range planning task force. •
There are significant areas where integration is lacking, at least
to the degree it was uncovered in this study. Although the interviews
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were not designed to uncover issues of corporate social responsibility,
only a single respondent mentioned any concern, or even thoughts, about
this area except in the context of exhibiting concern for employees.
Likewise, one senior officer expressed the need for more overall
integration of financial management, a concern which was significantly
not expressed by anyone else.
Of course there would be areas where organizational knowledge has
not been extended, and there were areas--like the one concerning com-
munication with employees beyond issues of task performance- -where what
the dominant coalition shares is a feeling of mystification. The
important fact is that there were very important areas of company
functioning where the dominant coalition had developed an integrated,
consensual, accessible, and communicable set of action-outcome under-
standings.
Organizational Learning . Given that a well established dominant coali-
tion possesses a well developed organizational knowledge base, there was
also ample evidence that this coalition has been (and is) engaged in a
continuous learning process in which it is consciously and deliberately
extending the parameters of its shared knowledge.
There is some evidence in the literature to suggest that
formalized planning processes alone correlate with improved economic
performance in business organizations (Hofer and Schendel , 1978).
Planning has certainly made a key contribution to the improving economic
performance at Berkshire Life; in the comments of the senior officers,
it has been perhaps the most important element in that
improvement.
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Theorists in strategic planning tend to be rationalists, however; they
rarely mention the political foundation of an effective planning pro-
cess. This foundation has been evident at Berkshire Life since before a
formal plan was ever instituted. Still, the plan and the planning
I
process--as the comments quoted earlier indicated--have been a critical
method of defining and making explicit the organizational knowledge base
and then of refining it. Bill Furey's comments about how definition of
the markets led logically to more careful definition of every aspect of
the business show beautifully how integration was a vital aspect of that
organizational knowledge base, and also how the plan promoted that
integration. The juxtaposed quote from A1 Cornel io shows how the per-
formance gaps that grew out of monitoring the plan led to new
organizational knowledge. Duncan and Weiss (1979) emphasized the
importance of performance gaps as a starting point for organizational
1 earning.
In fact, the senior management seems to have employed a wide range
of learning strategies beyond planning. They have promoted individual
learning, relying on intra-organi zational communication to capitalize
on ideas that might thus be introduced. They have made regular use of
external consultants, trainers, and researchers; they have developed
systems of generating information about the environment, and par-
ticularly about their competitors, which assist them in product de-
velopment, pricing, etc.
The dominant coalition at Berkshire Life provides an excellent
example. It would appear, of Wllensky's (1967) emphasis on the
quality
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of top management questions as the basis of quality information. As A1
Cornel io emphasized repeatedly, the plan was as important because of
what it permitted him to stop doing as it was for what it directed him
to do. He and his staff stopped pursuing every appealing idea; they
stopped researching the college market or the mortgage insurance market.
As this delineation sank in, he and his staff were able to focus one
hundred percent of their attention on the questions that might make a
difference—those that pertained to the professional and small busi-
nessperson and the other companies out to get the same business.
One organizational learning strategy deserves analysis in some
depth. In describing the basis of planning for innovation at Texas
Instruments, Patrick Haggerty repeatedly emphasizes the concept of
"coupling" (Dowling, 1970; Jelinek, 1980). By this he means the
juxtapositioning of specialists from different fields in the context of
a common product development problem. Jelinek (1980) goes on to de-
scribe how this approach to innovation was institutionalized, insuring
continuous innovation, in the Objectives, Strategies, Tactics (OST) pro-
cess. On a much smaller scale, with a shorter time frame, Berkshire
Life has built this same "coupling" into its marketing committee
structures. The product line is limited, so they do not organize around
projects unless a task force is needed to address some specific issue.
The standing committees, however, bring together all the specialists who
are involved in a specific function. In this way, everyone has input
into the original decision, limiting the likelihood of a need later for
significant changes. Task forces drawing on specialists or affected
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departments are called together from across all three divisions when
some corporate-wide issue needs to be addressed. This type of ongoing
exchange seems to have promoted both effective problem solving and com-
mitment to impl ementat ion j even as it developed a shared perspective on
the specific problem, it reinforced in an ongoing way a general company
philosophy about how to solve problems.
Organizational Paradigm
. The paradigmatic nature of many of the con-
sensual ly held ideas was quite obvious. When Larry Strattner or Gene
Amber described a company-wide commitment to service, they were not re-
ferring to some specific approach to handling inquiries from the field.
They were describing a philosophical commitment, a general attitude they
want to cultivate in all employees to be applied in every exchange with
an agent, a customer, a fellow employee, whomever. The commitments to
consensus building, to concern for employees, to open communication, or
to fair compensation can each be viewed in a similar light. Each could
be shown to have quite specific and quite beneficial behavioral cor-
relates, but the dominant coalition was--as it must be--concerned with
the underlying principles. Obviously, this did not preclude specific
actions. When A1 Cornel io got involved in details of paper flow or when
Larry Strattner went to Jim Dunn's office to offer his condolences and
personal reassurance, they were genuinely committed to addressing that
specific issue, but the fact that it was the Executive Vice President or
the President made it also a symbolic act. Pfeffer (1980) and Peters
(1980) emphasize the significance of just such behavior by top
management. Larry Strattner has so solidly established a pattern of
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such g6stur6s, thdt mor© thdn once people responded to the question
about a company management style by saying, in effect, "It's Larry's
style." It is important to understand that noting the "symbolic" or
"political" significance of such actions in no way calls their sincerity
into question, it simply indicates what Allen and Pilnick (1973)
emphasized, that few factors have as much impact on organizational norms
as top management modeling. In the case of Berkshire Life, this seems
to be true within the dominant coalition as well as at lower levels of
the hierarchy.
In the interviews, Larry Strattner and the other senior officers
were very clear about their conscious efforts to shape the paradigm at
Berkshire Life, Although in some cases it seems they may have been more
frustrated in these efforts than in their more directly task related
leadership, there can be little doubt that these paradigmatic concerns
have stimulated efforts at organizational learning in much the same way
that more functional, specific concerns led to organizational learning
in more limited spheres of action.
Summary . The entire organizational learning cycle (See Figure 2, pg.
63) is amply demonstrated at Berkshire Life. The dominant coalition es-
tablished an organizational knowledge base at least as long ago as 1972
and there have been continuous efforts to refine it in varied spheres of
organizational action, from field recruiting to product development to
compensation in the home office. These efforts have led to pro-
gressively clearer role definitions, especially for managers immediately
below the senior officer level. These changes have permitted more
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systematic efforts still at the extension of valid knowledge about the
effects of organizational actions.
The next level of analysis concerns the meta-purpose of this
study, the assessment of the usefulness of the model in the analysis of
organizations. That issue is the core of the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
One of the risks of this type of research design is that the
researcher has a great deal to do with what kind of information is
gathered and complete control over what is reported. This project
generated over two hundred pages of interview transcripts as well as
observation notes, documents, and a wealth of data which went unrecorded
except in the researcher's memory. There were eleven trips to the site,
several of which lasted all day. Since the model guided the search for
information, and presumably shaped the researcher's perceptions as well,
there is the possibility on the face of it that the project simply dis-
covered what the researcher already believed to be true.
Counterbalancing this problem, however, there were thorough checks
built into the design. There were ample opportunities for the senior
managers at Berkshire Life to offer conflicting points of view or to
question the accuracy of the conclusions; there would have been little
point in their attempting to mislead the researcher, since their invest-
ment in the outcome of the project was minimal. It is also unlikely
that so many different sources of information could be made congruent
intentional ly.
Barring informant censoring, the other way that researcher bias
could have affected the project would be through omission of significant
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findings or neglect of strategies of investigation that might have un-
covered problematic information. The procedures are reported in full
and the findings are summarized systematically; of course, there is
still the danger of researcher selectivity, but here again, the evidence
reported converges so consistently that whatever the researcher might
have added or subtracted would be of minor significance compared to what
has been reported. Alternative explanations can be offered for the re-
markable overlap in subject responses, but the consensual agreement in
so many areas is factual, the structure of the company is factual, and
the economic performance of the company is factual
.
Interpreting and labeling such data is the leap of research, and
in an exploratory field study, the leap is a long one--one not generally
taken without faith. Yet the primary benefit of this type of research
is precisely that it provides a perspective that might never be obtained
through the orderly additions of more rigorous research designs. Given
a description of that destination point, the point from which new ex-
planations or new integrations are possible, subsequent research may
indicate the small, component truths that made the original leap of
faith successful
.
The destination point in this project was a new, more integrative
explanation for the fact that some organizations are remarkably effec-
tive over time while others are not. The starting point for this study
was a model of organizational learning that appeared, on the basis of
theory, to offer such an explanation. The purpose of the study was to
see whether or not that model might usefully provide the basis for
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The conclusion is that it did in this exploratory study, and that it can
be even more usefully employed in the future. Before examining the
reasons for this in more detail, it may be useful to retrace the theory
and the research.
The model of organizational learning . The most important sources of
the model are political theories of organizing and decision making.
These theories establish the inevitability of coalitions in
organizational life and provide a coalitional or political explanation
for corporate action, the dominant coalition. This is the starting
point of the model, the group which collectively determines the long-
term direction of the organization. This group then becomes the focus
of attempts to explain organizational effectiveness, and the rest of the
model flows from that point; the dominant coalition which improves
organizational performance over the long-term must be capable of learn-
ing. Since individual learning is insufficient, the learning must be
extensions--non-accidental extensions--of the knowledge shared by that
group as a whole. This is the origin of the social requirements of
organizational knowl edge--that it be consensual, accessible, com-
municable, and integrated. Conscious and deliberate development of
organizational knowledge by the dominant coalition is organizational
learning. An important subject of inquiry by the dominant coalition is
that set of norms, beliefs, and commonly held principles which give the
organization its unique personal ity--the paradigm. The paradigm both
shapes and is shaped by actions in every sphere of the organization.
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It is through the progressive and continuous refinement of this
organizational knowledge base that organizational learning takes on real
significance. As action-outcome relationships are more clearly under-
stood, and related more closely into an integrated system of knowledge,
performance gaps become easier to identify and roles and responsibili-
ties become easier to establish and evaluate. These processes in turn
lead to the development of new organizational knowledge. The dynamic
nature of this model is illustrated in Figure 4. This learning dynamic
produces a more and more extensive and integrated organizational knowl-
edge base. Various technical knowledge specialties must be included in
this knowledge base, but it is the paradigm which serves to integrate
the different subsystems and to guide the organizational actions taken
in each technical domain. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between
various components of the organizational knowledge base. Figure 6 shows
how these different aspects of organizational knowledge are both pro-
duced by and productive of organizational action. The dominant coali-
tion always serves as the "learner" of this knowledge, and unless all
members of the coalition have access to this knowledge, it is not truly
organizational
.
The research results . In an exploratory case study of Berkshire Life
Insurance Company, each element of the model was identified in terms of
specific people, ideas, and processes within the company. The dominant
coalition at Berkshire Life deliberately and consistently attempts to
improve an already extensive and integrated knowledge base. Hence
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING DYNAMIC
Fig. 4. The dominant coalition selectively
monitors organizational outcomes and then feeds new
organizational knowledge into the organization to
shape new actions.
138
ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
STRATEGIC
PLANNING
Fig. 5. This shows visually how organizational
knowledge is the combination of technical knowledge in
different domains of organizational action and the paradigm,
which serves to integrate and guide organizational action
within technical specialties.
THE FLOW OF ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE INTO
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION AND VICE VERSA
Fig. 6, This diagram illustrates how the
various components of organizational knowledge guide
organizational action and are in turn shaped by
those actions and their perceived consequences.
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Berkshire Life was found to be a good example of on-going organizational
1 earning.
What this means in more detail is important. First, it was found
that the four senior officers--the President, Executive Vice President--
Marketing, Senior Vice President--Investment
,
and Senior Vice
Pres ident- -Admi ni strati on- -cons i dered themselves, and were likewise con-
sidered by everyone else, to be determining the future direction of the
company. Thus, all questions of long-term goals, of significant com-
mitments of company resources, and therefore of long-term effectiveness,
are the responsibility and ultimately the product of this group.
Second, this group has systematically developed a knowledge base
that guided its actions. The degree of consensual agreement, par-
ticularly in the essential areas of daily operations and long term
direction, was striking. Management philosophy, financial and customer
service orientations, company markets, and the serious trends affecting
those markets were all points of detailed agreement expressed in very
practical, applicable terms. None of the senior officers, or the of-
ficers below them that participated in the research, have any questions
or confusions regarding the direction of the company in its economic or
managerial actions or about their personal role and priorities in pro-
moting company performance in that context. There were certainly areas
where organizational knowledge was lacking or so vague as to be of only
marginal usefulness; these areas, such as overall financial management,
have not been subjects of particular problems, however.
This sort of clarity in relation to corporate direction and
individual contribution is a substantial achievement, and one which was
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obtained through a number of processes that meet the definition of
organizational learning. Planning was mentioned routinely as a source
of continued redefinition of company commitments and strategies.
Similarly, committees and task forces which bring together people from
diverse specialities and company roles have promoted a shared sense of
corporate endeavor at the same time that they have contributed new,
integrative solutions to organizational problems. External people and
organizations have also been called upon to offer new knowledge which
became part of the organizational knowledge base. Organizational learn-
ing proceeded by all these routes, and the dominant coal i tion--and other
managers as wel l--credi ted these processes with the company's success.
Obviously, these processes have not been divorced from the personal
leadership qualities of the top managers either, particularly those of
the President.
Conclusions
This final point in the summary is the key one for the purposes
of the overall study. Research guided by the model focused on precisely
those processes which the people who have worked in the company--most of
them for more than twenty years--described as central in determining
organizational effectiveness. Explanations for the importance of these
different processes, and prescriptions of their importance, have been
offered before. In fact, the various managers sometimes spoke in terms
of different theories: "Theory Y management style," "matrix organiza-
tion," strategic planning, etc. These and other ideas have been
developed piecemeal, however, and no one of them could serve as the
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integrating theory for the rest. The model of organizational learning
fills that role, and hence represents a significant advance in the
fields of organizational behavior and organization development. The fact
that it also led to successful inquiry into a single organization indi-
cates, in a preliminary way, that it is not only broadly integrative but
also sufficiently specific as to lend itself to diagnosis and predic-
tion. Hence, it seems to meet the tests of a good theory--extensivity
,
parsimony, empirical validity, internal consistency, testability, and
usefulness (Epstein, 1973). Since the overriding purpose of this study
has been to assess the value of a particular theory of organizational
learning, it makes sense to address each of these points discreetly as a
way of presenting the assessment of the model.
Extensi vi ty . This theory accounts for a very wide range of phenomena.
Its starting point is a political analysis of organizational life, and
it therefore provides a perspective on and integrates prior contribu-
tions to theories of individual and group behavior in organizations. As
Pettigrew's study (1973) shows, the tensions that arise between tech-
nical, functional, or divisional specialties within organizations can be
understood in political terms. The responses at Berkshire Life which
described the functional bases of individual power would at once support
Pettigrew's conclusions and demonstrate how inquiry in organizational
learning points up the significant bases of political action.
In their original proposal of the organizational learning model
which was fundamental to this project, Duncan and Weiss (1979) demon-
strate how this model can serve as the "macro" theory for a "middle
V
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range" theory of organizational design. Similarly, discussion in Chap-
ter II indicates how the social criteria of organizational knowledge can
provide a starting point for investigation of information processing in
an organization. Here again, the responses at Berkshire Life both ad-
dressed these issues of management and also integrated them into a
larger explanation of corporate functioning.
Pfeffer (1980) describes how literature on organizational behavior
can be viewed as falling into one of two school s--the phenomenological
and behavioral school which is concerned with managerial issues and the
more quantitative, "macro" school which is concerned with patterns of
organizational responses to general economic and environmental con-
ditions. Pfeffer cites evidence to indicate that the latter, more
termini Stic school of thought can explain most influences on organiza-
tional performance, influences which for the most part are out of the
control of managers, especially in the short term. This would support
the focus of the organizational learning model on long term goal
achievement. More importantly, the organizational learning model--while
being clearly of the phenomenological-behavioral school--bridges the gap
between the two by not being content or form specific. It is suffi-
ciently general, and not at all prescriptive in the behavioral sense, as
to emphasize management adjustment to whatever ongoing environmental
forces affect the organization. Figure 7 illustrates the theoretical
congruence of the organizational learning model with other theories, and
its significance as an integrative and "linking" theory.
An important aspect of extensivity lA^ich cannot be fully addressed
of the limitations of the study,at this point concerns one
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general izabil ity. Because the theory has never been applied in actual
research in a very large firm, a large public bureaucracy, or a firm
which faces more strictly technical concerns--such as a mining
operation, there can be no certainty that the model would provide
insight into the factors determining effectiveness. There is no
apparent logical or theoretical reason why it would not, however.
Parsimony
. One of the very great strengths of the organizational
learning model is its simplicity and economy. It is not weighted down
with extraneous concerns and its postulates are both broad enough to
provide for integration of many phenomena and specific enough to provide
some guidance as to the significance of phenomena, or of subtheories
pertaining to certain types of phenomena. This can be illustrated in
several ways.
Argyris and Schon (1978) spent a great deal of time developing the
idea of two "archetypes" of organizations--Model I organizations which
are characterized by rigid policies and procedures, conflicting norms
and values, and the general inability to inquire, and Model II organi-
zations which are characterized by flexibility, inquiry, and resolution
of implicit conflict. Although the categories are interesting and may
be of descriptive value, they appear ultimately superfluous, and perhaps
misleading. Berkshire Life would seem on the face of it to represent
Model II, but there are areas in which inquiry does not take place, and
there never seems to have been a discontinuous leap from Model I to
Model II. Although the planning task force of 1972 may have been an
example of dutero-1 earning , of learning to learn, there were clear
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HIERARCHY OF THEORIES EXPLAINING ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
Focus
Broadest
\/
Most Specific
Level of Theory
Soci o-cul t ural and Economic Theories
(i.e. Sociological and Economic Models)
Organi zation-Envi ronment Theories
(i.e. Open Systems Models)
Organizational Theories
(i.e. Organizational Learning Model
developed herein)
Subsystem Theories
(i.e. Organization Design Models)
Group Behavior Theories
(i.e. Group Development Models)
Individual Behavior Theories
(i.e. Leadership, Management Style,
and Motivation Models)
Figure 7. Although knowledge of the first and second levels in
this hierarchy can inform management decisions, only the four lower
levels pertain to areas which actually fall under top management
control. The promise of the organizational learning model is that it
provides a framework for integrating all the theories at the four lower
levels in a way which does not contradict the importance of the first
two levels.
In addition, there are very general theories such as information
processing theories or systemic learning theories (Bateson, 1979) that
can be applied at every level of the hierarchy above. They lack
specificity, however; while more specific, the organizational learning
model is still congruent with these theories.
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that original process. Most importantly, however. Model I and Model IS
add nothing to the analysis of those learning phenomena, they are just
theoretical labels requiring explanation. The model used in this
research, while relying on invented terminology in some degree, is not
laden with the labels and implicit value judgments of the Argyris and
Schon theory, and as a result is cleaner and easier to present and to
use. This heightens both its analytical and its heuristic value.
Another strength of the model in terms of parsimony is its dis-
tance from any specific behavior. Although planning played a prominent
role in the reports of organizational learning at Berkshire Life, the
model is not attached to planning, or matrix structure, or any other
specific behaviors or structures. At the same time, its concepts pro-
vide an explanation for the utility of planning, and theories of
strategic planning can be integrated comfortably into the model. This
combination of being one step removed from the behavior itself and yet
clearly attached to behavioral processes is a peculiar strength of the
model
.
Empirical validity . Does the organizational learning model reflect
reality? It seems clear that it reflects the reality of Berkshire Life;
the theory seems to both indicate what data should be collected and how
it can be viewed. Although explanations of the data and its signifi-
cance were offered by participants in the research, their explanations
were less comprehensive than that offered by the model. It should also
be remembered that the model is itself an outgrowth of an empirical
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research tradition, as opposed to the more purely theoretical --and less
real i stic--concepts of organizational action and decision making that
have grown out of the more quantitative and rationalistic approaches.
Although this study presents only a single, very limited test of
its empirical val idi ty--an(i in fact avoids the most crucial question,
causal ity--there is reason to trust its empirical basis. Not only does
it grow out of empirical studies of decision making, but it seems to be
broadly appl icabl e--much more so than this single case study can indi-
cate. Analysis of published cases provides some additional suppport.
(See Appendix B.) Finally, there is some convergence with the results
of descriptive studies. In the broadest analysis to date of long-term
effective companies, McKinsey and Co. (1980) has outlined six basic
similarities between the companies surveyed:
a) a clear guiding philosophy, often identified with a single,
well-known individual or small directing group;
b) a strong orientation to meet customer needs and maintain
customer satisfaction;
c) an emphasis on smallness and flexibility in internal organiza-
tion;
d) strong internal accountability systems, even as rapid changes
take place;
e) attention to the development of people within the organization;
and,
f) careful, thorough integration of various subsystems.
Berkshire Life appears to share many of these same characteristics,
some
of which pertain directly to the model and some of which
do not.
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Importantly, the McKinsey report stresses the uniqueness of each com-
'
pany's approach to, and evolution in relations to, these issues; what it
does not offer is any explanatory theory.
^
The model provides such a
basis for explanation, and hence for prediction. If the model is
empirically valid, it will provide the basis for predictions; an example
might be: "long-term effective companies will have a clear, stable
dominant coalition over long periods of time." More emphasis on the
importance of predictive accuracy will be given in the next subsection,
but suffice it to say that the model is at least congruent with the best
descriptive studies available on long-term effective organizations.
The McKinsey study also points up a gap in the model. As orig-
inally proposed, the model does not distinguish between different areas
of organizational knowledge. Yet, all knowledge is not of equal signi-
ficance. The model at this point offers only one qualitative distinc-
tion, that being an emphasis on the importance of knowledge relating to
organizational learning processes; the model implicitly stresses the
significance of knowledge of those processes..
At the same time, empirical evidence in the McKinsey data, other
research, and the data from Berkshire Li fe--indicates that other types
of knowledge are similarly vital. Marketing knowledge, including the
orientation toward customer needs, would be one example; this includes
an implicit definition of who the customer is, a validation of the
importance of knowing the organizational purpose or mission. Similarly,
the McKinsey data, with its stress on a guiding philosophy, and the
Berkshire Life data as well, indicate the central importance of an ex-
plicit paradigm. The idea of the paradigm is sort of tacked onto the
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original model, and is not well connected to it theoretically. What is
needed is a comprehensive statement of what the most important areas of
organizational inquiry are; the descriptive data gathered to date offers
some powerful indications, and even some good conceptualizations. More
specificity in this aspect of the model would be a substantive addition
to it.
There are other, less significant ideas which might benefit the
model as well, and heighten its empirical reliability. Although the
present indications are mostly anecdotal and sketchy, an example might
focus on the types of events that characteristically present learning
opportunities and what types of conditions must be in place for a domi-
nant coalition to benefit. At Berkshire Life, the crisis in cost
control in 1968-9 might be considered such an event, similar in kind to
the inventory crises at General Motors in 1920 or at Texas Instruments
in the early 1960's. All three seem to have had a precipitating effect.
Attempting to include such relatively "micro" explanations in the
overall model, however, represents one of the dangers of attempting too
much empirical specificity. Unless clearly separated from the organiz-
ing constructs of the model, such specificity could undermine the ex-
tens ivity and economy of the model. By the same token, however, it is
important that the model is capable of providing guidance to research
into such limited phenomena and to possibly be congruent with micro-
level theories which explain them.
An example of a specific hypothesis that the model might call into
question is drawn from Pettigrew (1973), who in turn drew on other
decision theorists. His contention is that "innovative" decisions lead
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to more political activity than "routine" ones, which can be sys-
tematized. His study, conducted in an organization where little or no
organizational learning took place at the highest levels, confirms this
hypothesis. The results from Berkshire Life and those of Jelinek ( 1979 )
would indicate that learning organizations handle innovative decisions
in much the same way they handle routine ones, except that the innova-
tive ones obviously receive more top management attention. The model
might suggest then, that the handling of innovative decisions would be a
point of differentiation between learning and non-learning
organi zations.
Empirical validity has been a stumbling block in the behavioral
sciences generally where the object of investigation was too complex for
laboratory replication or even for control of variables. This the-
oretical model, dealing as it does with a very broad range of ex-
ceedingly complex phenomena, is particularly susceptible to criticism in
terms of its adherence to reality.
Of necessity, it is divorced from the data to a level of abstrac-
tion where the complexity and richness of the subject can be selectively
screened; and naturally, no firm link of causality can be established
between the presence of organizational learning and long-term effective-
ness. As was stated at the outset, there is no consensus even about the
meaning of "effectiveness." For the purposes of this study, effective-
ness has been accepted as the capacity to meet long-term objectives as
established by the dominant coalition. Given that starting point, and
the present impossibility of establishing causal relationships, this
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study makes a first positive step in establishing a correlational re-
lationship between organizational learning and organizational effective-
ness. In the current state of behavioral science, that is a significant
first step in the direction of establishing empirical validity.
Internal Consistency
. The organizational learning model is so simple
at this stage of development that any logical inconsistency would likely
be apparent. As various postulates and sub-theories are added, however,
this will become more of a problem.
The logical consistency in the model itself is best illustrated by
the cyclical nature of organizational learning as described by the model
(see Figure 2, pg. 63). As the dominant coalition investigates per-
formance gaps or generates new knowledge through other means, it is cor-
respondingly able to define clearer roles and responsibilities in the
organization. This increased accountability leads to a firmer def-
inition of the dominant coalition and the cycle is reinforced. The
assumptions on which the model is based, such as the assumption that the
improvement of organizational knowledge will lead to improved per-
formance, are subject to individual scrutiny, but none of them is in
conflict with another.
Testabi 1 ity . Whereas the other conclusions discussed to this point are
essentially by-products and indications which grew out of the theory
building or the research, the issue of testability represents the heart
of the project. The purpose of this study was to find out if the ele-
ments of the model could be investigated--and therefore tested--
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simple methodology and a single organization as a sample case, each
element of the model--the dominant coalition, the organizational
knowledge base, and the organizational learning processes--was
successfully uncovered. This means that the groundwork is there for
future research, research that can be designed to test discreet and
specific hypotheses.
Dominant coalitions can be more fully examined in terms of the
importance of stability of membership, of breadth of membership, or
other factors. Similarly, as has already been suggested, the various
components of an organizational knowledge base could be identified and
attributed different degrees of importance. Various different ap-
proaches to organizational learning could also be identified,
categorized, and evaluated. These various suggestions should not be
viewed lightly—they are undertakings of immense complexity; but this
project has shown that the core elements of the organizational learning
model are discoverable, and the strong contention has been made that
they are worth investigating. Furthermore, the testability of the
organizational learning model can be enhanced through the use of oper-
ational definitions for organizational phenomena, such as the defini-
tions pertaining to political activity provided by MacMillan (1978).
Usefulness . The primary reason for undertaking a study with the under-
lying complexity and methodological problems of this one was the per-
ceived usefulness of the theory. The project has offered a preliminary
affirmation of that perception, but the ultimate usefulness of the model
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remains to be validated. On the face of it, the model offers a very
significant theoretical and practical contribution.
Theoretically, as has been pointed out repeatedly, this model pro-
vides a basis for integration of various important but previously dis-
connected ideas in the literature. In the professional ranks of
organizational and management academicians, just as in most organiza-
tions, most people are specialists. The decision theorists do not
necessarily interact with the planning theorists or with the information
systems specialists. This model could potentially provide a means of
integrating the products of these disparate interests.
The practical benefits of the model are easier to see. The de-
scription of a learning organization provided by the model gives active
managers a picture of a desirable outcome without necessarily making de-
mands for speci ficchanges of personal style or of organizational
structure. Furthermore, because the propositions of the model are
testable, a manager can determine whether or not organizational learning
is happening. Finally, it is performance oriented rather than value
based; it is less concerned with individual behavior than it is with the
basis for informed action at the top of the organization. It does not
replace other models, except perhaps those that insist that human
behavior be more rational not as a result of organizational action but
as a precursor to it. It permits the managers to use approaches that
fit their own styles to answer the central question posed by the model
to practitioners, "Are we developing a progressively more valid shared
knowledge base to inform our long-term decision making?" If the answer
is "no," the model gives some indications as to why that might be.
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Summary
. As with any new theory, where little supporting research has
been conducted, there are gaps and unanswered questions about the value
of the model. The most critical of these is, "Does it really focus on
the internal determinants of organizational performance?" It is far too
soon to venture a definitive answer to that question, but there are
indications--theoretical
,
anecdotal, and 1 ogical--that it does. Given
the relative absence of other convincing models to explain organiza-
tional effectiveness, this is a very hopeful contribution.
This study has shown the model to be: broad enough to account for
a wide range of phenomena; simple and direct enough to offer clear ex-
planations; rooted enough to the behavioral reality of organizations to
have both analytic and heuristic value; internally consistent; oper-
ational enough in its conceptualizations to be testable; and promising
enough to be worth further investigation. There are questions to be an-
swered, refinements and specifications to be made, in each of these
areas, however. This study was conducted to see whether further re-
search would be productive or worthwhile. It is definitely merited on
the basis of the results.
Recommendations for Further Research
In the case of a model so recently developed, there is no end to
the various research efforts which are needed to test, refine, and add
to this bare theoretical base. In general there are two general
directions in which the research should proceed. The first direction
might be loosely modeled on the case study described herein or on
similar projects, such as those conducted by Gabarro (1979), Jelinek
155
(1979), Murray (1976), or Pettigrew (1973). These studies would be
efforts to investigate specific elements of the model in more detail.
The second productive avenue for research would be very different,
modeled more on the Pierce and Del berg (1977) study where a number of
organizations were surveyed for both outcomes and factors viewed as
.contributing to those outcomes. Comparative survey research could go
far in establishing both the general izabil ity of the model and also the
correlation between organizational learning and certain standard mea-
sures of effectiveness, such as return on assets in business organiza-
tions.
Detailed analysis of specific factors could be designed to answer
a host of relevant questions. Gabarro (1979) charted through interviews
over three years the interpersonal relationships developed between new
chief executive officers and their immediate subordinates. Jelinek
(1979) and Murray (1976) traced the process of institutionalization of
an innovative idea from the point of introduction to the point of
general
,
systematic enactment of that core idea through routine admin-
istrative and control systems. Similar efforts could be made to test
specific hypotheses concerning the nature of the formation and develop-
ment processes for a dominant coalition, the patterns and sequences of
organizational learning processes, and the relative importance of
different aspects of organizational knowledge. For example, an attempt
could be made to test certain hypotheses related to dominant coalition
characteristics as "necessary but not sufficient' conditions for
organizational learning. As Figure 8 indicates, coalitions might be
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DOMINANT COALITION CHARACTERISTICS
Fig. 8. Inquiry into the link between these and
other charac-
teristics and organizational learning could serve as
one subject or
continued, intensive research.
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tested for stability, cohesion, communication, and productivity. Such
research could test and yield subtheories, many of which have already
been developed with a body of research to support them, which could be
now integrated into the organizational learning model. The interview
schedule developed for this project would provide a methodological
starting point for such inquiry.
The more pressing direction for research of the model, and for
organizational research in general, is in the survey, comparative area.
Once a model, such as the organizational learning model, has been de-
veloped, only this approach to research offers the possibility of truly
establishing the correlation between organizational learning and
effectiveness. It also offers, when samples are sufficiently large, the
chance to correlate the existence of organizational learning with cer-
tain industries, certain organizational structures, or certain types of
educational background for dominant coalition members. Such research
would provide broad new questions and issues to be the subjects of
intensive, case study style projects. More importantly, only this type
of research offers hope of settling any of the theoretical issues which
make management theory the confusing tangle of conflicting theories,
assumptions, and definitions that it is.
Examples of such a research design will give an indication of the
substantial benefits that might result. The farm equipment industry is
the domain of fairly few firms, a few giants such as A1 li s-Chalmers,
John Deere, Massey Ferguson, International Harvester, and a range of
much smaller, more specialized companies. It is also an industry where
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the performance results are largely a matter of the public record.
Historical information on the companies could be gathered easily--given
the research resources, which would have to be substantial --and then a
survey could be conducted, necessitating of course the cooperation of
the chief executive officers of each company. Such a survey could probe
the composition of the dominant coalition in each company, the areas of
organizational knowledge which are defined clearly or vaguely, and the
processes through which performance is monitored and improved. The com-
parative results from a number of large organizations facing essentially
the same environment could go a long way in verifying the usefulness of
organizational learning as a contributing element toward organizational
effectiveness. Analysis of corporate histories, such as those provided
by Chandler (1962), give preliminary substantiation to the link between
organizational learning and effectiveness, but much more is needed.
Ideas about the importance of specific components of the model, such as
a clearly defined and consciously promoted paradigm or a well estab-
lished dominant coalition, could also be tested in a more substantive
way.
Similarly, a survey could be conducted for a number of urban ele-
mentary schools in the same system. A number of performance indices
could be collected at the same time as information about coalitions,
political activity, and organizational learning processes; anonymity of
individual schools could be protected to insure cooperation. Such an
extensive body of data, once gathered, could be used to answer a number
of questions related to the model, such as: "Does formal planning
or
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any other specific structural factor or combination of factors correlate
with organizational performance indices?"; "Does the presence of a well
established and stable dominant coalition correlate with decreased
political activity, increased organizational learning, or increased
performance?"
There is one aspect of research into the model which is vital.
The model is a long-term one, and hence, some historical or longitudinal
component is a necessity of meaningful tests of the model.
In summary, there are myriad options for productive research as a
sequel to the study described here. The more desirable route, large
scale, comparative designs, also require extensive resources and access.
For this reason alone, intensive methodologies such as this project's,
may be the more likely avenue for gradual strengthening of the model.
Regardless of the specific methodology, however, more research is needed
to verify the encouraging results of this preliminary step.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Schedules
This appendix contains the two interview schedules used as the
primary data gathering tools of the project. The first schedule, the
"Initial Interview Schedule," was used for six interviews which required
about two hours to complete. These interviews were subsequently fol-
lowed up with a few specific questions that, after the tapes were
transcribed, needed to be clarified or elaborated.
Initial Interview Schedule
INTRODUCTION: This interview format is to be unstructured, free flowing
with a premium placed on getting the information in the language and
points of emphasis of the interviewee. The specific questions are
designed to answer three fundamental questions.
1) Who is the dominant coalition?
2) What is the present stat e of organizational knowledge?
3) How is this knowledge base developed by members of the
dominant coalition?
ORIENTATION:
- What are the most critical things you do in your role?
- With whom do you communicate most often to do your job?
- What would you say your major contribution to this organization is
or has been?
DOMINANT COALITION:
- Who are the people that determine the future of this company?
- Is this a clear cut and stable group in the organization or does
it vary?
- If it changes, how and under what circumstances does it change?
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- Who are the most powerful members of this group in terms of
shaping future directions? Who are the less powerful members who
nonetheless still have a voice?
- What is the basis for different degrees of power among the members
of this directing group?
- Who makes the decisions concerning long-term strategies? interim
objectives? resource allocation?
- How are these decisions and plans developed and finalizes?
- Who participates in monitoring, changing, or developing these
pi ans over time?
- What criteria are applied in this process?
ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE:
Questions in each area beyond would follow what Kerlinger (1973)
calls a funnel pattern--begi nning with very general, open-ended ques-
tions and then getting more specific. The distinction between private
perceptions and public knowledge is key here.
Standard prompts: - What is the basis for your response?
- Do you think other managers would agree with your
statement?
- Has this perception been openly discussed?
actively developed? Who participates in such
di scussions?
A. Planning and Strategy:
- Where is this organization headed in the next 5-10 years?
- How has this set of goals been developed? Were you included?
- What are the major goals and objectives for this year? What
specific strategies are you using or planning to use to accomplish
them?
- Do you have specific responsibilities in terms of these long-term
strategies? Do you know how your functions fit with those of
others?
- What major changes have affected this organization in the last 3
years? What was their impact?
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- In the next five years, what major changes and trends in social
,
technological, economic, and political conditions do you expect to
have the most impact on your organization? What will this impact
be?
- How would you describe the basic purpose of this organization?
- Evaluating planning process. Changes? specific strengths and
weaknesses of plan produced by this process?
B. Performance:
- How would you describe the performance of this organization over
the past few years?
- How does this performance get measured? Is it accurately
measured?
- What does this organization do particularly well?
- What does this organization do particularly poorly?
C. Management Philosophy, Orientation toward Organization Members:
- What is the general style of management in this organization?
- How does individual performance get appraised? rewarded?
- Is there an "official" management philosophy? Does it function in
practice?
- Are there organizational systems designed to support this
philosophy, e.g., training and development programs?
D. Communication and Information Flow:
- How would describe the flow of information in this organization?
- Are there specific subjects you feel must not be discussed? What
subjects? What would happen if they were discussed?
- Do you know about problems/projects other people are dealing with?
- Is there an "official" policy or philosophy about communication in
this organization? How does it work in practice?
- How do you get information on the performance of this
organization?
- How do you get information on your own performance?
E, Customer Orientation:
- What is the general attitude among managers here toward the
consumers of your products?
- Do you think customers are satisfied with your product and
services?
- Is there an official policy or set of guidelines for dealing with
customers?
- What kinds of feedback, if any, do you get from customers? How do
you get it? Is it used?
F. Financial Orientation:
- What are the general attitudes of top managers in relation to
profitability? cost effectiveness? cost control?
- Are these issues openly discussed?
- Is information on performance in these terms available to
everyone? On every project?
6. Orientation of Individuals toward the Organization:
- How do you feel about this organization as a place to work?
- Have certain events in the last few years had a major impact on
your view of and understanding of this organization?
- Do you think your feelings are typical or unusual?
- Are such perceptions openly discussed?
- What specific aspects of organizational life make you feel this
way?
- How would you characterize the overall atmosphere or climate
around this organization?
- How would you assess the general level of morale? job
satisfaction?
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING PRX ESSES
"We've talked about many aspects of life in this organization.
You've mentioned X, Y, and Z statements which you think are generally
agreed upon by members of the top management team. Is there anything
else you can tell me about how this agreement is built?"
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- Are specific ideas recognized as crucial and publicly promoted?
- How are these central ideas developed? changed?
- Who participates in this process? How does it happen?
- When you were new to the organization, how did you learn them?
When or if you find a contradiction in some area (e.g., management
reward systems not reinforcing these ideas), what do yo do?
The second interview schedule was used in a second round of
interviews which included four other participants in addition to the
original six. This round included ten of the eleven original members of
the task force convened by President Strattner in 1972 to develop the
first formal long-range plan for Berkshire Life. This task force was
chosen as the critical historical incident for investigation as part of
the study.
Historical Incident Interview Schedule: The Initiation of
Long-range Planning
Background: What were the significant events leading up to the
institution of a formal planning process?
The Event: Describe any events or moments you remember in that
process as being particularly important or revealing
to you?
Who were (and have been) the "prime movers" behind
the planning process?
Retrospective
Analysis: Has anything happened since the beginning of formal
planning process to alter your perception of it?
How, if at all did top management behavior change as
a result of the planning process? Their
effectiveness?
I
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What have been the most important results of the
formal planning process?
What have been the most important results of the
formal planning process?
How would you evaluate the planning process today?
What significant changes in it would you make? Why?
The general approach to this format was very similar to that of the
first round of interviews. Respondents were encouraged to elaborate and
draw connections which were important to them.
APPENDIX B
ANALYSIS OF PUBLISHED CASES
There are many tests of a theory: consistency, both internal and
within the broader framework of accepted scientific truth; parsimony or
economy; extensivity; specificity; and empirical validity. Of these,
Chapter II concentrated on the first in the list above, on demonstrating
that this model of organizational learning is both internally coherent
and in substantial harmony with a large body of the prior theorizing on
organizations. It was also shown how this theory brings together
diverse themes in the 1 i terature--pol itical behavior within organiza-
tions; organization decision-making and information utilization; organ-
izational learning; and individual learning--in useful and economical
and relevant ways. Each component of the model--organizational knowl-
edge, paradigm, and the dominant coalition—has been independently
addressed as well as integrated into the larger model, each one a neces-
sary but insufficient aspect of organizational life, when considered in
isolation, to account for organizational learning. This Appendix is
based on a body of literature quite separate from the ones reviewed to
this point, the literature of case histories and illustrative examples.
These cases have often been prepared to demonstrate very different
theories than the one proposed here. Yet, the writer has not discovered
a single case, either in the literature or in direct experience of many
organizations, which could not be usefully analyzed in terms of this
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model of organizational learning. This addition to the main body of the
study is a review of several of such cases drawn from various sources
and analyzed in terms of the organizational learning model. This type
of comprehensive validation, where all aspects of the theory are tested
against real situations, was a meaningful prelude to field research.
Unless the model held up when applied in such a sample, unless the
abstract concepts brought order to the relatively tame world of written
cases, there was little hope for it in the jarring world of direct
experience.
A first example is the history of Texas Instruments, a corporation
recognized in diverse sources as a remarkably innovative and adaptive
organization (Dowling, 1979; McClellan, 1978; McKinsey and Co., 1980).
In an interview (Dowling, 1 979), Patrick Haggerty, the retiring chair-
man, credited the consistent record of organization and product inno-
vation to comprehensive planning. Long-range planning has been a regu-
lar procedure since 1952, formally institutionalized after the economic
crunch of 1961-62 created unprecedented problems for the company follow-
ing the exponential growth of the 1950s. Today, a five-day "strategic
planning conference" attended by four hundred top managers produces a
thirty page document with quantifiable and monitorable return on asset
goals as well as an update on company philosophy including: attitudes
toward customers, suppliers, and employees; ethics; stress on technology
and innovation; and the "three basic functions--create, make, and mar-
ket," any of which can be the seat of innovation. Within these broad
outlines specific objectives and strategies are mapped out with a
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manager assigned tx) each (p. 43). In a separate but related planning
process, every "product center" manager must submit a ten-year plan with
oach year's budget request, which is the only way proposed innovations
get funded. It is hard to imagine a clearer example of the generation
of organizational knowledge within the context of a consciously held and
promoted organizational paradigm. Haggerty stresses planning again and
again, saying it is so important that there isjio separate planning
department; every manager participates and performance in planning is a
crucial aspect of evaluation and reward systems.
As for the dominant coalition, it must be intuitively obvious that
this organization is directed by a group that shares an orientation as
well as a knowledge base and that they clearly direct the organization
toward "intended future domains." Haggerty describes those men who
founded TI, two others and himself, of whom he is the last to retire.
There is a stable board of directors which reviews all requests for in-
novation f unds--"strategic funding" in the terms of the TI budgeting
system- -and they allocate funding and other resources to a balanced
group of projects considering such factors as prospective pay-off time,
integration of the three basic functions, etc.
In this company, there is a crystal clear example of the whole
organizational learning model. A dominant coalition, until very re-
cently guided by the founders of the organization, shared a commitment
to technological innovation and a philosophy of organizing. From the
outset they concerned themselves with the development of consensual.
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communicable, and integrated understandings of action-outcome relation-
ships in every aspect of the business from employee relations to market-
ing processes. To serve the development of this knowledge, they insti-
tuted planning and budgeting processes which directly involve every
manager. This learning is truly organizational, conscious and delib-
erate within a guiding paradigm.
The Levi-Strauss Company, although in a more mundane business,
provides a similarly clear example. Here, the dominant coalition is
even more obvious, four members of the Haas family and a brother-in-law
who have managed the company continuously since it was an essentially
local concern in the San Francisco area at the end of World War I. Over
that period the company has doubled its output approximately every five
years and grown to multinational size. Grether (1978) points to the
principles, both business and organizational, that have guided the com-
pany over all those years. Within these paradigmatic guidelines, such
as an emphasis on quality and maintenance of direct contact with re-
tailers (resulting in independence from chains and control over pric-
ing), the company has flexibly developed new applications of its basic
business and adapted successfully to many environmental shifts. A sin-
gle example is the shift from work clothes to leisure-casual wear that
accompanied the cultural shift first from manufacturing and agricultural
work to greater service employment and then toward greater informality
in clothing. There is no evidence at hand that Levi-Strauss management
has been innovative internally in the same sense that Texas Instruments
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has, creating unique budgeting or planning systems. They have, however,
consistently responded to new information about trends in the environ-
ment culled from close ties with retailers; they have consistently
emphasized executive recruitment and development as crucial components
of an overall plan; they have maintained extraordinarily peaceful labor
relations through employee stock purchase and profit sharing plans and
through careful attention and responsible commitment to relationships
with communities in which the company is located. In short, there is
and has been a paradigm that has provided a basis for the continual
development of an action-outcome knowledge base that served as the basis
for growth and entry into new domains.
In a very different approach to a case. Guest, Hersey, and Blan-
chard (1977) describe and analyze a situation in which a new plant man-
ager was introduced into a manufacturing plant that was plagued by prob-
lems and ranked worst along several dimensions relative to a group of
six very similar plants in a very large corporation. The replacement of
the manager with the new man, called Cooley in the case, was the only
significant shift in personnel within intra-organi zational and extra-
organizational environments that remained essentially unchanged. In
three years, the performance and the culture of the plant were sub-
stantially improved; Cooley's actions and success can be viewed quite
simply as an example of organizational learning according to the model,
even though the authors' emphasis is on Cooley's special role.
V
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Cooley's first steps were essentially political and paradigmatic.
At the dinner he was introduced to all the managers from the foreman
level up, seating patterns were arranged to disperse established coali-
tions that had sustained an intraplant atmosphere characterized by blam-
ing, suspicion and continual crisis. Cooley himself made a point of
mingling informally with all the managers, not staying close to his su-
perior or the top plant personnel. In a series of formal and informal
meetings immediately following his arrival he continued to lay the basis
for both a dominant coalition and for the development of organizational
knowledge within the context of a very different managerial philosophy
than that of his predecessor. Quoting Cooley:
I saw that the organization needed a long range program spelled out
in writing and reviewed with the department heads, the staff, and
the superintendents. They needed to be in agreement on something
that was realizable and tangible and practical. It had to come from
the whole organization and be explained to the whole organization.
. . . Then we had to start moving on it (emphasis added, p. 8^).
Although less remarkable than the Texas Instruments "strategic planning
conference," it is hard to imagine a more direct and simple statement
confirming the commitment to the development of action-outcome relation-
ships ("tangible and practical") which are consensual ("They needed to
be in agreement"), communicable ("explained to the whole organization"),
and integrated ("it had to come from the whole organization").
There is no need here to detail all the changes that Cooley insti-
tuted that slowly reverberated through the behaviors and attitudes of
almost everyone in the system. It is, however, worth quoting a single
staff member to show how it appears to a single individual to be
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included in the organizational learning process as a member of the domi-
nant coalition. Quoting the comptroller:
. . . Cooley told me right off that he felt that our department
could be a lot more helpful to the operating people and the service
departments. In fact, , , , Matt would frequently come up and grab
me and tell me we were going to take a walk through the plant, , . .
I spent a lot of time talking not only to the department heads and
the superintendents, but with the general foremen and all other
foremen as wel 1 , , , it became apparent that, although they got to
understand how the information on efficiency and costs and other
things was constructed, they were not necessarily the type of infor-
mation which would be useful to them in their day-to-day work , , ,
when you really got the foremen to open up, they thought that some
of our figures were lying. The figures in themselves were not
wrong, but they certainly weren't useful to them, which amounts to
about the same thing , , , some of these factors were beyond [the
foreman's] control. Yet he was being punished for them, , , , We
worked for a long time figuring up a formula which the foremen and
general foremen and superintendent could use to analyze figures
quickly, , , , Next, we got all of supervision in and presented the
idea to them, showing that the idea had basically come from our
talks with them , , ,
We would observe the operations themselves to see why the changes
needed to be made. Even though I didn't know much about the opera-
tions themselves, I was always asked ny opinion. My job, of course,
was to work up the information to be submitted to the division for
money outlays. It meant a lot more to us in writing up the request
for appropriations, when we had actual experience of seeing the
problem itself and in having a part in making suggestions. In other
words, we again got away from the business of sitting in an office
by ourselves. We were cut in on the deal (pp, 1 43-145),
Such an extensive quote shows first hand how organizational learn-
ing can take place, with the dual process of building a dominant coali-
tion and developing organizational knowledge taking place in a comple-
mentary way,
Alfred Chandler wrote something of a landmark work in business
history in which he details the development of the divisional
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organizational structure in American corporations (1962). He devotes a
lengthy chapter to each of four large corporations--DuPont
,
Sears,
Standard Oil of New Jersey, and General Motors--which independently
arrived at a divisional structure uniquely evolved to the special
demands they faced. Although Chandler's focus is on the relationship
between strategy and structure and on the role of innovative indivi-
duals, it was in reading these four historical cases that this writer
was first struck by how clearly the organizational learning model
explained differences in the rate and apparent effectiveness of organi-
zational adaptation,
DuPont, where throughout the period considered there was a stable
coalition of five or six individuals who emphasized specific directions
and objectives within a guiding framework, was much quicker to adapt to
environmental change and to innovate internally with new budgeting, con-
trol, or information systems. Sears and Standard Oil had nationally
prominent CEOs, but underneath them in the hierarchy there was less
stability or unity, with conflicting ideas about strategies, organiza-
tion, and philosophy. Chandler details how for more than ten years at
Standard Oil there was a conflict between older refinery directors and
newer, more managerial ly oriented men. The former maintained that
refining was more an art than an exact science and they were politically
entrenched, with the result that during that time Standard Oil went
without a uniform system of grading or quality control in its refinery
operations even though the younger men recommended it and documented the
need for it.
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All of the brief descriptions to this point are positive examples
of organizational learning, cases which may be expected to uphold the
model. It is also be worthwhile to examine examples of organizations
that seem not to fit the model
,
but there are some general themes that
are worth mentioning that do not pertain directly to the model but which
shed light on organizational learning as it appears to happen in the
real world. First, as has been mentioned repeatedly, once a dominant
coalition is engaged in the process of developing organizational know-
ledge, quality of information on which to base decisions is not a prob-
lem. At Texas Instruments, General Motors, DuPont, and the Cooley
plant, information systems were developed as the gaps in information
were made apparent in the learning process. This did not happen spon-
taneously, however, which is the second key point. A crisis or serious
performance gap usually precipitated a large scale innovation internal-
ly. At DuPont it was the major threat of overcapacity following World
War I; at GM and TI and Sears, serious inventory control problems at a
time of economic recession made obvious the need for change; in Cooley's
plant, the obvious performance problems were responsible for the change
in leadership.
The whole model and these additional themes are borne out as well
by a general review of large corporate efforts to incorporate data pro-
cessing systems into overall corporate systems (Finch and Nolan, 1980).
The authors detail a developmental process which they have observed in
numerous settings. Data processing is introduced but not fully
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understood by the dominant coalition. This lack of integrative under-
standing on the part of either senior management or users within the
organization leads to the development of political coalitions. The
dominant coalition reasserts control over the data processing unit,
often with a resulting loss of DP leadership. As the control process
takes place, knowledge of DP and its possible contributions to the
organization is integrated after this knowledge is made acccessible and
communicable either by the DP leadership itself or through the use of
outside consultants. Oftentimes, the initial conflict resulting in the
assertion of control by the dominant coalition is the result of serious
performance gaps, such as DP cost overruns, etc. As the interdependen-
cies and action-outcome knowledge are clarified through the organiza-
tional learning process, DP is integrated into the overall organiza-
tional knowledge base and its relationship to long-term goal achievement
i s establ i shed.
A theory which explains why successful organizations succeed,
based on the idea of organizational learning, should also provide ex-
planation for organizations that fail to learn. Sheldon (1980) provides
an excellent example of just such an organization, although his theory
of organizational change is focused primarily on "paradigm" change. He
describes an innovative psychiatric hospital which was founded by four
psychiatrists committed to a newly developed, long-term treatment for
patients who had failed in other treatment settings. The hospital was
clinically and financially very successful for several years and
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developed a "culture" in which administrative functions were very de-
centralized. Traditional managerial and clinical roles were often
blurred by multiple functions, informality, and the fact that newcomers
usually required more than a year to learn the special therapeutic
approach employed, regardless of prior training. Because of the unique
environmental "fit" based on the type of patient, there was little
apparent need for organizational learning. Internal transition in the
form of departing leadership and external change, due to seriously re-
duced referrals because of insurance reluctance to fund long-term treat-
ment, coincided, however, and it looked as if the hsopital was going to
collapse. The response of the new leadership, which was not as politi-
cally or philosophically rooted in the organization as the founders had
been, was to bring in a managerial ly oriented administrator and a nurs-
ing director trained in a different therapeutic approach. The result
was a new short-term ward, and also high staff turnover, low morale and
serious conflict between coalitions representing different paradigms.
The new medical director was undercut in his efforts to institute
programmatic change.
Apparently with outside assistance, the members of the organiza-
tion were helped to see the incompatible norms which lay at the root of
the conflicts which were previously defined as interpersonal and theore-
tical. The solution was to create two separate divisions, one on the
old model with its own orientation, staff, and director, and one organ-
ized separately along fairly traditional lines. Sheldon glosses over
I
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this solution and it is difficult to determine its long run effect
beyond the immediate positive effects of reduced turnover and higher
moral e.
This single, major change is an excellent example of what Argyri s
and Schon (1978) would term "double loop learning" based on inquiry into
organizational norms. There is, however, no reason to believe that or-
ganizational learning will continue without further outside assistance
although there is really too little information provided on which to
base a prediction. It is clear that no organizational learning was tak-
ing place prior to the change; a widening performance gap was evident to
almost everyone in the organization but no effective adaptation was tak-
ing place, only deterioration. The dominant coalition was not estab-
lished. A new medical director made decisions which were obviously not
based in a consensual, communicable, integrated knowledge base of
action-outcome relationships. The external environment was adjusted to,
with the shift of one ward to a different patient population, but the
conditions under which that adjustment might be successful were neither
understood nor clearly sought. Without this base knowledge, there was
no hope of resolution of the destructive infighting between coalitions.
Olsen (March and Olsen, 1976) offers another, much more carefully
documented case in which an organization acted without learning or an
organizational knowledge base and thus failed to achieve its goal. An
innovative professional school in an American public university was
faced with the need to hire a dean when its charismatic founder and
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present dean announced his intention to resign. The resignation was an-
nounced in September to be effective in the following August. Olsen
points out that the dean had been the central figure in directing the
school both philosophically and practically. In the first faculty meet-
ing following the announcement, there was general agreement that a
strong leader from outside the school should be sought and that s/he
should be capable of continuing the school's progress toward national
prominence. A search committee, not including the dean, was formed with
this mission.
The outcome of the process was that through a rather helter-
skelter approach, the position was eventually offered to and refused by
ten outside people of varying reputation. The latter stage of this de-
bacle was marked by the generation and invitation of candidates in a
closed meeting between the dean and the chair of the search committee.
At that point, political accusations began to fly within the school and
a candidate was proposed by one of the three semi -autonomous programs.
The search committee began to fall apart via the departure of the stu-
dent member and the highly charged and well publicized resignation of
one member. In the end, the Vice-Chancellor chose the chairman of the
search committee as the new dean with the assumed but covert support of
the resigning dean; a majority vote by the faculty for another candidate
from inside the school was overruled.
Olsen breaks the subsequent events into three phases, "the search
committee-centered phase," "the dean-centered phase," and the
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Vi C6-Chanc6l 1 or-C6n t6rGd phasG." Hg analyzGS thGSG with a gGPGral Em-
phasis on thG impact various typos of ambiguity sGomod to havG on tho
dGcision procGSS and ho applios throG modols of docision making--thG
rational, tho bargaining, and tho arti factual whoroin tho docision just
happons, usually duG to a doadlino, and is rational izod aftor tho fact.
Olson's contontion is that oach of thoso modols is most ofton doscrip-
tivG of dGCision procGSSGS charactorizod by contain dogroos of ambigu-
ity, G.g., sincG tho mombors of tho soarch committoG woro not cl oar
about Githor thoir spocific critoria or goals for candidatos and sinco
thoy woro not suro thoir docision would actually bo onactod, this am-
biguity lod to a paralysis and ovontual failuro to mako a cloar rGcom-
mondation to tho VicG-Chancol 1 or prior to tho doan's intorvontion.
Olson's analysis is intorosting, but is is moro doscriptivG than
Gxpl anatory.
Tho dGcisions did not fail to bo mado offoctivoly bocauso tho
various olomonts of tho situation woro ambiguous. Tho ambiguous
Glomonts romainod ambiguous bocauso : (a) no dominant coalition was
ablG to cloarly ostablish itsolf indopondont of tho old doan, and his
dominant coalition novor coasod to function but ves not part of tho
formal docision procoss; (b) no action-outcomo rolationshi ps concorning
any aspoct of tho docision procoss or its intondod outcomo woro ovor
GStabl i shod and sharod; thoro was not ovon a hint of a communicabl o, i n-
togratod, and consonsual knolwodgo basG--at loast publicly (a quostion-
nairo sont to tho faculty showod that most of thorn assumod tho doan
would pick his succossor aftor soliciting whatovor input ho dosirod);
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and, finally, (c) with the possible exception of the dean's influence,
which was largely concealed, there was no political base within the
faculty and no clearly established coalitions, except within the three
loosely knit programs, which could have served as the basis for a domi-
nant coalition and the subsequent development of organizational knowl-
edge; hence, it might have taken some period of time for organizational
learning to begin and the Vice-Chancellor's deadline did not accommodate
that lengthy political process of waiting for a coalition or coalition
of coalitions to emerge.
An alternative interpretation neither disconfirmed nor substanti-
ated by Olsen's extensive data is that the dominant coalition, repre-
sented by the dean and the chair of the search committee, did in fact
engage in organizational learning and at the very least exercised suf-
ficient political clout to have their final decision accepted by the
Vice-Chancellor in spite of a majority vote by the faculty for another
candidate. This interpretation is still in line with the conclusion
drawn from the model; namely that organizational learning did not take
place without the necessary components of a dominant coalition and
publicly generated organizational knowledge.
The final, and in many ways the most complex, case is drawn from
Pettigrew's booklength study of a major innovative decision, the pur-
chase of a new and considerably larger computer system, in a large re-
tail firm (1973). Beyond the case itself, this work is of particular
interest because it is the product of a research project which, while
more extensive, is very similar to the one described in this paper.
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Pettigrew's focus is not on the director level of the firm but on
the computer operations and implementation unit, called the "Management
Services Department." Still the decision he studied was made at the di-
rector level and therefore clearly involved organizational learning
within both the overall dominant coalition and also the single Manage-
ment Services Department. He is also not concerned with organizational
learning but rather with the patterns of specialization and interdepen-
dence that lead to disparity of goals within an organization and with
the social processes that are used to acquire and maintain power to
achieve those personal or subgroup goals.
Specifically, Pettigrew describes the rise of specialization in
the area of computer operations at Brian Michales. Because of the rel-
atively primitive state of technology, the lack of organized knowledge
about its commercial application, and the great market demand for pro-
grammers in the mid-to-late 1950s, the programmers established a subunit
within the organization that defied efforts to control or integrate it
either behavioral ly or philosophically. Even after this technological
expertise was generally available to the firm, the programmers main-
tained their power base through secrecy, denial of the competence of
others--especi al ly the newly hired and particularly threatening systems
analysts, control over training and recruitment policies, and "protec-
tive myths" such as their alleged inability to predict the time certain
functions would require.
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Th6 special power of this subunit was eventually overcome by
Kenny, a manager who served as liaison to the board for computer opera-
tions. His particular techniques for achieving this control were to:
(a) reorganize the programming section and separate geographically the
system development and operator functions so that knowledge previously
kept secret had to be publicly systematized; (b) to make programming one
equal subunit of a larger unit called "Management Services" which he di-
rected, a move which utilized his power with board members to make him
the formal head of all computer related functions and made him the con-
duit for all regular communication between top management and the pro-
grammers; and, (c) he enlisted programming assistance, from the computer
manufacturer, which demonstrated to both management and the programmers
that their technical expertise was no longer quite so special as it had
been at an earlier stage in technological development. Following these
changes, Kenny was able to prevail over the technical staff in the
choice of manufacturers for the next computer whereas the technicians
had always swayed the managing board before. Although the programmers
still maintained a significantly greater level of organizational power
than was typical of programming units in Britain at that time, Kenny had
cemented his control over the future direction of the computer opera-
tions and applications in the firm.
This very detailed account is useful because it illustrates both
learning and failure to learn within a specific organizational setting.
The limitations are perhaps most apparent. The programmers' collective
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effort to maintain their independence in the firm led them to withhold
information and to retard the integration of their expertise into over-
all organizational knowledge and resource bases. Similarly, because
Kenny felt he had to assert and maintain control over the programmers in
order to maintain influence, he emphasized the importance of a working
relationship with the manufacturer of the present computer system--a
source of power for him in the past--over technical factors which might
have led to the selection of a new manufacturer. His control of infor-
mation clearly constrained the range of options considered by the board
and the technical information the programmers might have been able to
contribute to the decision.
At the same time, the example shows very clearly that the dominant
coal i tion--true to the form proposed by Nolan and Finch (1980)- -asserted
control over the data processing coalition through the imposition and
support of "their man," Kenny. Furthermore, despite the limitations
that Kenny felt he had to enact in order to "win" against the program-
mers, he also clearly assisted the board in developing a more complete
organizational knowledge base as regarded the DP functions and applica-
tions. His requirements within the Management Services Department also
resulted in public exchanges and systematized knowledge that was instru-
mental in freeing the company from unnecessary and unwarranted depen-
dence on the clique among the programmers.
Finally, to the extent that Pettigrew attained information about
the functioning of the managing board, his findings clearly illustrate
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the usefulness of the model. The programmers were originally so dis-
tinct because they were not sharing an otherwise thoroughly founded
organizational paradigm. Part of that paradigm Involved competition
between the furniture and clothing divisions, even to the point of
Intra-company "spies" between divisions, so that Integration of new
knowledge concerning computer applications was slow to be Integrated.
The managing directors were not considered a group by either Kenny or
the programming director, so that their Individual knowledge was often
not shared and tended to be based as much on personal. Individual con-
tacts with Kenny or the programmers as on clearly formulated Inquiry
Into questions or decisions bearing on the Issue. This tended to make
them even more dependent on Kenny's decision about what was relevant
Information than they might have been had they been unified and
proactive In their search for valid knowledge.
This case Is perhaps the most useful one in that It demonstrates
both the learning process and the limitations on the learning process
predicted by the model. Further, It gives through Its richness a real
sense of the political and technological contexts which shape a given
situation and the learning process within that situation.
APPENDIX C
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: A KEY TO
LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS
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Introduction
In recent years there have been numerous efforts to account for
organizational effectiveness, both in research work and in more
practically oriented literature. Theorists have made useful contri-
butions, such as the evolving emphasis on "fit" between organization
design and the environment, on contingency approaches to management, and
on the interrelatedness of strategy and structure. Much of the progress
of this search has been blocked, however, by an inability to reach any
meaningful agreement on what constitutes effectiveness. Questions arise
as to what criteria should be used to compare results that are in
themselves very difficult to measure or compare.
On a more practical level
,
these theoretical concerns are not so
troubling. Many business leaders and consultants have stressed the
characteristics of "healthy" and consistently successful companies. In
a particularly comprehensive project, McKinsey & Company surveyed those
firms which sustained above-average levels of profitability and innova-
tion over long periods of time. The research showed areas of remarkable
similarity in these firms:
1) a clear guiding philosophy, often identified with a single,
well-known individual or small, directing group;
2) a strong orientation to meet customer needs and maintain cus-
tomer satisfaction;
3) an emphasis on smallness and flexibility in internal organiza-
tion;
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4) strong internal accountabi i ty systems, even as rapid changes
take place;
5) careful attention to the development of people within the
organization; and,
6) thorough integration of various subsystems and subprocesses.
Similarly, other research has shown that planning is a vital element in
organizational success over long periods of time. Thus, there is an
emerging picture of factors which lead to sustained high-level perform-
ance.
The problem facing top managers, however, is how to combine and
refine these factors to meet the unique needs of a given organization.
Strategy theorists have stressed the need for this unique plan but have
offered only rational, flow-chart style formulas for achieving it.
There has been comparatively little attention to the actual processes
through which the leaders of an organization shape its future direc-
tions. There is consensus that this is a top management function, but
there is little guidance as to how to perform that function.
There is the unmistakable fact, however, that some organiza-
tions--some top management teams--do consistently improve their per-
formance over time; in short, these organizations learn. The project
proposed herein offers a top management team an opportunity to study its
own learning processes and hence to improve its effectiveness. In
accord with the research to date, the focus is on planning processes, on
the means by which top managers incorporate what they know of the past
and present into a direction for the future.
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What is Organizational Learning?
Organizational learning is the conscious and deliberate effort on
the part of top managers to extend their shared knowledge of the organi-
zation, of its unique environmental demands, and of the future direc-
tions which will insure its continued prosperity. Individuals may
extend their private knowledge; learning is only organizational, how-
ever, to the degree that those who shape the future of the organization
construct a vision of the company and its future that they consensually
accept and that is expressed in terms that are understandable and based
on information that is accessible to the entire planning team.
Preliminary research indicates the forum for such learning is most
often the strategic planning process, both formal and informal. These
efforts to grasp the effects of past organizational actions, to remedy
performance gaps, and to adapt to and benefit from environmental changes
create a knowledge base. This knowledge base includes understanding of
the ways various subsystems within the whole affect each other and of
the distinctive strengths or competitive advantages of the organization.
Finally, this process both shapes and is shaped by the culture or para-
digm of the firm. This paradigm is that framework of shared values and
assumptions which make every organization a unique entity, almost like
an individual's unique personality. An effective planning process
includes an awareness of this paradigm and the many ways it can either
reinforce or undermine the implementation of new plans.
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The Learning-Planning Cycle
Effectiveness over long periods of time is a function of
executive leadership; a single product or a growing market may lead to a
spurt of growth or profitability, but over long periods success is the
result of deliberate choices made by managers. Uncertainty and risk are
factors in every such decision or strategic choice, and the increasing
pace of technological, economic, and social change only accentuates this
uncertainty. These shifting circumstances make each day's events more
difficult to manage effectively even as they make long-range planning
more important. Only a top management team capable of learning and
extending its own knowledge base can hope to balance these conflicting
demands.
The beauty of a planning cycle is that the development of the
management team and the refinement of their plans for the firm become
reciprocal processes. As the planning team examines performance gaps,
solves problems, considers new projects, sets goals and monitors move-
ment toward them, a clearer understanding of the distinctive competen-
cies of the company is slowly built; at the same time, increasingly
specific knowledge of the market demands, threats, and emerging
opportunities is also built. In an interacting way, this more valid and
extensive knowledge base permits clearer role definition and accounta-
bility within the management team and, subsequently, at lower organiza-
tional levels.
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Top Management Team
Clearer roles, responsibilities.
More unified membership and
shared vision of the
future.
Examination of performance
gaps, use of new knowledge,
monitoring of progress
toward goals and objectives,
etc.
Organizational Knowledge
Clearer roles, responsibilities, and accountability serve as a basis
for a more effective and unified group at the top of the organization,
and one more capable in turn of increasing organizational knowledge and
implementing corporate strategy.
Brief Examples
Texas Instruments has compiled a remarkable record of consistent
and successful innovation. Patrick Haggerty attributes this record to
the extraordinarily wel 1 -developed strategic planning process undertaken
at TI every year. Four hundred managers are called together for four or
five days and produce a thirty-page document outlining the overall
philosophy of the company, long-term goals and intermediate steps to
attain them, specific project groups, assignment of direct manager
responsibility for each objective, etc. Projects do not get funded
unless they are approved by the top management team at the conclusion of
this process. This is perhaps the picture-perfect example of large
scale organizational learning. The origins of this process,
however.
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are a more typical example. In the mid-1950's, Haggerty and the two
founders of TI would regularly set aside time not only to develop goals,
but also to establish a basis for organizational action in every aspect
of the internal and external environment. They emphasized innovation in
marketing and production as well as in product development, and as a
result the entire company has been transformed--and is remarkably suc-
cessful. As the business grew, and outgrew the capacity of any indivi-
dual or small group to manage and direct, Haggerty developed the present
planning process as a way to duplicate and extend in an institutional
way the innovative approaches which had been only informally structured
originally; by meshing this new planning process with the resource
allocation process, he made it not simply desirable, but necessary for
project managers to plan.
Another striking example of the central role of coordinated
planning is the present effort being made to shift A.T.&T. from a
service oriented monopoly to a marketing oriented competitor in many of
its product areas. This is a redirection effort of mind-boggling
proportions, involving many of A.T.T.'s one million employees. In the
initial phase of this process, large numbers of managers were simply
retrained in a special program emphasizing marketing and the necessity
of new approaches in the organization; most of these retrained personnel
left the company, however, when their efforts to reorient subunits were
contradicted by an interlocking network of other factors, such as
compensation and incentive systems, organizational traditions, and a
lack of product flexibility. Now more comprehensively planned attempts
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are being made where new people and new skills are being combined with
new products, new incentives, and new organizational roles and
structures; there is also the realization that effecting this massive
shift will require years, if not decades. Only as planning cycles are
passed through repeatedly--! i ke the circular tightening of lug nuts on a
tire- -does a sound knowledge base get developed by an ever more
effective planning team.
A final example is Levi Strauss Co., a clothing manufacturer which
through horizontal expansion alone has managed to double its volume
about every five years since World War I. Across all those years, the
company has had stable leadership built around the members of the Haas
family. It has had a guiding strategy built around strong ties to
independent retailers, trademark protection, internal commitment to the
development of managerial and human resources, and of course, a
reputation for product quality. The management team of this company has
consistently adapted to upheavals and rapid environmental change and the
effects of rapid growth internally; their own explanation of that record
is a combination of flexibility in addressing specific problems within
the context of firm commitment to the essential principles of the
strategy, and of always working as a team, even over the generations.
Again, all the elements of the organizational learning model are here.
Why Host and Fund This Research Project ?
There a number of concrete ways in which a subject organization
might benefit from hosting and funding this project. First and most
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obviously, at tho end of the project there will be a comprehensive
report describing the organization in terms of the model of
organizational learning. This would include an analysis of planning
procedures, a description of the organizational knowledge base, and a
description of the presently employed means of increasing organizational
knowledge. Such a report could be a valuable foundation for efforts to
improve organizational learning. The researcher would be available to
help in the interpretation of the data and in use of the information to
guide action planning for increased effectiveness. This model can pro-
vide an on-going frame of reference for the top management team in its
attempts to deal effectively with rapid technological or environmental
change, and hence to improve the entire cyclical process of strategy
formulation, implementation, evaluation, and reformulation. Organiza-
tional learning provides the support and context for effective strategic
planni ng.
A focus on the final product of the research, however, is a lim-
ited view of the possible organizational rewards. Before the report is
ever written, the research will have required top executives to reflect
in rigorous ways on the fundamental aspects of the organization. In this
process of disciplined inquiry, stimulated by the presence of an out-
sider with fresh perspective, participants will be asked to examine:
1) the actual processes, and people, that determine the future of
the organization;
2) strategic planning, long-term goals, and interim objectives,
207
3) management style;
4) patterns of innovation within the organization;
5) communication and information flow; and, of course,
6) the processes through which organizational knowledge in each
of these areas is developed.
Such a process of in-depth inquiry will in and of itself provide new and
valuable ideas to improve organizational functioning. Clearly, the re-
search project would be an opportunity to improve the functioning of the
subject organization, an outcome congruent with the research goals. The
information generatod will be available to the members of the organiza-
tion for any productive use.
What Will the Research Entail ?
The initial phase of the research will consist entirely of in-
depth interviews, probably an hour or more in length, with all the
members of the planning team. At least the highest two organiza-
tional levels would be included here. In order to clarify certain
issues, brief follow-up interviews might also be included in the initial
stage.
The next stage in the research process would include a wider vari-
ety of research activities, generally designed to substantiate and en-
rich the results of the initial interviews. Oie technique at this stage
would be observation of meetings.
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Another approach will be the investigation of one or more histori-
cal incidents, probably ones that are mentioned spontaneously in the
course of the interviewing. This type of investigation is advantageous
in that consequences or results of a decision or event are already known
and hence a fuller picture can be attained. The final technique applied
in this study will be documentary analysis. This will involve a review
of company and departmental reports, agenda from meetings, formal
statements of goals, and evaluation reports of special projects or com-
mittees. At this point, the organization will obviously have to provide
access to documentary data.
Before the preparation of the final report, the research data will
also be presented for review to those who have contributed to the data
collection. The form of this review, either individually or in small
groups, will be determined later. This feedback procedure will be an
opportunity to check the accuracy and the validity of the earlier
findings, as well as to begin the effort to use the information to the
firm's benefit.
Every effort will be made to limit disruptions caused by the re-
search project, but of course it will require some flexibility within
the organization. In order to facilitate the research process and mini-
mize inconveniences and disruptions to both parties, a liaison person
within the organization should be assigned to assist in orienting the
researcher and in scheduling data gathering events.
Interviews will be taped to insure accuracy and to permit im-
provement of the methods through retrospective analysis, but individual
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responses will be held in strict confidence unless permission to share
the responses is given by the interviewee.
Naturally, no one outside the organization except the researcher's
doctoral committee will have access to any information and the organiza-
tion's identity can be withheld entirely from the disseration if so de-
sired. In general, the highest professional ethical standards will be
maintained. These standards can be explicitly discussed as part of a
contracting process.
Altogether, the project should require three to four months to
complete from the date of agreement to participate in the study to the
presentation of the final findings. The specific amount of researcher
or executive time needed, beyond that required for the initial round of
interviews, is very difficult to predict at this time due to the depen-
dence of later stages on the outcome of the first. Many of the later
techniques, e.g., observation, documentary analysis, will require no
time at all from organization executives, however.
Summarizing the last two sections, this research project would:
Offer to the host organization:
a) a final report describing
- the membership and functioning
of the planning team;
- the state of organizational
knowledge and strategic plan-
ning; and,
- the organizational learning
processes presently in use.
b) a structured process of inquiry
for all top executives into the
fundamental aspects of organiza-
tional functioning; and,
c) instruction in a model that the
planning team can use to guide
and improve its own functioning.
Require of the host organization:
a) executive time;
b) a research project liaison
person within the organization;
c) a research grant; and,
d) access to documents and records.
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Introduction
This report is the product of a research project conducted at
Berkshire Life Insurance Company. The project was based on a theoreti-
cal model of organizational learning, and a full description of the
model and of the research findings can be found in "An Inquiry into
Organizational Learning," a doctoral thesis written for the School of
Education at the University of Massachusetts.
The organizational learning model focuses on the ways in which the
top managers of an organization develop and improve the knowledge which
serves as the basis for their decision making. For the academic pur-
poses of the dissertation, the research included extensive documenta-
tion of who constitutes the "dominant coalition" at Berkshire Life, the
state of their shared knowledge base on a range of topics, and their
methods of refining that knowledge base. For the more practical con-
cerns of the company, the study focused primarily on the planning proc-
ess and the structures which support it. The results of the study are
presented here in four sections—one assessing the plan itself as pre-
sented in "Corporate Philosophy-Objectives-Policy-Strategy: Janaury 1,
1978"; one assessing the implementation of that plan; one assessing the
planning process as it has performed since the long-range planning task
force convened in 1972; and, one addressing two larger, "contextual
factors that are important to planning, and the company as a whole, in
the not too distant future.
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The Plan
A critically important aspect of the long-range plan is that it is
very clear in its delineation of policies and strategies in the two
"line" functions of the company--marketing and investments. Not only
are these performance areas spelled out in sufficient detail to provide
broad guidelines for organizational action but they have also remained
remarkably stable over the eight year life of the plan, except for the
ongoing revisions of numerical goals. Since marketing and investments
are the two functions which most directly determine the economic per-
formance of the company, it is fitting that they should also be the most
carefully spelled out.
Other performance areas of the company are not presented so
thoroughly. I have in mind such broad management concerns as general
management philosophy, goals and strategies for productivity improve-
ment, or explicit commitments in the area of corporate citizenship.
Although there was general agreement in the interviews about the actual
policies in some of these areas, there were other issues which were
addressed either not at all or only in vague terms. It is perhaps
worthwhile stressing again that these areas of management are not likely
to have as direct an impact on company performance, at least in the
short run, as do the line functions discussed above.
Several respondents also noted a certain level of abstraction in
the numerical goals expressed in the plan, calling them "incidental or
"arbitrary." Whereas the market definitions included in the plan
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provide clear operating priorities, the numbers were reported to have
only limited meaning or significance to those involved in departmental
planning. This lack of relevance was emphasized by the fact that little
apparent attention is given to forecasts or goals which are missed,
either above or below.
Implementation of the Plan
Overall, the implementation of the original plan has been excel-
lent and seems to be steadily improving. The recent economic perform-
ance of the company speaks for itself, and the benefits of this perform-
ance are being spread throughout the company. One result is that the
management areas described in the preceding section as only vaguely
elaborated are receiving additional attention.
The committee system provides an extremely effective method of
continuously monitoring and revising the specific tactics through which
the plan is implemented. This is especially true in the marketing area.
One very useful and important function which the committees and task
forces serve is the integrHion of diverse technical specialties.
Although the turbulent economic environment has made frequent
adjustments necessary in the investment area, the clarity of the invest-
ment goals has made performance in that area easy to monitor. Several
interviewees outside the investment area spoke in considerable detail
about performance in Investments.
Employee relations, productivity improvement, and issues of cor-
porate citizenship have been effectively addressed. They do not seem
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to be as thoroughly integrated, at least conceptually, as is the opera-
tional management of the line divisions. These are more difficult areas
of management in which to establish integrating ideas, but the search
for some larger integration might be informative and useful.
The Planning Process
The planning process has proven itself effective to this point.
One supportive structural component of the planning process is, again,
the use of committees which build planning into ongoing operational
decision making.
Since the original task force, planning beyond operational or
tactical issues has been increasingly centralized as a function of the
four senior officers. Other interview subjects expressed a feeling of
decreased involvement in overall corporate development. The discussion
of numerical goals was related to this issue, where some subjects said
that corporate numbers gave them little sense of what they should be
emphasizing more in their own work.
More importantly, those below the senior officer level almost
always mentioned contributions of the original task force over and above
the definition of a corporate direction. They usually described one or
more of a range of individual benefits they gained from participating.
Frequently mentioned learnings were:
-a new awareness of the "big picture" of the company;
-new knowledge about other company functions;
-new knowledge about the views and values of senior officers, and,
-insight into the considerable capacities of their colleagues.
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These learnings came largely as by-products of the planning process but
as by-products which have had a significant impact on the job perform-
ance of the individuals involved.
Important Larger Issues
First, not a single respondent expressed any indication that the
company needs to alter its basic strategy, in spite of a general recog-
nition of environmental threats. Two competitive threats mentioned by
almost everyone were new types of investment oriented products, which
both offer competition at present and may undermine the distribution
system long-term, and increasing numbers of new types of competitors.
Thus, while no change is viewed as necessary now, continued watchfulness
is necessary. It is evident that that watchfulness is present.
Second, most people mentioned Larry Strattner's approaching re-
tirement even though this was not a subject of questions in the inter-
views. Any type of leadership change causes uncertainty. This could be
especially true in this case because Larry's personal stj^le of leader-
ship was frequently described as the basis for the planning approach and
as the basis for and exemplification of corporate commitments to concern
for people and to communication of important company information.
Conclusions and Recommendations
No significant need for immediate change is indicated by the
results of this project. The company is obviously performing very well,
ongoing improvements are taking place, and morale seems very
high. The
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usefulness of planning as a communication and management development
tool has perhaps been underestimated in the past few years, but these
are long-term concerns which can be addressed in a gradual, evolutionary
way. I would recommend that more people be included in the long-range
planning process in the future. The ne;^t five year review might be such
an opportunity to formally expand discussion beyond the four senior
officers. Other approaches might be to convene task forces, not on the
long-range marketing or investment strategies, which seem to be clearly
understood, well accepted, and regularly reviewed, but on other issues
of corporate-wide concern. Examples might be some of those topics men-
tioned earl ier--general management philosophy, productivity improvement,
and corporate citizenship.
Unquestionably, Berkshire Life meets my criteria for a learning
organization. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance to
you in any way.
4 Will Ratliff
Doctoral Candidate
University of Massachusetts


